Whitaker v. Cal. Dept. of Social Services










Filed 11/8/10 Whitaker v. Cal. Dept. of Social Services CA1/4




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

FRED A. WHITAKER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A126704 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG08-414038)

I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Fred A. Whitaker, appearing in propria persona, appeals following the dismissal of his first amended petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus after the superior court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrers of respondents California Department of Social Services and John Wagner (collectively, the State) and County of Alameda, Alameda County Social Services Agency and Yolanda Baldovinos (collectively, the County). Appellant’s petition sought a writ of mandamus overturning the denial of his request for a credit against the $20,004 he claims was unlawfully taken out of his retroactive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) as reimbursement to the County for interim public assistance appellant received while his application for SSI was pending.[1] Appellant claims he should have received compensation in the form of a credit for hours he worked in the County’s Social Services Workfare Program (workfare program) as a condition of receiving interim assistance. Appellant also claims that welfare recipients who participate in workfare programs are entitled to minimum wage protections. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend and therefore we will affirm the judgment of dismissal.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant is a resident of Alameda County who received interim assistance in the form of General Assistance (GA) from the County from approximately August 1996 until January 2005. During this time, appellant’s application for SSI benefits from the federal government was pending. As a recipient of GA, appellant was required to participate in the County’s workfare program whereby GA recipients are sent to perform work for various employers.
The County’s GA is considered a loan; and as a condition of receipt, applicants must agree to repay the aid. (Alameda County General Ordinance § 9-3-5 et seq.) As a condition of receiving GA assistance, appellant executed a series of reimbursement authorizations allowing the County to recover the interim public assistance provided to him out of his retroactive SSI benefits. The reimbursement agreement did not provide for credit to be given for work performed through the workfare program.[2]
While on GA, appellant was assigned to various work sites, including a program called Redwood 415, where he chopped wood alongside paid employees. Appellant was also assigned to do janitorial work for the Salvation Army, where he worked alongside paid employees. He also moved boxes alongside paid County employees. County records show that appellant received $20,004 in GA benefits during the period of time he waited for authorization of SSI.
In or about January 2005, appellant was found eligible for SSI benefits retroactive to his original application, which was filed in approximately July 1995. County records indicate that appellant’s total retroactive SSI benefit was $54,464. Appellant obtained information in or about January 2005 from the Social Security Administration that $20,004 had been taken from his retroactive SSI benefits to repay the County for the GA benefits that he received.
Appellant first initiated an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge from the State Department of Social Services. He argued that he should have been credited for the value of the work he performed while he was on GA, thereby reducing the amount that he owed the County. Appellant was denied relief.
After appellant exhausted all administrative remedies available to him, he filed a petition for writ of mandate in October 2008. The petition alleged that both the State and the County violated numerous constitutional, statutory, and equitable mandates by deducting the entire amount appellant received in GA benefits from appellant’s retroactive SSI benefits without crediting him for the value of the work he performed. On March 10, 2009, the trial court sustained the demurrers filed by the State and the County to appellant’s petition with leave to amend.
In a first amended petition filed on March 26, 2009, appellant added nothing new to his factual allegations. He once again claimed, “County Respondents operate a GA program that fails to compensate or credit . . . using at least the state minimum wage, recipients who perform Workfare . . . .” Appellant alleged that he and other GA recipients worked under similar working conditions alongside other employees who were paid at least the state minimum wage, yet appellant and other GA recipients were not similarly compensated. He claimed that this state of affairs violated, among other provisions, California labor laws; the equal protection and due process clauses contained in article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution; the prohibition against involuntary servitude under article 1, section 6 of the California Constitution; and the equitable principle of quantum meruit.
County and state respondents again filed demurrers. On July 7, 2009, the trial court sustained respondents’ demurrers to the first amended petition for writ of mandate without leave to amend and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.
III.
DISCUSSION
