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Filed 5/2/17 Welch v. State Teachers’ Retirement Bd. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
MELANIE WELCH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent.
C079794
(Super. Ct. No.
34200800007702CUWMGDS)
In this case, plaintiff Melanie Welch objected to certain actions taken by defendant
California State Teachers’ Retirement Board (CalSTRS) after CalSTRS -- acting under
the command of a writ of mandate -- reconsidered (and granted) her application for
disability retirement benefits. The trial court overruled Welch’s objections and
discharged the writ. Because Welch’s objections relate to actions taken after CalSTRS
fully complied with the terms of the writ, they were beyond the limited scope of the trial
court’s jurisdiction in this case following issuance of the writ. Accordingly, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We draw the following facts from our prior decision in this case:
In 1998, only a little more than a year after she became a member of CalSTRS,
Welch was physically attacked by a group of students while working as a teacher at a
middle school in Oakland. (Welch v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6 (Welch I).) While she was on administrative leave, a CalSTRS
representative misinformed her that five years of credited service were necessary to apply
for disability retirements benefits. (Id. at pp. 6-7) In fact, however, there was an
exception to the five-year requirement that might have applied to Welch (hereafter, the
bodily injury exception).1
(Id. at p. 7.)
In February 1999, Welch was released from her employment contract. (Welch I,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) In January 2001, a superior court ordered her reinstated.
(Ibid.) In June 2001, the school district once again terminated Welch’s employment, this
time using proper procedures. (Ibid.)
In 2005, Welch learned for the first time of the bodily injury exception and filed
an application with CalSTRS for disability retirement benefits on the ground she had
been disabled by the attack in October 1998. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.)
In February 2006, CalSTRS rejected Welch’s application because the medical
documentation she provided did not substantiate that she had been disabled since her last
day of work. (Ibid.) Welch sought administrative review of the denial, then brought this

1 Under that exception, “a CalSTRS member who has less than five years of
credited service can receive a disability retirement allowance if ‘(1) [t]he member has at
least one year of credited service performed in this state’; ‘(2) [t]he disability is a direct
result of an unlawful act of bodily injury that was perpetrated on his or her person by
another human being while the member was performing his or her official duties in a
position subject to coverage under the Defined Benefit Program’; and ‘(3) [t]he member
provides documentation of the unlawful act in the form of an official police report or
official employer incident report.’ ” (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-7.)
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administrative mandamus proceeding in the Sacramento County Superior Court to
challenge the denial of her application. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)
The trial court found CalSTRS had misinformed Welch about the eligibility
requirements for disability retirement benefits but also found that the weight of the
evidence did not establish that Welch was actually disabled until, at the earliest, August
2005. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 9-10.) Because the Education Code does
not authorize disability retirement for delayed onset cases of disability, the court denied
Welch’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate. (Id. at p. 10.)
On Welch’s appeal, this court pointed out that under subdivision (c) of Education
Code section 22308, CalSTRS may correct all actions taken as a result of its own errors.
(Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14-15.) In light of this provision, we concluded
“the trial court erred in refusing to grant [Welch] any relief based on its finding that
CalSTRS misinformed her in 1999 about the eligibility requirements for disability
retirement benefits.” (Id. at p. 22.) In our view, “[i]t was abuse of discretion for
CalSTRS not to consider whether to apply section 22308 to this case, and if so how.” (Id.
at p. 28.) Thus, we concluded “[t]he matter must be remanded to CalSTRS for CalSTRS
to consider, in the first instance, the proper application of section 22308 here.” (Ibid.)
Our disposition of Welch’s appeal read in its entirety as follows: “The judgment is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new
judgment granting Welch’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The writ shall
direct CalSTRS to vacate its decision denying Welch’s application for disability
retirement benefits and to reconsider whether to grant that application under
section 22308, consistent with this opinion.” (Id. at -pp. 28-29.)
We issued our opinion in January 2012. On June 7, 2012, the trial court entered a
new judgment granting Welch’s mandamus petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of
mandate. In the judgment, the court expressly “reserve[d] jurisdiction in this action until
there has been full compliance with the writ.” On the same day, the court clerk issued a
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writ of mandate in compliance with the judgment that commanded CalSTRS to:
(1) “vacate the decision denying [Welch]’s application for disability retirement benefits,”
(2) “reconsider whether to grant [Welch]’s application for disability retirement benefits
under Education Code, section 22308,” and (3) “make and file a return within 60 days
after issuance of this writ setting forth what you have done to comply with this writ.”
On August 6, 2012, CalSTRS filed a return to the writ stating that CalSTRS had
set aside its decision denying Welch’s application for disability retirement benefits and
was “in the process of reconsidering whether to grant [Welch]’s application.” CalSTRS
further explained that, “[t]o this end, [CalSTRS] will be scheduling one or more
independent medical evaluations . . . of [Welch],” and following those evaluations,
CalSTRS would “issue a new decision regarding [Welch]’s application for disability
retirement benefits.”
