Swanson v. Simpson Timber
Filed 10/2/13 Swanson v. Simpson Timber CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ALBERTA
SWANSON, Individually and as Successor, etc.,
Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
SIMPSON TIMBER COMPANY,
Defendant
and Respondent.
B244266
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. BC438035)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Amy Hogue, Judge.
Affirmed.
The
Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Farrise Firm and Simona A. Farrise for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Foley & Mansfield,
Stephen J. Foley and Keith M. Ameele for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
In
Cal.App.4th 15 (Campbell), the court
applied the Rowland v. Christian
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland)
factors, as further clarified in Cabral
v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 (Cabral), to hold a “property owner has no duty to protect family
members of workers on its premises from secondary exposure to asbestos used
during the course of the property owner’s business.â€
supra, at p. 34.) In this secondary asbestos case, we must
determine whether to follow Campbell
in an action against a premises owner brought by its employee who initially was
exposed to asbestos used in manufacturing the premises owner’s products, but
also allegedly was secondarily exposed off the premises to respirable asbestos
on his work clothes or on his son’s work clothes, who also was an
employee.
Although
the factual circumstances differ here, like Campbell,
we conclude that based upon the Rowland
public policy factors, a premises owner has no duty to protect an employee from
secondary exposure to asbestos off the premises arising from his association
with a family member and fellow employee who wore asbestos-contaminated work
clothes home. To hold otherwise would
impose limitless liability on premises owners.
We further conclude an employee’s secondary asbestos exposure when
wearing home his own work clothes is a collateral or derivative
exclusivity provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment of nonsuit.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Generally,
in secondary asbestos exposure cases against a premises owner, the theory of
liability is that a worker brought home asbestos dust and fibers on his work
clothes or person and a family member who never set foot on the premises
suffered an asbestos-related illness. (
In this case, the plaintiff was an employee who was exposed to asbestos
while working on the premises and is alleging secondary asbestos exposure off
the premises when he and his son brought home respirable asbestos on their work
clothes.
1.
Facts
John
Swanson died of lung cancer allegedly caused by asbestos exposure. He worked at the Simpson Timber Company (the
company) from 1947 to 1975. The company
used asbestos as a component in the manufacturing of its compressed insulating
boards and ceiling tiles.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] The boards and ceiling tiles were
manufactured in the insulation board plant.
Swanson worked at the plant as a fork lift operator and later became
lead man.
Joseph
Swanson,
the decedent’s son, worked at the plant for three months in 1967 and again for
a few months in 1969. Joseph worked on
the production line.
The
company did not provide its employees with work clothes, masks, and
respirators, or a changing room and showers.
Both Swanson and Joseph allegedly had asbestos dust and fibers on their
work clothes, and the dust and fibers were deposited on the floor, couches, and
chairs in their family home and in the car they drove to and from work.
2.
Swanson’s
Primary Exposure Claim Barred by Workers’ Compensation
Swanson’s
surviving spouse, acting as his successor in interest, and his heirs
(appellants) filed a complaint alleging negligence, strict liability, breach of
warranties, premises liability, fraud, conspiracy, loss of consortium, and
wrongful death against numerous defendants. The negligence cause of action against the
premises defendants, which included the company, alleged the premises owners
caused asbestos and asbestos-containing products to be used on the premises
either by its own workers or independent contractors. The complaint further alleges it was
foreseeable that in performing these acts, dangerous and toxic asbestos dust
and fibers would be released into the air creating an unreasonable risk of
harm.
The
trial court concluded that the claims against the company arising from
Swanson’s asbestos exposure while working on the premises were barred by the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Although not
alleged, the theory of liability then shifted to secondary asbestos exposure.
3.
Nonsuit on
Premises Liability Claim for Secondary Asbestos Exposure
Citing
Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 1367, the trial court employed a procedure to address the viability
of the secondary asbestos exposure theory.
Labeled an “offer of proof,†the court also asked the parties to brief
duty to Swanson for injuries caused by secondary asbestos exposure.
The
trial court concluded the offer of proof would not sustain the remaining cause
of action for premises liability following
set a briefing schedule for a motion for nonsuit. The trial court granted the motion for
nonsuit, concluding the premises liability claim arising from secondary
asbestos exposure failed as a matter of law under
was preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Judgment
of nonsuit was entered and this timely appealed followed.
DISCUSSION
1.
