Shaw v. Moore

Filed 3/22/06 Shaw v. Moore CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David L. Minning, Judge. Affirmed.

George M. Halimi for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Alfred Visco and Alfred Visco for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Frank G. Moore appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to correct clerical error or, in the alternative, to clarify an ambiguity in the judgment entered in Bette Shaw's action against him to quiet title to property. Moore contends he presented sufficient evidence the judgment contained a clerical error or an ambiguity that needed clarification and the trial court erred by denying his motion without refreshing its memory of the case to make such a determination. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Purchase of the Ridgeley Drive Residence

Moore and Shaw were romantically involved from 1980 through 2001. In 1986 the rental property on South Ridgeley Drive in Los Angeles in which Shaw had been living was offered for sale. Moore and Shaw entered into a bewildering series of transactions to effect the purchase of the property and then to attempt to obtain financing to remodel the residence.

Moore provided the entire $45,000 purchase price. The prior owner of the property executed two grant deeds: one conveyed a one-half interest in the property to Moore; the other a one-half interest to Shaw. At the close of escrow Shaw gave Moore a promissory note, dated May 12, 1986, for $22,500 secured by a deed of trust on her interest in the property. A short time later Moore executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the property to Shaw, apparently to permit Shaw to obtain a loan to finance a remodeling project. At the same time Shaw executed a second deed of trust, which indicated it was security for a second $22,500 promissory note (apparently also dated May 12, 1986) from Shaw to Moore. A few months thereafter Shaw executed another promissory note, once again dated May 12, 1986, for $45,000. This new promissory note was also secured by a deed of trust on the Ridgeley Drive residence. Approximately three years later, in September 1989, Shaw quitclaimed back to Moore a one-half interest in the property. A few months later she executed a second quitclaim deed, dated November 22, 1989, to Moore, again for a one-half interest in the property.

2. Shaw's Quiet Title Action Against Moore and Moore's Answer

On March 19, 2002 Shaw filed a verified complaint against Moore to quiet title to the Ridgeley Drive property alleging that, although she, at a minimum, owned half of the property, Moore was claiming sole ownership and attempting to oust her from the premises without compensating her. Shaw prayed for a judgment that she is the one-half owner of the property and that Moore has a one-half interest in the property. On May 15, 2002 Shaw filed the operative, verified first amended complaint, which clarified the legal description of the property. Moore answered the first amended complaint stating he had been granted by deed a one-half interest in the property and denying Shaw's allegations, except that he was trying to evict her from the property. Although alleging he had held title to a one-half interest, Moore prayed he be declared the property's sole owner.

3. The Trial and Judgment

A bench trial was conducted on June 30 and July 1, 2003.[1] After taking the matter under submission, on July 11, 2003 the trial court issued a minute order finding that title to the property â€