Sawyer v. Mercedes-Benz USA

Filed 7/20/07 Sawyer v. Mercedes-Benz USA CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Mercedes-Benz), appeals a judgment in favor of plaintiff Julie Sawyer on a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Warranty Act).[1] Sawyer was awarded $12,500 in damages for diminution in value of her car and an additional $37,524.53 in attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Mercedes-Benz asserts there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict, because the testimony at trial regarding the diminution in value lacked foundation. In addition, Mercedes-Benz seeks to reduce the attorney fees award.

Statement of the Fact and Case

Sawyer purchased a new 2003 Mercedes Benz SL500 in March 2003 that was manufactured and warranted by defendant. Sawyer experienced various problems with the car including defective a glove box, molding, center console, ash tray, visor, keyless entry, and SOS message, as well as squishy and squeaky breaks, streaky windows, engine surges, squeaks in the passenger door pocket, and discrepancy in the window height. Sawyer complained about these problems to defendant, and alleges defendant failed to repair them within a reasonable time or a reasonable number of attempts. As a result of, Sawyer filed a complaint under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code, section 1793.2 (Song-Beverly). In addition, Sawyer asserted a claim for breach of written and implied warranties under the federal Warranty Act.

As a result of the Song-Beverly allegations, Sawyer sought a refund of the purchase price of the car. Sawyer alternatively sought damages including diminished value as a result of the Warranty Act allegations.

The trial began on August 23, 2005. At trial, Robert Stork testified as an expert on the cars value due to its defects and repair history.

Stork was qualified as an expert based on his experience in the automotive industry that began in 1962. Stork has substantial education in various areas of the industry, including in excess of 50 classes over the span of his career, including college courses, extension courses, manufacturer and industry studies. In addition, Stork has a master certification from Automotive Service Excellence (ASE), a program that sets standards and certifies service technicians. From 1969-1981, Stork worked for Hartford Garage in New Harford, Iowa, where he ultimately purchased the dealership. While there, he worked as a wholesaler in the sales department of the dealership, where he would determine the value of cars for trade-ins. Stork testified he estimated the value of thousands of cars during his time at Harford, including Mercedes-Benz cars.

After serving as a car wholesaler, Stork began working as a lemon law arbitrator for the American Automobile Association (AAA). Since 1998, Stork has worked as an independent lemon law arbitrator for the National Center for Dispute Settlement.

Stork testified he evaluated the repair history of the car, as well as industry standard valuation guides. Specifically, Stork testified that he looked at the total cash price of the car, including the taxes and additional charges. Stork also reviewed Kelley Blue Book and the National Auto Dealers Association guide book. Based on Kelley Blue Book, looking at the make, model, year, mileage equipment and options, Stork testified the average retail value of the car was $88,460. Additionally, Stork reviewed the Kelley Blue Book, and determined the average trade-in value of the car with an undisclosed repair history was $72,925. Based on his experience, Stork opined that with a disclosed negative repair history that this car had, the value of the car would be diminished to $46,960. In arriving at the diminished figure, Stork testified that he reviewed the 17 repair orders, what procedures were used to complete the repairs and what the outcome was. Stork noted that there were several visits for the same concerns throughout the repair history of the car, and that such repair history affected the marketability of the car.

Based on his evaluation of the relevant factors, Stork estimated value of the car was diminished by $25,965.

Following three days of testimony, the jury reached its verdict, finding that the car had defects that substantially impaired the use, value or safety, but that the defects were repaired after a reasonable number of attempts. As a result, Sawyer did not receive damages or repurchase under Song-Beverly. Alternatively, the jury found the car contained defects and that the defects were not repaired in a reasonable number of attempts under the Warranty Act, and the jury awarded Sawyer damages in the amount of $12,500 for the diminished value of the car.

Following the trial, the court awarded Sawyer $37,524.53 in attorney fees and costs, reducing the requested amount of $70,138.17 by 46.5 percent.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

On appeal, defendant asserts there was not substantial evidence to support the jurys award of damages under the Warranty Act, because the expert testimony of diminished value lacked proper foundation. In addition, defendant asserts the trial courts award of attorney fees in the amount of $37,524.53 was an abuse of discretion.