Standards
of Review and Governing Premises Liability Principles
Although
this appeal is from a judgment of nonsuit, we are presented with legal questions,
which are reviewed de novo on appeal.
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 770;
v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 710, 718-719.)
“The
general rule in California is that ‘[e]veryone is responsible . . . for an
injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his or her property or person . . . .’ †(Cabral,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 771; Civ.
Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) A
landowner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the property in
such a manner as to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of
injury. (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.) A landowner’s duty of care to avoid exposing
others to a risk of injury is not limited to injuries that occur on premises
owned or controlled by the landowner; “the duty of care encompasses a duty to
avoid exposing persons to risks of injury that occur off site if the
landowner’s property is maintained in such a manner as to expose persons to an
unreasonable risk of injury offsite.
[Citations.]†(
1473, 1478-1479.)
As
the Supreme Court stated in Cabral,
that, when balanced together, may justify a departure from the fundamental
principle embodied in Civil Code section 1714.
(Cabral, at p. 771.) The Rowland
factors are: “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.†(Rowland,
supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113; see also
should create an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 only
where “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ †(Cabral,
supra, at p. 771; Rowland, supra, at p.
112.)
The
Rowland factors determine the scope
of a duty owed whether the risk of harm occurs on the landowner’s premises or off
the premises. (Barnes v. Black, supra,
71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479.)
While Rowland rejected rigid
classifications to determine a premises owner’s duty, the proper test to be
applied is whether in the management of the property, the premises owner has acted
reasonably in view of the probability of injury to others. (Rowland,
supra, 69 Cal.2d at p.
119.)
2.
Campbell Held
a Premises Owner has No Duty to Protect Family Members of Workers on its
Premises from Secondary Asbestos Exposure
a premises owner has a duty to protect family members of workers on its
premises from secondary exposure to asbestos used during the course of the
property owner’s business.†(
Employing the Rowland factors,
the Campbell court concluded that the
premises owner did not owe a duty.
In
Campbell, Eileen Honer’s father and
brother worked as asbestos insulators in the late 1940’s during the
construction of one of Ford’s assembly plants.
(Campbell,
with mesothelioma and filed a complaint stating a premises liability cause of
action, alleging her father and brother were exposed to asbestos-containing
products that caused their clothing to be contaminated with asbestos
fibers. (Ibid.) Honer allegedly was
exposed to the asbestos fibers because of her direct and indirect contact with
her brother and father, as well as her contact with their clothing. She washed her father’s and brother’s clothes
and would first shake out the clothes because they were “ ‘dirty’ â€
and “ ‘dusty,’ †and “ ‘nasty.’ †(Ibid.)
Before
the case was presented to the jury, Ford requested a jury instruction based
upon Privette v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, stating that a premises owner is not liable to the
plaintiff for injuries caused by the actions of independent contractors on
Ford’s premises unless Ford affirmatively contributed to plaintiff’s alleged
injury. (Campbell, supra, 206
Cal.App.4th at p. 23.) The trial court
refused the instruction. (
By special verdict, the jury concluded that Ford’s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing Honer’s injury, and Ford was responsible for 5
percent of her damages. (
Ford appealed, relying on the legal principles in its rejected jury
instruction to argue it owed no duty to Honer.
(Id. at pp. 28-29.)
As
noted, the Campbell court reframed
the issue Ford presented and analyzed the Rowland
factors to conclude no duty was owed.
Addressing the first three Rowland
factors, that is, foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, and closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the Campbell court reiterated that foreseeability alone was not enough
to impose a duty. (Campbell, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29-32.) Ford
acknowledged the second factor that Honer suffered asbestos-caused harm. But, even if it were foreseeable to Ford that
workers on its premises could be exposed to asbestos dust and fibers, the third
factor addressing the “ ‘closeness of the connection’ †between
Ford’s conduct (hiring workers) and the injury to a family member was
“attenuated.†(Id. at p. 31.) In a
footnote, the court stated: “Although
our analysis does not turn on this distinction, we note that in this case, the
relationship between Ford’s conduct and the injury Honer suffered is even more
attenuated inasmuch as Ford hired a general contractor to perform the work,
that general contractor hired a subcontractor, that subcontractor hired another
subcontractor, and that subcontractor employed Honer’s father and
brother.†(Ibid., fn. 6.)
