Stigall v. Brown

Filed 4/13/07 Stigall v. Brown CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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Two separate final judgments in two separate actions seven years apart determined that appellant Arthur Stigall is not entitled to possession of real property in Sacramento known as 2841 Albatross Way (Albatross property). Nevertheless, Stigall filed a third action seeking possession of the property. This time, respondents Eddie and Tanya Brown obtained an order declaring Stigall a vexatious litigant and requiring him to furnish security in the amount of $20,000. When Stigall failed to furnish the security, the trial court dismissed the action. Stigall appeals from the judgment of dismissal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

We take judicial notice of our unpublished opinions in Stigalls two prior appeals regarding the Albatross property, which set out the factual background of this dispute:

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) advised Stigall in 1984 that he owed back taxes. In March 1989 the IRS recorded a federal tax lien against Stigall and his Albatross property for the back taxes. Stigall failed to pay the taxes, and in October 1993 Larry Scott, trustee of the Scott Family Trust, bought the Albatross property at a tax lien sale. When Stigall failed to redeem the property, the IRS gave Scott a deed to the property. (Scott v. Stigall (Dec. 23, 1996, C022435) [nonpub. opn.] slip opn. at pp. 4-5.)

Scott sued Stigall to quiet title to the Albatross property. The trial court entered judgment in Scotts favor in 1995. We affirmed the judgment on Stigalls appeal, rejecting Stigalls procedural challenges to the IRSs seizure of the property and imposition of the tax lien, and related contentions. (Scott v. Stigall, supra, slip opn. at pp. 3-4, 8, 11-13.) Our remittitur issued to the superior court on February 24, 1997.

Several years later, Stigall filed suit against the Browns, Scotts successors in interest, asserting that the IRSs deed of the real property to Scott, and Scotts subsequent quiet title judgment against Stigall, were void for various reasons, including because the IRS had filed a release of the tax lien in 1999. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Browns in part because the action was barred under principles of claim preclusion. (Stigall v. Brown (Feb. 20, 2004, C043791) [nonpub. opn.] slip opn. at pp. 1, 5-6.)

Stigall appealed, and we again affirmed the judgment. As relevant, we explained: It is evident that the present case arises from the same cause of action on which the plaintiff did not prevail--the previous quiet title litigation by a predecessor in interest of the present defendants. It is simply an effort by plaintiff Stigall to present yet another legal theory for the invalidity of the determination of delinquency, to the end of regaining possession of the realty. (Stigall v. Brown, supra, slip opn. at p. 5, fn. omitted.)

We also rejected Stigalls argument that the action was not barred by claim preclusion because the 1995 judgment was void, given the 1999 release of the IRS lien which allegedly voided the deed to Scott, and thus could be set aside at any time. We explained: The purported voidness of the directors deed, however, does not detract from the validity of the judgment. There is nothing on the face of the prior judgment demonstrating a lack of either subject matter jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction over the plaintiff, or a lack of notice to him of the litigation (to which he in any event submitted). The court therefore had the power to render judgment in 1995, even if it relied erroneously on a deed that the IRS subsequently admitted was void. [Citations.] Finally, we rejected Stigalls claims of extrinsic fraud, the only other basis for a claim that the otherwise proper judgment was void. (Stigall v. Brown, supra, slip opn. at pp. 6-7.) Our remittitur issued to the superior court on April 21, 2004.

Undeterred, Stigall filed a second complaint against the Browns in February 2005 to obtain possession of the Albatross property. Stigall again asserted the IRS deed to Scott and the trial court judgments in favor of Scott and the Browns are void, and added an allegation that the decisions of this court affirming the trial court judgments are void.

The Browns moved for orders declaring Stigall a vexatious litigant and requiring him to furnish security to maintain the action, and for a prefiling order prohibiting him from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge. The Browns argued Stigall is a vexatious litigant because he has repeatedly relitigated in propria persona the validity of a determination made against him, and has repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions while acting in propria persona. The Browns sought an order requiring Stigall to furnish $20,000 in security on the ground that Stigall has no reasonable probability of prevailing in the action.