The standard of review governing an appeal from the judgment after the trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend is well established. “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Representing himself in propria persona[3] and unmindful of proper appellate procedure, appellant’s briefing on appeal discusses his claims against respondents in a confusing series of conclusory allegations, many of which are made for the first time on appeal. Appellant lists no less than 10 legal arguments for our review. However, most of these issues are redundant or unintelligible. The brief is disorganized, repetitive, and largely incoherent. Despite the requirement that appellate briefs state each point under a separate heading summarizing the point, followed by argument and citation to authority, many of appellant’s headings contain multiple points, and his arguments are often unrelated to the point or points made in the heading. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Appellant also has failed to provide any coherent legal argument supporting his legal theories and has not explained the relevance of the various statutes and cases that he does cite. Furthermore, his brief does not state the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, the challenged court rulings, nor does it contain a summary of the significant facts. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1), (2)(A-C).)
The deficiencies in appellant’s briefing have already been pointed out to him. Appellant’s original brief, which was lodged with this court in connection with his application for permission to file this appeal, was returned to him with directions to “file a proper opening brief.” (Order, Jan. 26, 2010, McGuiness, A.P.J.) Despite this warning, appellant has filed another brief seriously out of compliance with the California Rules of Court. (See Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1116-1117 [court has discretion to dismiss appeal for failure to file subsequent brief substantially in compliance with rules after order striking one nonconforming brief with leave to file new brief].)
Appellant’s in propria persona status does not entitle him to any special treatment. “When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys [citations]. Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney [citation].” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639, fn. omitted; see also Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.)
Appellant’s claims are therefore waived. “We [can address only] those arguments that are sufficiently developed to be cognizable. To the extent [appellant] perfunctorily asserts [his] claims, without development and, indeed, without a clear indication that they are intended to be discrete contentions, they are not properly made, and are rejected on that basis.” (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19, overruled on different grounds in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5.) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citations.]” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [where point is merely asserted by appellant without argument or authority, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by reviewing court].) Nevertheless, we proceed to provide a brief discussion of the main points raised on appeal, as we understand them, in order to lay to rest any doubt that the trial court’s ruling dismissing appellant’s first amended petition was correct.
The various causes of action pled or implied by the first amended complaint are all based upon the propriety of the County’s recoupment of $20,004 as reimbursement for the interim general assistance paid to appellant while his application for SSI benefits was pending. Not only is there no law prohibiting the County from taking such action, but the County’s actions in recovering the full amount of appellant’s interim assistance was expressly authorized under federal law.
The United States Code expressly provides for reimbursement of such interim assistance payments when SSI is approved: “[T]he Commissioner of Social Security may, upon written authorization by an individual, withhold benefits due with respect to that individual and may pay to a State (or a political subdivision thereof if agreed to by the Commissioner of Social Security and the State) from the benefits withheld an amount sufficient to reimburse the State (or political subdivision) for interim assistance furnished on behalf of the individual by the State (or political subdivision).” (42 U.S.C., § 1383(g)(1).) As a condition of his receipt of interim assistance benefits from the County, Whitaker admits that he signed repeated authorizations allowing the County to recover the interim assistance from his retroactive SSI benefits. It has been held that “the effect of § 1383(g)(1) and (2) is to make a state which supplies interim assistance a preferred creditor as to the first SSI payment.” (Inman v. Department of Social Services (Mich.App. 1980) 296 N.W.2d 232, 235, original italics.)
Federal regulations further clarify the right of the County to be reimbursed for these funds. “[W]e may withhold your SSI benefit[s] . . . and send them to the State (or a political subdivision of the State) as repayment for interim assistance it gave you while your application for SSI was pending . . . .” (20 C.F.R. § 416.1901 (2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1904 (2010) [“We may withhold your SSI benefit payment and send it to the State to repay the State for the interim assistance it gave to you if—[¶] (a) We have an interim assistance agreement with the State . . . and [¶] (b) Your authorization is in effect . . . .”].)
Following federal law, a state appellate court has expressly recognized the County’s right to reimbursement for interim assistance from a recipient’s subsequent SSI benefits. “The Social Security Act authorizes the withholding of benefits due, upon agreement with the individual applicant, for the purpose of reimbursing the state or county for interim assistance furnished to meet an eligible applicant’s basic needs after he or she has applied for benefits but has not yet received the initial payment. [Citation.]” (Neal v. County of Stanislaus (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 534, 536, fn. omitted.)