Because
the existence of a duty is a combination of foreseeability of the risk and a
weighing of public policy considerations, the Campbell court addressed the remaining factors outlined in
policy considerations counsel against imposing a duty of care on property
owners for such secondary exposure.†(
Ford’s negligence did not rise to the level of moral culpability. (Ibid.) As for the next two Rowland factors, that is, the extent of the burden to the
defendant, and the consequences to the community if the court imposes on a
particular defendant a duty of care toward the plaintiff, these factors weighed
heavily against Honer. (
The court noted the difficulty with these factors is drawing the line
between persons to whom a duty is owed and those persons to whom no duty is
owed.
Relying
on the analysis in Oddone v. Superior
Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 822, describing the difficulty in
arbitrarily determining the scope of the duty to those secondarily exposed to
toxic chemicals, the Campbell court
stated, “in a case such as Honer’s, where the claim is that the laundering of
the worker’s clothing is the primary source of asbestos exposure, the class of
secondarily exposed potential plaintiffs is far greater, including fellow
commuters, those performing laundry services and more.†(Campbell,
supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp.
32-33.) Imposing such a duty would be
uncertain and potentially large in scope.
Campbell also cited with
approval cases from other jurisdictions that have rejected the imposition of a
duty on premises owners for secondary asbestos exposure, recognizing that tort
law must draw a line between the competing policy considerations of providing a
remedy to everyone who is injured and extending limitless liability. (Id.
at p. 34.) Accordingly, the
duty.
3.
Campbell
Appellants
contend Campbell does not apply,
principally arguing that Campbell was
limited to a premises owner’s duty to an independent
contractor and a different analysis of the Rowland factors applies when considering a premises owner’s duty to
an employee who is secondarily exposed to asbestos used to manufacture the
company’s product. Appellants also
contend Campbell overlooked the body
of case law imposing a duty on the premises owner for secondary asbestos
exposure based upon the foreseeability of the risk of injury to a family
member. We discuss each contention,
concluding the Rowland public policy
factors are even more compelling here than in Campbell. In reaching this
conclusion, we solely focus on the theory that an employee (Joseph) brought home asbestos dust
and fibers on his work clothes and secondarily exposed another employee and
family member (Swanson). We discuss the
alternative secondary self-exposure theory that Swanson brought home asbestos
dust and fibers on his work clothes, post
at pages 14-16.
a.
Campbell
Did Not Turn on the Worker’s Employment Status
Appellants
contend that Campbell is not
applicable because its holding is limited to a premises owner’s duty to the
family member of an independent contractor.
The issue addressed in Campbell is
the duty of a premises owner to family members injured off premises from
secondary asbestos exposure. The
and did not address, Ford’s argument that because it owed no duty to Honer’s
father and brother as independent contractors, it owed no duty to Honer. (Campbell,
supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at
p. 29.) Therefore, the
appellants suggest, that Ford’s lack of control militated against imposing a
duty. Campbell’s only reference to the independent contractor status of
Honer’s father and brother was in a footnote, stating “our analysis does not
turn on this distinction.†(
Appellants
also improperly read more into the Campbell
court’s modification order to support their argument. Initially, Campbell framed the issue as the duty of an employer “ ‘to
protect family members of employees
from secondary exposure to asbestos used during the course of the
and “employer’s business†to “property owner’s business,†is consistent with
the facts of that case. (
court intended to determine the duty a premises owner owed to family members of
an independent contractor, it would have decided the issue Ford presented to
the court for review.
Appellants’
reliance on Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
(N.J. 2006) 895 A.2d 1143 undercuts their argument that employment status
is determinative when evaluating the duty of a premises owner to family members
who have been secondarily exposed to asbestos.
In Olivo, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided the issue presented in Campbell, concluding a premises owner has a duty to the wife of an
independent contractor who laundered her husband’s work clothes based on the
foreseeable risk of exposure from asbestos brought home on contaminated
clothing.
at pp. 1146, 1149; see
contra, Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy
Co. (Iowa 2009) 777 N.W.2d 689, 699 [premises owner owed no duty to
the household member of an independent contractor exposed to asbestos fibers
and dust taken home on the independent contractor’s clothes].) Unlike Campbell,
Olivo also addressed the premises
owner’s argument that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff who was an
employee of an independent contractor.
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra, at pp. 1150-1151.)
b.
