Suh v. Suh

Filed 2/28/07 Suh v. Suh CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Laura A. Matz, Judge. Affirmed.

Martinez Law Group and Ralph G. Martinez for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lee Anav Chung, Jay J. Chung and Bubjoo S. Lee for Defendant and Respondent.

________________________________

SUMMARY

A grant deed purported to convey title to residential property to a married couple and one of their sons in joint tenancy. After the death of the father, the son brought an action to partition the property and the mother cross-complained, seeking to establish her sole ownership of the property. We affirm the trial courts judgment reforming the deed to show the mother as sole owner.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A grant deed recorded in 1989 for a residence in Glendale shows the property was granted to WOON TAIK SUH and SANG HEE SUH, husband and wife, and SUNG HO SUH, a single man, all as joint tenants. Woon Taik Suh and Sang Hee Suh are the parents of Sung Ho Suh. Woon Taik Suh died in 2002. Two years later, Sung Ho Suh, also known as Steven Suh (Steven) sued his mother, seeking partition of the property, which had no encumbrances and was valued at more than $1.1 million. Stevens mother (Mrs. Suh) filed a cross-complaint for reformation of the deed, to quiet title and for declaratory relief, asserting that she is the sole owner and Steven has no interest in the property.[1] At the conclusion of several days of trial, the court quieted title to the property in favor of Mrs. Suh and ordered the deed reformed to show Mrs. Suh as the sole owner of the property.

Among the facts stipulated by the parties or established at the trial were these. The Suh family (the parents, Steven and another son) emigrated from Korea to Chicago when Steven was a child. The parents worked industriously and supported Steven through college and medical school. After he graduated from college, Steven moved to California. The parents decided they eventually wanted to retire to California. In 1989, believing residential property would be a good investment, they visited California and arranged to purchase a house in Glendale. They selected the house, executed a purchase contract, made a down payment and opened escrow, all within a single week. The parents then returned to Chicago, and Mrs. Suh left the closing of escrow and the details of the property purchase to her husband. The Suhs originally planned to rent the property to others until their retirement, but then concluded they would allow Steven to live there rent-free in the interim. Steven moved in after the purchase, and lived there between 1989 and 1995. While Steven was out of the country in medical school, and for some time before he left, the Suhs allowed Stevens brother to live in the house.

The relationship between the Suhs and Steven deteriorated, and in 1995, the Suhs ordered Steven out of the house. Steven left without protest, and the Suhs then leased the property to third parties. In 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Suh retired and moved from Chicago to the Glendale property, where they resided together until Mr. Suhs death in July 2002. Mrs. Suh still resides there.

The Glendale property was purchased with a down payment consisting of community funds and with mortgage financing. Mr. and Mrs. Suh made all the payments on the mortgage, eventually paying off the mortgage by borrowing against their home in Chicago, and paid all the maintenance costs of owning the property. Mrs. Suh testified, and the court found, that the Suhs agreed at the time of purchase that the house was community property, and that all of their community property would devolve to the surviving spouse upon the death of the other, and to their two children equally upon the death of both parents. As to the conveyance of title to the Suhs and Steven as joint tenants, Mrs. Suh testified her husband had Steven placed upon title without her actual knowledge. Mrs. Suh discovered Stevens name was on the grant deed in 1999, while the Suhs were preparing to move to California. When she confronted her husband, he reassured her that he had named Steven in the deed merely to permit him to handle the details of escrow (because Steven lived in California and they were in Chicago), for ease in maintaining the property, and so that Steven could handle the details of splitting the property between himself and his brother in the event of the simultaneous death of the parents. Mr. Suh told her they would take Steven off the title by selling the house and purchasing a new home, apparently believing this could be done without the consent of their alienated son, and in fact the Suhs had opened escrow for the purchase of a new home at the time of Mr. Suhs death. The real estate agent who handled the Suhs purchase of the Glendale property testified that Mr. Suh told him the property was to be taken in joint tenancy, but admitted he did not explain the legal ramifications of doing so.

The trial court concluded:

              The presumption of joint tenancy arising from the grant deed was rebutted by significant credible evidence.

