Singh v. Superior Court
















Filed 3/20/17 Singh v. Superior Court CA1/4







NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.




IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


“MISHYA” RIMPEL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Respondent.





A148451

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J16-00180)



This writ challenges a $250 sanctions order imposed on “Mishya” Rimpel Singh, a deputy public defender, for making a tardy request to continue a jurisdiction hearing in juvenile court. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County found good cause for the continuance, but nevertheless imposed the $250 sanction for Singh’s having filed an untimely request. We conclude the court based this sanctions order on a facially ambiguous local rule. Because Singh cannot be sanctioned for knowingly violating a rule that, by its terms, may or may not apply, we agree with Singh that imposing sanctions here was an abuse of discretion.
Now that the Superior Court has been called upon to take a position on what precise conduct it deems to be a violation of the rule, thus clarifying the ambiguity in application, the court has identified the offending conduct as Singh’s having sent an unprepared colleague to report on whether she intended to make a motion for a continuance. Separate and apart from the facial ambiguity of the rule involved, we see no substantial evidence to support the finding that Singh’s having sent someone to cover for her in making a status report to the court was a knowing violation.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and order the sanction reversed.
I. BACKGROUND
Singh is a deputy public defender for Contra Costa County. On March 9, 2016, she was scheduled to appear for jurisdiction hearings in two unrelated juvenile wardship matters in two different courtrooms. Singh had one appearance scheduled in the morning and the other at 1:30 p.m. That morning, the prosecutor on Singh’s afternoon case provided additional discovery via email. Based on this new discovery, Singh emailed the prosecutor, indicating that she would be seeking a continuance of the 1:30 p.m. hearing. Because she was tied up with her morning hearing, Singh sent another deputy public defender to inform the court of the need for a continuance. According to the court, Singh’s colleague was not definitive about whether a motion to continue would be necessary.
At 1:30 p.m., Singh made her afternoon appearance and filed a written motion to continue. The prosecutor provided additional discovery to Singh at 1:30 p.m. The court admonished Singh for not appearing personally during the morning to seek the continuance and noted that five witnesses, present as required for the 1:30 p.m. hearing, had been waiting unnecessarily. Singh explained the circumstances of her other hearing and her attempt to transmit the message via her colleague. The court found this was insufficient and issued an order to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. The court also found there was good cause for a continuance based on the late discovery.
At the subsequent order to show cause hearing, Singh apologized to the court and detailed her attempts to convey her intended message. The court responded, “You caused a great deal of trouble to a lot of people by your actions, and, pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure section] 177.5,[[1]] I am sanctioning you. I am fining you $250 . . . .” In the court’s Notice of Sanctions, the court found that Singh violated Contra Costa County Superior Court, Local Rules, rule 5.53 (local rule 5.53) by filing an untimely motion to continue a jurisdictional contest. The court then imposed sanctions for this violation under section 177.5.
Singh filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition challenging the order imposing sanctions against her. We summarily denied the petition. Singh filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which granted the petition and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our order denying Singh’s petition and to issue an alternative writ. We then issued an alternative writ ordering the Superior Court to vacate its sanctions order or show cause why the petition for writ of mandate should not be granted. The Superior Court elected not to vacate its sanctions order and, in response to our show cause directive, filed a brief in support of its order.
II. DISCUSSION