Stigall opposed the motion, arguing mainly that he has not relitigated a final determination against him because the underlying judgments are void and thus not final.

On May 26, 2005, the trial court granted the Browns motion, declared Stigall a vexatious litigant, and ordered him to deposit $20,000 as security. The court simultaneously entered a separate prefiling order, prohibiting Stigall from filing any new litigation in propria persona in the courts of California without approval of the presiding judge of the court in which the action is to be filed.

Stigall then filed two ex parte requests for leave from the presiding judge, one to file a motion to vacate the May 26, 2005, orders and the other to file a case management statement.

However, Stigall failed to furnish security. Accordingly, on August 23, 2005, the trial court filed a signed order dismissing the action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.4.^[1] Because the dismissal order is signed and filed, it constitutes a judgment. ( 581d.)

Stigall then filed two more ex parte requests for leave from the presiding judge, one to file a motion to vacate the judgment on September 15, 2005, and the other to file several documents, including a motion for summary judgment, on October 6, 2005. The presiding judge signed an order denying the ex parte application filed on October 6. Thereafter, the trial court also entered an order denying Stigalls motion to vacate the judgment. Stigall appeals from the May 26, 2005, August 23, 2005, and September [sic: October] 6, 2005, orders.

Although the May 26, 2005, order declaring Stigall a vexatious litigant and ordering him to furnish security is not an appealable order, appeal lies from the August 23, 2005, order dismissing the action due to Stigalls failure to furnish security. (Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498 (Holcomb); People v. Harrison (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 780, 785, fn. 6.)

DISCUSSION

A

The first seven contentions of Stigalls opening brief attack the order declaring him a vexatious litigant. As best we can discern, Stigall contends: his complaint legitimately attacks the deed and the judgments in the two previous actions as void; the Browns vexatious litigant motion failed to respond to Stigalls allegations that the deed and judgments are void; Stigall has never before been declared a vexatious litigant, and the trial court did not find that Stigalls complaint is vexatious; the earlier void judgments cannot be the basis for a determination that Stigall is a vexatious litigant; denying Stigall the opportunity to prove the underlying judgments are void deprives him of due process; the Browns failed to prove a necessary element of the vexatious litigant statute -- that the litigation has been finally determined -- because the judgments are void and thus not final; and the trial courts order is superseded by federal law because the IRS deed was void under federal law. We disagree.

The statutory definition of a vexatious litigant includes a person who [a]fter a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined. ( 391, subd. (b)(2).)

Litigation means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court. ( 391, subd. (a).) Litigation includes an appeal. (McColm v. Westwood Park Assn. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1219.)

Under the statutory definition, a litigation is finally determined when the judgment is final for all purposes, and

a judgment is final for all purposes when all avenues for direct review have been exhausted. [Citation.] (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 993.)

Further, a vexatious litigant repeatedly relitigates a litigation which was finally determined when the litigants conduct shows a past pattern or practice on the part of the litigant that carries the risk of repetition in the case at hand. (Holcomb, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) As the court explained in Holcomb: Of course, the risk of repetition is fairly easy to demonstrate in situations where the defendant seeking security has been the target of previous relitigation attempts or the case involves facts or circumstances similar to those in which the plaintiff sought to relitigate. (Ibid.)

