Simpson v. Barak
Filed 3/28/06 Simpson v. Barak CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
| GENE SIMPSON et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. RONALD S. BARAK et al., Defendants and Appellants. | B178411 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC282616) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ernest M. Hiroshige, Judge. Affirmed.
Baker, Keener & Nahra, Robert C. Baker and Daniel Patrick Leonard for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Ruel Walker, W. Ruel Walker; Makarem & Associates, Ronald W. Makarem and Marni B. Folinsky for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants and appellants Ronald S. Barak and the Law Officers of Ronald S. Barak (collectively Barak) and plaintiffs and respondents Gene Simpson and Donna Simpson (collectively the Simpsons) and their business, C&W Parking Corporation (C&W) arbitrated, among other issues, the issue of attorney fees due and owing to Barak for his representation of the Simpsons and C&W in a number of matters. The arbitrator voided the parties' hourly and contingency fee agreements and awarded Barak quantum meruit for the services performed.
Barak appeals from the trial court judgment confirming the arbitration award in favor of the Simpsons and C&W. Barak asserts that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in violation of section 1283.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure,[1] quoted below, by failing to determine all issues submitted. Barak also claims that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by determining issues not submitted to arbitration, as well as awarding the Simpsons attorney fees and interest.
Barak also asserts that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award in violation of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), quoted below, because the trial court's purported correction of the arbitration award necessarily affected the merits of the arbitrator's decision. Thus, according to Barak, the trial court was required to vacate the award pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4). For the reasons stated below, we find no error and affirm the judgment confirming the arbitration award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As noted in the Introduction, Barak claims that the judgment confirming the arbitration award must be reversed and vacated on a number of procedural grounds. Barak does not claim that the arbitrator's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence or otherwise erroneous. We mention this because Barak has supplied a limited record on appeal which included: (1) the Simpsons' complaint in superior court; (2) the Simpson's complaint in arbitration; (3) Barak's answer to the Simpsons' complaint in arbitration; (4) the Simpsons' notice of petition and petition to confirm the final arbitration award, including the final arbitration award; (5) Barak's objections to the petition to confirm the arbitration award; and (6) the order and judgment confirming the award.
Barak did not supply this court with a reporter's transcript of the arbitration proceedings. Thus, in this regard, given that the underlying facts are largely undisputed, we must take our factual summary primarily from the arbitrator's (Hon. Lester E. Olson, Retired), 100-page written decision entitled â€