              The Suhs intended their property to retain community property status through their respective lifetimes.

              Mr. and Mrs. Suh did not understand the significance or legal meaning of the term joint tenancy.

              The Suhs believed they were ensuring that the property would go to the surviving spouse if the other died, and to Steven for division between him and his brother if the parents died simultaneously.

              The conduct of the parties both before and after the purchase indicated the Suhs did not believe they had conveyed any ownership interest to their son. Steven expended no funds to maintain the home when he lived there, did not protest his eviction, made no claim to rents the Suhs collected from others, and never thanked his parents or even discussed their gift to him of ownership in the house, which suggests to the court that even he [Steven] did not think he owned a beneficial interest in the house.

Judgment was entered quieting title in Mrs. Suhs favor, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Steven proffers several arguments for reversal of the trial courts judgment. None has merit.

First, Steven points out the grant deed contains no ambiguity in its conveying language. He asserts it was reversible error to consider extrinsic and parol evidence of the intent of two of the grantees. Steven cites the frequently stated principle that if the language of a contract or deed is plain, certain and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor surrounding facts and circumstances will be considered to add to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate conveyed. (Laux v. Freed (1960) 53 Cal.2d 512, 523 (Laux).) He also cites various provisions of the Civil Code. (Civ. Code, 1066 [[g]rants are to be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general]; Civ. Code,  1636 [[a] contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful]; Civ. Code, 1638 [language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity].) However, Steven ignores another equally venerable principle that takes precedence here: while a deed is prima facie evidence of title, it is not conclusive. (Parks v. Parks (1918) 179 Cal. 472, 475 (Parks).) Parks states the rule:

The general rule is that the real nature of the transaction concerning property conveyed, the true intent and purpose moving parties in taking a conveyance to property in their joint names, or in that of one of them, can be investigated and determined unless where in good faith interests of third parties have intervened and would be injuriously affected.[2](Parks, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 475.)

The Parks principle has been applied in many cases. For example, in French v. Brinkman (1963) 60 Cal.2d 547 (French), the Supreme Court cited the Laux rule, but found it was not applicable to the facts in the case before it. (French, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 552.) French held the trial court did not err in admitting parol evidence of circumstances surrounding a conveyance, in derogation of the deed, as special rules came into effect allowing the admission of parol evidence. (Ibid.) In French, the special rules concerned mutual mistake. The court observed that plaintiffs theory was they intended to sell, and defendants intended to buy, a particular parcel, and through mutual mistake the deed did not truly express their intention [citation]; therefore, the evidence was admissible in order that the deed might be reformed to conform to such true intent.[3] (Ibid., fn. omitted; see Parks, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 475 [evidence showed quite satisfactorily that, while a contract for purchase of the property was made by son and his mother, and years afterward a deed was made to both of them, it was never the intent of [son] or his mother that [son] should acquire a legal title to any portion of said property and that [the son], though a party to the conveyance, never asserted or claimed any interest in it until long after the death of his mother]; Demetris v. Demetris (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 440, 442-443 [deed reformed to show tenancy in common, rather than joint tenancy, between a father and his son where father agreed orally with son to buy a home as partners and told son he wished to leave property to all of his children]; see also Hansford v. Lassar (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 364, 372-373 (Hansford) [demonstrated ignorance on the part of a husband and wife as to the nature of joint tenancy and how such holding is distinguished from community property ownership has been held on occasion to provide ample support for a determination that the parties actually intended to hold the property as community property].) Accordingly, Stevens claim the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence of his parents intent when they purchased the Glendale property is without merit.