Rowland Compels
the Conclusion No Duty is Owed
Aside
from pointing out the employment status distinction, which was not
determinative in Campbell, appellants
contend the analysis of the Rowland
factors differs here because the company’s moral culpability, a public policy
factor, is greater as it manufactured asbestos-containing products. Appellants maintain that, unlike Ford, the
company had absolute control over the release of asbestos fibers in its
manufacturing plant. Appellants overlook
the facts in Campbell in which “Ford
knew asbestos was being installed on its premises,†and “[a] Ford employee
regularly checked on the progress of the insulation work.†(Campbell,
supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp.
20-21.) But, even if this factor does
not militate in the company’s favor, as it did in Campbell, the remaining Rowland
public policy factors weigh more heavily in the company’s favor than these
factors did in Campbell.
When
assessing the burden to the premises owner and the consequences to the
community if a duty of care is imposed on the particular defendant toward the
plaintiff, we agree with the Campbell
court that it is hard to draw the line between the class of persons to whom a
duty is owed and those persons to whom a duty is not owed. Would the duty owed apply to all family
members, some of whom may not be in contact with the exposed person, or to all
household members, some of whom may not be family members? In Campbell,
laundering the worker’s clothing was the primary source of asbestos exposure,
and the class of secondarily exposed plaintiffs was far greater than just
family members, “including fellow commuters, those performing laundry services
and more.†(Campbell, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32-33.)
Here,
the class of secondarily exposed plaintiffs is even greater than in
exposed by coming into contact with asbestos fibers on Joseph’s work clothes
away from the premises in the car driving to and from work and at home. Under these circumstances, the class of
secondarily exposed plaintiffs includes household members, guests, and any
person who has come into contact with the employee and his or her
asbestos-contaminated clothes. Joseph potentially
could cut a wide swath by taking a bus home from work, dropping into the
pharmacy or grocery store after work, or attending a school meeting or city
hall meeting before going home for the day.
Imposing a duty under these circumstances to persons who may have come
into contact with an employee wearing asbestos-contaminated work clothes
saddles the premises owner with a burden of uncertain and limitless
liability. Thus, in a case such as this
one, in which an employee alleges secondary asbestos exposure by coming into
contact with asbestos fibers on the work clothes of another employee away from
the premises, we hold the premises owner owes no duty. We are not confronted with a case similar to
has never set foot on the premises, is repeatedly and regularly exposed while
laundering asbestos-contaminated work clothes, and therefore make no
determination on whether a duty is owed under any other circumstances.
c.
Out-of-State
Cases Are Not Persuasive
Appellants
contend Campbell is out of step with
the majority of other state courts addressing this issue and employing similar
foreseeability. None of these cited
cases was brought by an employee who was initially exposed to asbestos during
the course of the premises owner’s business and alleged secondary asbestos
exposure by coming into contact with asbestos fibers on the work clothes of
another employee away from the premises.
Like Campbell, the majority of
the cited cases address a duty owed to a family member who has never set foot
on the premises and is regularly and repeatedly exposed while laundering
asbestos-contaminated clothes.
name="_ftnref8" title="">[8]
Even
courts focusing on foreseeability and concluding a duty is owed limit the scope
of the duty. In Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra,
895 A.2d 1143, the court stated, “[t]he duty we recognize in these
circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm to
plaintiff’s wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household chores that
would include laundering the work clothes worn by her husband.†(Id.
at p. 1150.) In Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. (Tenn. 2008) 266 S.W.3d
347, the Tennessee Supreme Court held, “the duty we recognize today extends to
those who regularly and repeatedly come into close contact with an employee’s
contaminated work clothes over an extended period of time, regardless of
whether they live in the employee’s home or are a family member.â€
at p. 374.)
Although
appellants criticize the Campbell
court’s citation to and reliance on Oddone
v. Superior Court, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th 813, the cited cases limiting the scope of the duty illustrate and
recognize the difficulty in drawing the line between those persons to whom a
duty is owed and those persons to whom no duty is owed. Olivo
appears to limit the duty owed based on the foreseeability of a spouse
laundering her husband’s work clothes, which leaves unresolved the
the duty owed includes all persons who regularly and repeatedly launder the
husband’s work clothes.
those who “regularly and routinely†come into contact with the
asbestos-contaminated work clothes “over an extended period of time,†which, as
the Oddone court notes is not a
bright line rule. (See
p. 822.) Would a premises owner owe
a duty to fellow commuters in a van pool or a train who “regularly and
routinely†come into contact with asbestos-contaminated work clothes? Drawing the line proves even more difficult
where the exposure is based on mere association with, or contact with, the
employee’s asbestos-contaminated clothes because even if the class of secondarily
exposed plaintiffs is limited to the household, every person entering the house
is a potential plaintiff. As in
properly drawn between the competing public policy considerations of providing
a remedy to everyone who is injured and extending tort liability almost without
limit. Under the circumstances presented
here, we conclude the company owed no duty to Swanson to protect him from
secondary asbestos exposure arising from his association with a family member
and fellow employee who wore asbestos-contaminated work clothes home.