A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the courts ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment. [Citation.] (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that Stigall is a vexatious litigant because he has repeatedly relitigated a litigation finally determined against him. More than 10 years ago, in 1995, Stigall lost a quiet title action as to the Albatross property. Stigall appealed and we affirmed the judgment, which became final, because it was no longer subject to review, on February 24, 1997. Several years later, Stigall sued the Browns, the successors in interest to the plaintiff in the earlier quiet title action, seeking title to the same property and alleging the deed to the property and the 1995 judgment were void. When Stigall lost the second lawsuit involving the same cause of action, he appealed. We again affirmed the judgment, and expressly rejected his argument that the 1995 judgment was void. The judgment in the second lawsuit became final on April 21, 2004. The following year, Stigall filed another lawsuit against the Browns, again alleging the 1995 judgment is void, and arguing as well that the subsequent judgment and appellate opinions are void. Under Stigalls analysis, like Russian nesting dolls, each successive judgment against him can simply be lifted free from its predecessor, here by his stratagem of characterizing every preceding judgment as void. Stigalls pattern of repetitious litigation involving the same parties, cause of action, and issue patently demonstrates the risk of continued repetitious litigation.

The earlier judgments against Stigall are final because they are no longer subject to direct review. His contention that the 1995 judgment is void was decided against him in our 2004 opinion, and that judgment too is now final because it is no longer subject to direct review. It is not relevant that Stigall has not previously been declared a vexatious litigant. The earlier judgments are not void and thus can indeed be the basis for the determination that Stigall is a vexatious litigant. And Stigall has not been deprived due process because he litigated in the previous appeal his claim that the underlying judgment is void.

The crux of Stigalls contention is that because (he claims) the IRS deed to Scott for the Albatross property was void, every subsequent judgment and appellate decision that has rejected Stigalls claim to the Albatross property is also void, ad infinitum. As Stigall puts it: No matter how many times the respondents attempts [sic] to affirm Scotts void IRS deed that deed remains void and since any decision affirming a judgment void on its face is itself void on its face [sic]. A void judgment has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification. [Citation.] [] Each and every decision that affirms the IRS deed or attempts to sustain previous void on the face decisions simply increases the list of void on the face decisions.

The most glaring problem with Stigalls analysis is that he has already litigated to a final decision his contention that the IRS deed and the 1995 judgment determining the validity of the IRS deed are void. As we explained in our earlier opinion which rejected this contention: Issue preclusion operates as an estoppel against a losing party as to issues actually litigated and resolved in the prior proceeding. (Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235, 242; Rest.2d Judgments, supra, Introduction, pp. 1, 4.) (Stigall v. Brown, supra, slip opn. at p. 4.) To put it simply, Stigall had a full opportunity to litigate his claim that the IRS deed and 1995 judgment are void, and may not continue to do so.

B

Next, Stigall contends the trial court erred by ignoring his ex parte requests for leave to file postjudgment motions for summary judgment and to vacate the judgment. We disagree.

The trial court entered a prefiling order on May 26, 2005, and dismissed the action on August 23, 2005. Stigall, apparently assuming the prefiling order precluded him from filing postjudgment motions without the presiding judges permission, requested leave to file a motion to vacate the judgment on September 15, 2005, and requested leave to file a number of motions, including a motion for summary judgment, on October 6, 2005. We need not address the question whether the prefiling order required Stigall to obtain leave from the presiding judge to file postjudgment motions.

Our record reflects that the presiding judge denied Stigalls October 6, 2005, ex parte application and denied on the merits Stigalls motion to vacate the judgment. Thus, the record belies Stigalls claims that the trial court failed to rule on his ex parte applications.

C

Stigall next contends the trial court deprived him of due process by ordering him to furnish security despite his claimed impoverishment. Again, we disagree. The courts of this state long ago rejected the contention that an order directing an indigent vexatious litigant to furnish security deprives the litigant of due process. (Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 521, 527-529.) And the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the vexatious litigant statute does not unconstitutionally discriminate against litigants of modest means. (Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 786.)

D

Finally, Stigall contends his action to declare void the Scotts quiet title action is not barred by a statute of limitations. Because we conclude the trial court properly dismissed this action when Stigall failed to furnish security, we need not address this contention.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The Browns are awarded their costs on appeal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).

RAYE , J.

We concur:

BLEASE , Acting P.J.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.