Second, Steven argues the trial court erroneously applied a rebuttable presumption standard that is applicable only in marital dissolution cases, and that [does] not apply to the interests of third parties. Again, Steven is mistaken. The trial court expressly acknowledged the general presumption that property is owned in the manner in which title is taken, or that the holder of legal title is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. The court cited a marital dissolution case in which title was taken as joint tenants, where the court stated the presumption of joint tenancy could be overcome only by evidence tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property was to be other than joint tenancy.[4] (Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado).) Steven appears to believe the Machado principle either cannot be applied to his case or, if applied, merely means that he is a tenant in common rather than a joint tenant. But nothing in Machado or other cases supports Stevens claim. The principle cited by the trial court that a joint tenancy deed creates a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy is a principle of general application. It is merely one way of stating the presumption that property is owned in the manner in which title is taken. (See Hansford, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at pp. 371, 372 [joint tenancy ownership is the presumed fact which flows from the basic fact of a deed that is joint tenancy in form; opponent of joint tenancy presumption has burden of establishing that the ownership interests in the property are held in some other capacity such as single ownership, tenancy in common, or as community property]; see also Paterson v. Comastri (1952) 39 Cal.2d 66, 71 [statute applicable to joint bank accounts created a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy that may be overcome by proof that the owner-depositor, when making the deposit, had no intention to create a true joint tenancy; the statutory presumption of equality of interest arising from the form of the joint account is rebuttable by competent evidence showing the true character and ownership of the monies deposited].) Stevens claim to the contrary has no merit.

Finally, in his reply brief Steven contends, for the first time, that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof. Evidence Code section 662 provides that the presumption that the owner of legal title to property is the owner of the full beneficial title may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof. Steven asserts the trial court made its decision based on the preponderance of the evidence. We reject Stevens contention. Steven failed to raise the issue in his opening brief, and accordingly waived it. (Tisher v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361.) Moreover, even if the issue were not waived, the clear and convincing evidence rule applies only at the trial level. On appeal, it is assumed that the trial court applied the proper standard and the judgment will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to support it [citation]. (Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693, 700.)[5] As the trial court observed, although there is a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy ownership of this property by virtue of the grant deed, I find that Mrs. Suh has presented significant and credible evidence which overcomes that presumption and demonstrates that it was neither her intent nor the intent of her husband to make a present gift of a beneficial interest in the property to her son . . . . The record supports the trial courts finding, and no basis exists for upsetting the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The respondent is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BOLAND, J.

We concur:

COOPER, P. J.

FLIER, J.

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Analysis and review provided by La Mesa Property line Lawyers.

[1] Mrs. Suh also asserted legal claims for slander of title and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but abandoned these claims after trial.

[2] The court continued: It may be shown that the taking of a conveyance in the name of the grantee, or one of them, was a mistake, or that it was a matter merely of convenience, or as security for a loan, or was taken under such circumstances as created a resulting trust or trust of some other character. (Parks, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 475.)

[3] See also Civil Code section 3399: When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value. Moreover, even a mistake that is not mutual, and is not one that the other party knew or suspected, may justify reformation of a deed. (See Jones v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 381, 388, 389 [[i]t is well settled that the remedy of reformation is equitable in nature and not restricted to the exact situations stated in [Civil Code] section 3399; mistake is an ingredient of reformation, but not its essence; essential purpose of reformation is to reflect the intent of the parties].)

[4] For the purpose of division of property in marital dissolution cases, the Family Code now provides a rebuttable presumption that property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in joint tenancy, is community property. (Fam. Code, 2581.)

[5] Steven insists the trial courts opinion shows it applied the preponderance standard because, when it discussed Stevens testimony, the court observed:

Although [Steven] said his father told him the house was purchased for [Steven], the court finds that statement ambiguous and susceptible to both the interpretation it was purchased for him to own and that it was purchased for him to inhabit for some period of time until he was out on his own and his parents had relocated here. The latter is the more reasonable in the courts view, in light of all the facts and circumstances.

The entirety of the trial courts discussion of the evidence shows Steven is mistaken. The final quoted sentence, upon which Steven relies, applies to a specific ambiguous statement to which Steven testified. It does not apply to all of the evidence in the case, which the trial court recited at some length, including testimony from Mrs. Suh; testimony from Julia Joo, which the trial court found corroborated the more salient aspects of [Mrs. Suhs] testimony; and testimony from the real estate agent who represented the Suhs in the purchase of the house. Indeed, the court expressly found the testimony of each of these witnesses credible and consistent with each other. Steven simply cannot substantiate his claim that the trial court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.