Thomas v. Victim Comp. and Gov. Claims Bd

Filed 3/30/06 Thomas v. Victim Comp. and Gov. Claims Bd. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

After respondent Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (board) found appellant Carol Thomas ineligible for crime victim compensation, Thomas sought a writ of administrative mandate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5; Gov. Code, §§ 13950-13966; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2 (hereafter Regs.), § 656.1, subd. (a).) The trial court denied her petition. On appeal,^[1] Thomas challenges the validity of the board's decision, the sufficiency of evidence in support of its factual findings and the fairness of the proceedings.^[2] We affirm the order denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate.

I. FACTS

Beginning in March 2003, appellant Carol Thomas was living with a friend in Mill Valley. Her friend's boyfriend--Paul Holmes--moved in on May 2, 2003. Two days later, Thomas and Holmes quarreled about household chores. The quarrel escalated. Holmes took Thomas's clothing from her bedroom and tossed them into the front yard of the house. At this point, the dispute moved to the kitchen. According to Holmes, Thomas came at him several times with a knife. According to Thomas, she grabbed a knife but did not have a chance to strike him because Holmes squeezed his hand around hers, causing the knife to cut four fingers and two tendons.

When she saw blood, Thomas's friend called the police. When they arrived, the kitchen was in disarray. Holmes had sustained a knife wound to his left shoulder and defensive wounds consistent with his version of events. He was calm, but Thomas was angry. Thomas explained that Holmes's shoulder wound was self-inflicted. Holmes was left-handed, causing the police to doubt that his shoulder wound was self-inflicted. Thomas was arrested for assaulting Holmes with a deadly weapon and jailed for a day as a result of this incident, but she was not prosecuted. Holmes was not charged with any offense. On May 8, 2003, surgery was performed on Thomas's hand. She was unable to work as a result of her injuries.

In July 2003, Thomas applied for compensation for medical, mental health and relocation expenses as well as lost income from the board. In December 2003, Thomas received notice that her claim did not meet the requirements for approval. Apparently, she filed an appeal of this decision. In April 2004, the board staff recommended that her application be denied because the staff concluded that Thomas had participated in the crime or was involved in events leading to the crime. A hearing was held on that application in August 2004. (See Regs., § 647.20, subd. (a)(3).) Thomas appeared at the hearing and testified under oath. She repeatedly denied cutting Holmes.

In September 2004, the hearing officer found that Thomas was ineligible for crime victim compensation. She discounted some of Thomas's testimony about the assault, finding it inconsistent with other evidence of the incident. Specifically, she rejected her claim that she grabbed the knife in self-defense. Instead, she found that Thomas had grabbed the knife, that Holmes had struggled with her for possession of it, and that Thomas was injured in the process. She also faulted Thomas for not leaving the house when she had the chance to do so and avoid further escalation of the incident. The hearing officer concluded that Thomas was involved in events leading up to the assault, making her ineligible for compensation.

In October 2004, the board adopted the hearing officer's proposed decision denying her application. Thomas was given notice of this decision in November 2004. Thomas's December 2004 request for reconsideration was denied in February 2005.

In March 2005, Thomas filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate or prohibition. She challenged the board decision on various grounds--because the board had no proof that she was involved in the underlying crime; because the hearing officer did not find that she knowingly and willfully participated in the commission of the crime; and because the police report did not support the board decision. An amended petition was filed later that month, including assertions that the hearing officer's findings were speculative.^[3]

At this point, Thomas had not provided the board's counsel with a copy of the administrative record. The board sought a continuance of an upcoming hearing, but Thomas would not agree to one. The board filed a demurrer to the petition in April 2005, citing inter alia Thomas's failure to provide an administrative record for its review. One proposed remedy in the demurrer was a two-month continuance. In April 2005, the trial court continued the matter to June 2005 on its own motion to allow time for the administrative record to be provided and reviewed. The board answered the petition in May 2005. The trial court then issued a tentative decision to deny the petition for writ of mandate. It adopted its tentative decision on June 9, 2005.

Thomas filed a notice of appeal from the June 2005 minute order on the same day that it issued. A written order denying the petition was filed on August 23, 2005. In its order, the trial court recited that after it heard evidence in this matter, it exercised its independent judgment and concluded that the administrative findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. Notice of entry of judgment of this order was given on August 29, 2005.

II. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT RULES

Preliminarily, the Attorney General contends that Thomas has waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of evidence on appeal because her briefs do not comply with court rules. The Attorney General argues that Thomas failed to cite to the record or to include any legal authority in her opening brief, thus failing to affirmatively show insufficiency of evidence. It seeks dismissal of the appeal.

