Valdez v. Lennox Hearth Products

Filed 3/12/07 Valdez v. Lennox Hearth Products CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Josh Fredricks, Judge. Affirmed.

Nicholas Weimer for Defendant and Appellant.

Gray & Associates, P. C., Nancy E. Gray and Colin J. Gibson for Respondent.

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Jesus Valdez sued his former employer, respondent Lennox Hearth Products, bringing causes of action related to his employment and the termination of his employment. Lennox Hearth's motion for summary judgment was granted and judgment was entered in its favor. In B171364, we reversed that judgment, finding that there was a triable issue of fact on a single the cause of action, the cause of action for breach of contract. We noted that on appeal, but not in the trial court, Lennox Hearth argued that the cause of action was pre-empted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act. We held that "Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.) This question must be addressed to the trial court.

On remand, Lennox Hearth raised the issue by way of a new summary judgment motion, contending that the cause of action was preempted. The trial court agreed, and entered judgment for Lennox Hearth. We affirm, as we explain:

Lennox Hearth manufactures fireplaces. Valdez began working for Lennox Hearth in 1980. He had a variety of jobs at a Lynwood facility, most of them union positions, the union being the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. In 1993, while he was working in a position subject to the collective bargaining agreement,[1]he was promoted to a management position, team leader, which took him outside the union.

Valdez's cause of action for breach of oral contract was based on his allegation that at the time of the promotion, Lennox Hearth management orally promised that he could at any time return to his union position with his seniority intact.

In March 2001, when Lennox Hearth production moved to Tennessee, Valdez's position was eliminated. He was offered a return to a union position, but without seniority, pursuant to Article 27 of the collective bargaining agreement, which provided that "An employee who is promoted or transferred to a position . . . not covered by the collective bargaining agreement shall retain what seniority they had for a period of one year from the date of such transfer or promotion. Should the employee be returned to the bargaining unit within the above period, such employee shall be entitled to his former classification and current rate of pay without any loss of seniority. Should such transfer or promotion exceed one year, the employee's bargaining unit security shall be terminated."

Valdez refused the offer to return him to a union position without seniority, instead seeking enforcement of the alleged oral promise to return him to such a position with seniority intact.

Lennox Hearth's argument is the case is preempted under section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947[2]because the subject matter of the oral contract was reinstatement to the bargaining unit, and because the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement conflict with the promise Valdez alleged.

We agree with Lennox Hearth that the claim is preempted under section 301, which has been expansively construed by the United States Supreme Court to confer federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements, claims founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, and claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. (Warehouse, Processing etc. Union v. Hugo Neu Proler Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 732, 737.)

"[S]ection 301 preempts any individual labor contract inconsistent with a collective bargaining agreement in order to assure uniform federal interpretation of the collective agreement. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911." (Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc. (9th Cir.1987) 830 F.2d 993, 1001.)

We find Young, supra, and Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co. (9th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 1283 dispositive. In Young, the employee worked for the defendant company, then quit, then was re-hired to a position within the collective bargaining unit. She was fired on the same day she returned to work, and alleged in her lawsuit that when she was rehired, there was an oral contract that she could only be fired for good cause. The Court found preemption, writing that "Young contends that her individual labor contract is independent of the CBA and that her contract claim is thus not a claim for breach of the CBA. The subject matter of her contract, however, is a job position covered by the CBA. Because any 'independent agreement of employment [concerning that job position] could be effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement,' the CBA controls and the contract claim is preempted. [Citations.]" (Young, supra, 830 F.2d at p. 997.)

Chmiel, supra, 873 F.2d 1283 is similar. In that case, the employee alleged that independent of the collective bargaining agreement, the employer expressly or impliedly agreed that he would not be fired except on a showing of good cause. The Court held "This alleged independent agreement is inconsistent with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement," (id. at p. 1285) and concluded that "Since Chmiel's independent contract claim concerns a job position governed by the collective bargaining agreement, it is completely preempted by section 301." (Id. at p. 1286.)

Valdez seeks to distinguish Young by arguing that the job of team leader was not governed by the collective bargaining agreement. This is so, but the argument ignores the fact that Valdez sought to return to a bargaining unit position, and that the alleged contract concerned a return to a bargaining unit position and was clearly inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, under which an employee returning to a union position after being in a management position for more than a year would return without senority.

Having so found, we need not and do not address Lennox Hearth's second argument, that the claim is preempted under section 9a of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 159, subdivision (a).

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ARMSTRONG, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

MOSK, J.

Publication Courtesy of California attorney referral.

Analysis and review provided by Vista Property line attorney.

[1]It is apparently undisputed that Lennox Hearth engages in interstate commerce.

[2]29 U.S.C. section 185, subdivision (a), which provides that "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."