4.
Workers’
Compensation Exclusivity Bars Secondary Self-Exposure Injury
As
an alternative theory of secondary asbestos exposure, appellants contend that
Swanson was injured off premises (and outside the employment relationship) when
he wore his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home. This secondary self-exposure theory was not
raised or addressed in Campbell or
any of appellants’ cited cases imposing a duty on a premises owner for
secondary asbestos exposure. In
resolving this issue, we must decide if Swanson’s secondary self-exposure is
outside the reach of workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. As the Supreme Court stated in
Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, while the theoretical compensation
bargain in the workers’ compensation laws seems to be straightforward, the
“unabated flow of published decisions clarifying
the scope of workers’ compensation exclusivity suggests considerable confusion
as well as innovative lawyering.†(
As
a general rule, an employee who sustains an industrial injury “arising out of
and in the course of the employment†is limited to recovery under the workers’
compensation system. (Lab. Code, §§
3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a).) Injuries
caused by unsafe working conditions are compensable solely under workers’
compensation, even if the employer failed to correct known safety
violations. (Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 720-723.) The basis for the exclusivity rule “is a
presumed ‘compensation bargain,’ pursuant to which the employer assumes
liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in
exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and
certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury
without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of
damages potentially available in tort.â€
(Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52
Cal.3d 1, 16; see also LeFiell
Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (2012) 55 Cal.4th 275, 279.)
In
Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State
Comp. Ins. Fund, supra, 24
Cal.4th 800, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine “whether
the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy
provisions.†(Id. at p. 811.) First, is
the injury “collateral to or derivative of a personal ‘injury sustained and
arising out of the course of employment.’ †(Id.
at p. 812.) Second, do “the alleged acts
or motives that establish the elements of the cause of action fall outside the
risks encompassed within the compensation bargain.†(Id.
at pp. 811-812.) “Where the acts are ‘a
“normal†part of the employment relationship’ [citation], or workers’ compensation
claims process [citation], or where the motive behind these acts does not
violate a ‘fundamental policy of this state’ [citation], then the cause of
action is barred†by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Act. (Id. at p. 812.) Employing
this test, Swanson’s secondary self-exposure injury falls within the
exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Here,
the alleged compensable injury arises from the unsafe working conditions in
which Swanson was exposed to respirable asbestos fibers and dusts, along with
the company’s failure to provide work clothes, respirators, and masks or
changing rooms and showers to prevent asbestos-related injuries. The alleged secondary self-exposure injury
occurred off the premises when Swanson wore his asbestos-contaminated work
clothes home. The secondary
self-exposure injury is derivative as it is dependent upon the compensable
injury arising from and in the course and scope of Swanson’s employment.
Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court, supra,
55 Cal.4th at pp. 280, 285.) Swanson’s
secondary self-exposure from the asbestos fibers and dust on his work clothes
would not have occurred if he were not exposed to asbestos in the course and
scope of his employment. Contrary to
appellants’ argument, the collateral injury doctrine is not limited to loss of
consortium claims. (See
Comp. Ins. Fund, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 814-815.) Thus, Swanson’s
alleged injury from secondary self-exposure falls within the scope of the
exclusive remedy provision. No exception
applies because the acts that give rise to this claim are a part of the
employment relationship. Accordingly,
although appellants have presented a novel theory, the premises liability claim
arising from secondary self-exposure is subject to exclusivity.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. No costs are
awarded on appeal.
ALDRICH,
J.
We concur:
CROSKEY,
Acting P. J.
KITCHING, J.
exposure also is referred to as “bystander,†“take home,†or “transmission
asbestos exposure.â€
support this fact, appellants cite to 23 record citations. We have reviewed all of these citations and
only two actually support this fact. It
is counsel’s duty to refer the reviewing court to the part of the record that
supports her clients’ contentions on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) The purpose of requiring record citations is
not merely formulaic. Rather, it is to
allow the court to find facts in the record when evaluating arguments in the
brief. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239
& fn. 16.)