“We generally review orders for monetary sanctions under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] However, the proper interpretation of a statute or rule of court relied upon by the trial court as its authority to award sanctions is a question of law, which we review de novo.” (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452, citations omitted.) We may find an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s factual findings lacked substantial evidence or the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. (Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481–1482.)
Under section 177.5, “[a] judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification.” While section 177.5 does not require “willfulness” (People v. Tabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1311), it does require “a knowing violation of a valid order of the court without good cause or substantial justification.” (Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 726.) A “lawful court order” under section 177.5 includes a rule of court. (People v. Ward (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1527–1528; People v. Smith (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 869, 878, fn. 4 [“rules governing when and how continuance requests are to be made and what is necessary to support them may be promulgated by local rule or courtroom rule . . . , and any such rules may be enforced, where appropriate, by imposing monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 . . .” (citations omitted)].)
The sanction imposed on Singh was predicated on a violation of local rule 5.53(b), which states in relevant part: “A motion to continue the jurisdiction hearing in any proceeding shall be made and heard no less than two (2) court days before the jurisdiction hearing, after service of notice on the opposing party at least five (5) court days before the jurisdiction hearing. . . . The Court, however, may continue a jurisdiction hearing on motion of any party at the proceeding for good cause without the requirements of this subdivision being fulfilled. Untimely last minute continuances, without good cause, may be subject to sanctions.”[2]
The record here does not support a finding that Singh committed a knowing violation of this rule, for two reasons.
First, because local rule 5.53 is ambiguous on its face, Singh cannot be deemed to have knowingly violated it. The rule states that “[u]ntimely last minute continuances, without good cause, may be subject to sanctions.” (Local rule 5.53(b).) This opaque sentence leaves open not one, but three possible interpretations of sanctionable conduct: a late request that presents no good cause for a continuance; a request that presents no good cause for being late; or a request that fails on both counts. While counsel has a professional responsibility to be aware of all local rules (see Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 499), she cannot be expected to understand how to comply with an unclear rule of court. For a violation of a local rule to be “knowing,” counsel must be able to understand—in advance—what conduct the rule proscribes.
Because the rule applied here is unclear, and because the court expressly found Singh did present good cause for a continuance, we cannot conclude she committed a knowing violation. The Superior Court asks us to construe the language of local rule 5.53 in context, reading all parts of it together, but even if the court’s proffered interpretation is a textually permissible one, the fundamental issue here is whether Singh had fair notice she might be at risk of monetary sanctions for failing to convey her intentions to the court more clearly and more promptly on the morning of March 9. Because there is more than one reasonable reading of local rule 5.53(b), we think it fails to give fair notice of that risk.[3]
Second, apart from whether the local rule at issue was sufficiently clear, we discern no substantial evidence to support a finding that Singh knowingly violated it. The Superior Court contends sanctions were proper because Singh could have conveyed her message more clearly—either by appearing personally during the morning, or by sending a colleague with a clearer message—and because she later expressed contrition to the court for not doing so. But the fact that, in hindsight, Singh recognized she could have chosen a more effective means of communication, and that she apologized to the court for not doing so, provides no support for the sanctions award here. There is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, that Singh knowingly sent an unclear message about whether a continuance was necessary. If the miscommunication was inadvertent, which it appears to have been, then Singh cannot be found to have knowingly violated the rule.
The Superior Court’s position is that Singh may be faulted for failing to inform the court during the course of the morning, with certainty, that a continuance was going to be necessary. But the court did not find that her written motion submitted at the 1:30 p.m. hearing could have been filed earlier. Nor did the court find that she could have requested a continuance before she received the morning’s late discovery. All we have in the record here is Singh’s undisputed representation that she gave her colleague instructions to inform the court a continuance motion was coming. At worst, the record supports an inference that the message was garbled in translation by the lawyer who delivered it.
Imposing sanctions on Singh in these circumstances was not only harsh, but unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion.
III. DISPOSITION

Singh’s petition is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue compelling respondent court to vacate its order of March 30, 2016 imposing sanctions against Singh and directing that the money be refunded.







_________________________

Streeter, J.





We concur:





_________________________

Reardon, Acting P.J.





_________________________

Rivera, J.








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[1] All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
[2] In Welfare and Institutions Code section 682, the Legislature has also addressed the subject of continuance motions in juvenile court proceedings. That statute, which makes no mention of monetary sanctions for tardy motions, provides in pertinent part as follows: “(a) To continue any hearing relating to [juvenile court] proceedings . . . , regardless of the custody status of the minor, beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be heard, a written notice shall be filed and served on all parties to the proceeding at least two court days before the hearing sought to be continued, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing good cause for the continuance. [¶] (b) A continuance shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause . . . [¶] (c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision. However, unless the moving party shows good cause for failure to comply with those requirements, the court shall deny the motion.” Thus, by the terms of this statute, denial of a requested continuance is the only authorized sanction for “failure to comply” with the specified procedure for seeking one.
[3] Assuming local rule 5.53(b) is properly construed to authorize sanctions for the filing of a motion for a continuance at the 11th hour without good cause to explain the tardiness, even where the continuance motion is meritorious, Singh makes the further argument that the rule conflicts with Welfare and Institution Code section 682 and is therefore invalid as preempted. Seeing no need to reach that issue, we express no view on it.