Does the fact that appellant was required to participate in a workfare program in order to receive interim public assistance impact the County’s right to recover the full amount of interim public assistance that was provided appellant while his application for SSI benefits was pending‌ Appellant appears to urge that a distinction should be made between recipients of interim public assistance who are required to perform employment-related tasks as a condition of receiving interim assistance and recipients who are not required to do so. He argues that this distinction should lead to a different analysis and that he should be reimbursed in accordance with California’s minimum wage law in compensation for work he performed under the County’s workfare program between August 1996 and January 2005.
The case of Johns v. Stewart (10th Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 1544 (Johns), expressly rejected making this distinction. In Johns, recipients of SSI benefits, who had a portion of their SSI benefits withheld as reimbursement for interim public assistance provided by the state, claimed that the state benefits they received did not qualify as interim assistance because these benefits were not simply given to them. Instead, like appellant herein, they were required to earn their benefits by working for them. The Johns court rejected this distinction after “find[ing] nothing in the language of [42 U.S.C] § 1383, its legislative history, or interpretive case law to indicate that Congress intended to . . . exclude benefits provided to ‘workfare’ participants’ ” from the reimbursement mandate. (Johns, supra, at p. 1556.) The court reasoned: “Simply because participants perform a work component as one requirement of their assistance plans does not change the nature of the assistance as provided to them to meet their basic needs.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Johns court held that the addition of a “workfare” component does not impacts the local entity’s right to recover interim assistance under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g), and that a local entity “may properly withhold, from [participants’] SSI benefits, amounts sufficient to reimburse it for [workfare] benefits provided.” (Johns, supra, at p. 1556.)
The Johns court also determined that the beneficiaries of interim public assistance who were required to participate in a workfare program were not employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act; and consequently, they were not entitled to assert causes of action under the state’s minimum wage provisions. Applying the “economic reality” criteria to the facts in Johns, the court endorsed the proposition that even though workfare participants “ ‘may perform the same functions as regular employees at some of the projects to which they are assigned, they differ from state employees in that they do not receive the same salary, safe working conditions, job security, career development, Social Security, pension rights, collective bargaining, or grievance procedures as do the actual employees.’ [Citation.]” (Johns, supra, 57 F.3d at p. 1559, fn. omitted.)
The court below found the Johns holding both relevant and persuasive and so do we. By allowing a local entity to recoup its interim assistance, Congress intended to encourage local governments to provide assistance, when there is no duty to do so, during the often lengthy period of time between application for and receipt of SSI benefits in order to alleviate an applicant’s financial hardship. Although the first SSI check includes retroactive benefits from the time of filing, this does not help those indigent persons who are in immediate need. Thus, local governments are allowed to recoup interim assistance payments in order to encourage them to make such payments in the first instance. To hold that the local entity loses its right to be fully reimbursed merely because there is a work requirement for receiving public assistance or to hold that workfare participants attain the status of government employees entitled to be paid minimum wage would discourage local governments from giving SSI claimants’ interim assistance, defeating the very purpose behind the interim assistance recoupment statutes.
Once the court’s holding in Johns is endorsed, these facts––no matter how inventively they are pled––do not leave appellant with any basis for stating a cognizable cause of action against the County or the State. Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained demurrers to appellant’s first amended petition without leave to amend. Appellant cannot possibly amend the complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the State or the County, nor does the County’s recovery of the interim public assistance it granted appellant conceivably violate the equal protection, due process, or anti-slavery clauses of the California Constitution. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318 [on appeal of an order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend, burden is “squarely” on plaintiff to show a reasonable possibility that defect in complaint can be cured by amendment].)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment dismissing appellant’s first amended petition is affirmed.





_________________________
RUVOLO, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
REARDON, J.


_________________________
SEPULVEDA, J.


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