With regard to the first issue, the parties dispute the nature of the claim. While defendant asserts the verdict lacked substantial evidence because the experts opinion lacked proper foundation, Sawyer asserts defendant is attacking the admissibility of the opinion, and therefore, is actually claiming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. Sawyer further claims defendant waived this issue by not properly objecting to the admissibility of the opinion in the trial court.

Because defendant bases its claim that the jurys award of damages for diminished value of the car lacked substantial evidence on the foundation for the experts opinion and therefore, should not have been admitted, we will treat it as an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Moreover, we do not deem the defendants claim waived, because defendant did move in limine to limit the experts testimony on diminution in value of the car, and therefore, we will consider it on the merits.

The primary basis of defendants argument that the experts testimony lacked foundation is that in opining to the jury about the diminution in the cars value, Stork did not inspect the car himself, relying instead on repair records and Kelley Blue Book values. Defendant asserts this was improper and did not provide adequate foundation.

Defendant relies primarily on Moran v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2005) 622 S.E.2d 439 (Moran), a Georgia Court of Appeals case that analyzed Georgia and federal law. In Moran, the court affirmed the trial courts decision to exclude expert testimony of a cars diminution in value based on repair records and Kelley Blue Book on the ground that the opinion lacked the applicable scientific bases for expert testimony. Citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 509 U.S. 579 (Daubert), the Moran court stated: [Daubert]provides guidance as to the admissibility of expert testimony and lists the following factors as relevant to the analysis: whether the specialized theory or technique has been or can be tested, the theorys general acceptance in the expert community, rate of error, and peer review. (Moran, supra, 622 S.E.2d at p.98, citing Daubert,supra, 509 U.S. at pp.593-594.) Because the expert in Moran was not relying on specific factors stated in Daubert, the Moran court concluded the opinion testimony was properly excluded.

By analogy, defendant asserts we should follow the analysis in Moran, and conclude that because Storks testimony was not based on the Daubert factors, it should have been excluded.

Notwithstanding the fact that Moran is a Georgia Court of Appeals case inapplicable to this jurisdiction, the fundamental problem with defendants argument is that Daubert and its guidance on expert testimony relate to scientific testimony. Storks testimony in the present case was based on his experience as an automobile wholesaler and appraiser, and related to what he knew about consumers and car dealers, not on a scientific method. In arriving at his opinion about the cars diminished value, Stork did not need to use scientific method; rather, he could rely on his experience in the field of car valuation to estimate the cars value based on its history.

In the case at bar, Stork testified in detail about the diminished value of the car based on his years of experience in the auto industry, as well as review of the repair records of the car and consultation with the Kelley Blue Book for comparable values. There was no need for Stork to inspect the vehicle itself, nor was there need for him to consult with Sawyer about the vehicle. Moreover, there was no need for Stork to employ a scientific method to his calculation of the diminished value. Storks testimony was properly admitted and was supported by adequate foundation. We find no error in the admission of his opinion on the diminished value of the car.

In addition to its claim of no foundation for the diminished value award, defendant also contends the court erred in awarding $37,524.53 in attorney fees and costs to Sawyer. Specifically, defendant asserts the court erred because it did not cut the fees request in half based on the success of only one of the two claims asserted by Sawyer; the fee award was too high because the case should have settled before trial but for Sawyers refusal to do so; and the hourly rate for Sawyers counsel of $325 was too high.

The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrongmeaning that it abused its discretion.[] [Citations.] It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court . . . . [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.)

Here, the trial court reduced the fees requested by Sawyer by 46.5 percent. This matter involved procedure leading to trial as well as a full jury trial, including the presentation of expert testimony on the diminution in value of the car that ultimately led to Sawyer prevailing on her Warranty Act claim against defendant. Given the trial courts discretion in these matters, coupled with the fact that the trial court substantially reduced the requested fees, we decline to find that the attorney fees awarded were an abuse of discretion or outside the bounds of reason.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

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RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

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PREMO, J.

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ELIA, J.

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[1] (15 U.S.C. 2301.)