In December 2012, Welch filed a motion to vacate the new judgment and the writ
of mandate. In the course of that motion, Welch referenced the return filed by CalSTRS
and complained about CalSTRS’s stated intent to subject her to further medical
evaluations.
In January 2013, the trial court denied Welch’s motion to vacate and noted that
“[i]f [Welch] is attempting to object to [CalSTRS’s] Return, her objection appears to be
premature” because the return was “merely an ‘intermediate’ Return, in that [CalSTRS]
has not yet completed its administrative proceeding and issued a new decision.”
For reasons that we need not concern ourselves with, nearly two years passed
before CalSTRS finally did issue its new decision. In a letter to Welch dated
December 23, 2014, CalSTRS notified her that her application for a disability benefit had
been approved effective July 1, 2001. In that same letter, CalSTRS notified Welch that
“follow up medical examinations may be required,” and “[i]f you are no longer medically
disabled, your disability benefit will stop.” In a follow-up letter dated December 29,
2014, CalSTRS notified Welch of the amount of her disability retirement benefit
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($1,859.21 per month) and also notified her that she would be receiving a retroactive
payment of accrued benefits in the amount of $268,199.84 and an interest penalty in the
amount of $321,576.88.
On January 20, 2015, CalSTRS filed its final return to the writ of mandate, stating
that it had set aside its decision denying Welch’s application for disability benefits and
had approved Welch’s application effective July 1, 2001. In addition, the return provided
information about how CalSTRS had determined the amount of Welch’s retirement
benefit and the amount of interest owed to her. In closing, CalSTRS explained that while
it “endeavored to reach agreement with [Welch] so that no future legal challenges by
[her] would be necessary,” “[t]hese negotiations have proved unsuccessful as [Welch]
disputes [CalSTRS]’s: a) monthly benefit compensation calculation; b) interest
calculations; c) annuity determination; and d) [Welch]’s continuing obligation to
cooperate in providing information regarding her continuing future disability status.”
On March 13, 2015, Welch filed her objection to CalSTRS’s return to the writ of
mandate. In her objection, she requested that the court “require CalSTRS to amend its
Return with additional explanations and information that w[ould] enable [her] to learn the
legal authority for their calculations and interpretations of the sections of the California
Code that theoretically govern their agency.” She further requested that the court “order
CalSTRS to file an amended Return that explains what basis, legal authority, and
fiduciary interest they are basing each component of this benefit package being offered.”
A hearing on Welch’s objection to the return was set for June. CalSTRS filed a
response and its own objections to Welch’s objection, and Welch filed a reply.
Following a hearing on June 26, the trial court found that Welch’s objection to the return
lacked merit and therefore approved the return and discharged the writ. Welch timely
appealed.
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DISCUSSION
“On appeal from an order discharging a writ, the issue is whether the trial court
erred in ruling that the respondent . . . complied with the writ.” (Los Angeles Internat.
Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348,
1355.) As we have noted, the writ here commanded CalSTRS to: (1) “vacate the
decision denying [Welch]’s application for disability retirement benefits,” (2) “reconsider
whether to grant [Welch]’s application for disability retirement benefits under Education
Code, section 22308,” and (3) “make and file a return . . . setting forth what you have
done to comply with the writ.”
The record here demonstrates unequivocally that CalSTRS fully complied with all
of the terms of the writ in that CalSTRS: (1) set aside its decision denying Welch’s
application for disability benefits, (2) reconsidered whether to grant that application (and
upon reconsideration approved the application effective July 1, 2001), and (3) filed a
return setting forth what it had done to comply with the writ. Those three actions were all
that were necessary for full compliance. Welch’s complaints in her objection to the
return about (among other things) the amount of her monthly disability retirement
benefit, the amount of interest CalPERS paid her on her retroactive disability retirement
payments, and CalPERS’s assertion that she may be subject to further evaluations in the
future to determine whether she remains disabled are simply beyond the limited scope of
the trial court’s jurisdiction in this case following issuance of the writ of mandate. “The
trial court that issues a writ of mandate retains continuing jurisdiction to make any orders
necessary for complete enforcement of the writ.” (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High
School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) Indeed,
the trial court here specifically recited in the judgment on remand that it “reserve[d]
jurisdiction in this action until there has been full compliance with the writ.” Once
CalSTRS set aside its initial denial of Welch’s application for disability retirement
benefits, reconsidered that application -- whatever the outcome of that reconsideration --
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and filed a return advising the court that it had done both of these things, CalSTRS fully
complied with the writ, and the trial court retained no jurisdiction except that necessary to
acknowledge CalSTRS’s compliance and discharge the writ. The trial court properly
exercised that jurisdiction, leaving nothing for Welch to (validly) complain about. Any
challenge Welch might have to what CalSTRS did after it reconsidered her application
would have had to be the subject of a separate proceeding -- not this one.
DISPOSITION
The order approving the return and discharging the writ is affirmed. CalSTRS
shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
Mauro, J.
/s/
Renner, J.