Thomas's opening brief contains no pagination, making it difficult for us to reference her argument in our opinion. (See rule 14(b)(7).) The procedural history and factual background section of this brief contain no references to the trial court or administrative record. (See rule 14(a)(1)(C).) Aside from one citation to the board's burden of proof, Thomas's opening brief offers no legal authority in support of her apparent claims of error on appeal. (See ibid.) These procedural deficiencies permit us to return a filed brief for correction and refiling. (See rule 14(e)(2)(A).) However, at this stage of the proceedings, we exercise our authority to determine the merits of the appeal, despite these procedural defects.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

On appeal, Thomas's primary contention is that the board's decision was invalid because it lacked proof of its factual findings related to her involvement in the stabbing incident.^[4] Essentially, she disputes the credibility determination made by the hearing officer, which was ultimately adopted by the board and found by the trial court to be supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence in support of the trial court's findings on a petition for writ of administrative mandate, we must determine on appeal if the findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) When--as here--the trial court applied the independent judgment test, on appeal, we review its findings rather than the findings of the underlying agency to determine whether the trial court findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308; see Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1989) § 14.25, pp. 461-462.)

When findings are attacked for insufficiency of evidence, our power begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence to support them. We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence. We may not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve any conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. (Overton v. Vita-Food Corp. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370, disapproved on another point in Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 866, fn. 2; see Bravo v. Buelow (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 208, 211.) Thus, we cannot find--as Thomas would have us do--that the evidence offered against her was not deserving of belief.

Thomas also challenges whether the board met its burden of proof of her participation in that incident. A crime victim may apply for and obtain compensation for pecuniary losses suffered as a direct result of criminal acts. Certain eligibility requirements must be met, on which the applicant typically bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence. (See Gov. Code, §§ 13950, 13955; Regs., §§ 647.32, subds. (a), (c), 653.4.) A crime victim is not eligible for reimbursement under this statutory program if the board finds that the nature of the victim's involvement in events leading to the crime gives rise to the application. (Gov. Code, § 13956, subd. (c).) In this matter, the board determined that Thomas was ineligible for reimbursement for this reason. The board had the burden of proof of ineligibility, as the hearing officer properly concluded. (See Regs., § 647.32, subds. (b), (c) [preponderance of evidence].)

The hearing officer may rely on written reports of law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating the underlying crime when making its determinations. (Regs., § 647.31, subd. (d).) This is precisely what the hearing officer did in this matter. The application may be denied if it is found that the victim applicant was involved in the events leading to the crime, even if the victim did not engage in any illegal conduct. (Regs., § 656.1, subds. (a), (d).) If the victim acted solely in self-defense, then he or she cannot be found to have been involved in the events leading to the crime. (Regs., § 656.7.) In this matter, Thomas--in essence--asserted that she acted against Holmes in self-defense. However, the police report supports the conclusion that she attacked Holmes with a knife, stabbing him before Thomas was injured. The trial court determined that the board findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. Under these circumstances, we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court finding and the underlying board finding that Thomas was thus ineligible for the victim reimbursement that she sought. (See Gov. Code, § 13956, subd. (c); Regs., § 656.1, subd. (a).)

IV. FAIRNESS

Finally, Thomas criticizes the fairness of the hearing she received before the board. We have carefully reviewed the record of the administrative hearing and the trial court proceedings. Nothing in the record supports her unfairness claim. Both the hearing officer and the trial court were courteous and helpful to the in pro. per. Thomas and conducted themselves in a proper manner.^[5]

The order denying Thomas's petition for writ of administrative mandate is affirmed.

_________________________

Reardon, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Sepulveda, J.

_________________________

Rivera, J.

Publication Courtesy of California attorney referral.

Analysis and review provided by Vista Apartment Manager Attorneys.

^[1] Thomas purports to appeal from the trial court's June 9, 2005 minute order denying her petition. A minute order is not an appealable order. It is not a judgment, but merely an explanation of why the trial court intends to issue a judgment at a later time. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1121, fn. 3; see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); see also 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 8, pp. 545-546.) The Attorney General has provided us with a copy of the trial court's August 2005 written order denying her petition in its February 2006 motion to augment the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court (hereafter cited by rule), rule 12(a)(1)(A).) We hereby grant the motion to augment. We construe Thomas's notice of appeal to be from the later August 2005 written order denying her petition. (See rule 2(e).)

^[2] In the trial court and on appeal, Thomas represents herself in pro. per.

^[3] The amended petition contains numerous references to events and circumstances that do not appear to be relevant to Thomas's claim for compensation.

^[4] Thomas's brief is difficult to analyze, as it is somewhat rambling and refers to evidence that is not contained in the record on appeal, much of which appears to be irrelevant to her petition for writ of mandate. We disregard all references to matters outside the record on appeal. (See rule 14(a)(1)(C), (e)(2)(C).)

^[5] Thomas also contends that the trial court erred in â€