SANTA CLARA
COURT OF SANTA
Filed 7/26/10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., )
)
Petitioners, )
) S163681
v. )
) Ct.App.
6
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA ) No. H031540
CLARA COUNTY, )
) Santa Clara County
Respondent; ) Super. Ct. No.
CV 788657
)
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY )
et al., )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
__________________________ )
STORY CONTINUE
FROM PART I….
Our opinion in Clancy
recognized that the interests invoked in that case were akin to the vital
interests implicated in a criminal prosecution, and thus invocation of the
disqualification rules applicable to criminal prosecutors was justified. And if those rules are found to be equally
applicable in the case now before us, disqualification of the private attorneys
hired to assist the public entities similarly would be required.
As explained below, however, to the extent our
decision in Clancy suggested that
public-nuisance prosecutions always
invoke the same constitutional and institutional interests present in a
criminal case, our analysis was unnecessarily broad and failed to take into
account the wide spectrum of cases that fall within the public-nuisance
rubric. In the present case, both the
types of remedies sought and the types of interests implicated differ
significantly from those involved in Clancy
and, accordingly, invocation of the strict rules requiring the automatic
disqualification of criminal prosecutors is unwarranted.
The broad spectrum of public-nuisance law may implicate
both civil and criminal liability.[1] Indeed, public-nuisance actions vary widely,
as evidenced by Penal Code section 370, which broadly defines a public nuisance
as â€
| Description | A group of public entities composed of various California counties and cities (collectively referred to as the public entities) are prosecuting a public-nuisance action against numerous businesses that manufactured lead paint (collectively referred to as defendants). The public entities are represented both by their own government attorneys and by several private law firms. The private law firms are retained by the public entities on a contingent-fee basis. After summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants on various tort causes of action initially advanced by the public entities, the complaint eventually was amended to leave the public-nuisance action as the sole claim, and abatement as the sole remedy. Defendants moved to bar the public entities from compensating their privately retained counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying upon this court's decision in People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), ordered the public entities barred from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent-fee agreement, reasoning that under Clancy, all attorneys prosecuting public-nuisance actions must be †|
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