Willeford v. Sanchez

Filed 3/2/06 Willeford v. Sanchez CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In this case, appellant Roberta Willeford seeks to overturn the ruling of the Superior Court sitting as a probate court in which the court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. We will affirm.

Facts and Proceedings Below^[1]

Appellant Roberta Willeford initiated a proceeding in which she sought to have a 1998 amendment and a 2000 amendment to the living trust of Viola L. Amaral set aside and declared void. Viola Amaral died on April 22, 2003. During her lifetime, Viola Amaral had executed a trust declaration dated November 12, 1991, establishing an inter vivos trust (the Trust). On September 3, 1998, and again on September 26, 2000, Viola Amaral executed documents each of which were entitled Amendment to and Change of Declaration of Trust. Viola Amaral's attorney Robert Sturges prepared the amendments according to her express wishes.

The 1998 amendment reduced Willeford's distribution of the trust estate from 20 percent to 5 percent. The 2000 amendment eliminated any distribution to Willeford.^[2]

On August 7, 2003, Willeford filed a petition to vacate and set aside the two amendments and to declare them null and void. Willeford claimed that she is the niece of Viola Amaral's predeceased spouse, Edward Amaral, and a beneficiary under the terms of the Trust. Willeford maintained that after the death of her uncle, Viola Amaral filed a Spousal Property Petition in an action to probate Edward Amaral's estate.^[3] Willeford had received notice of the petition. Willeford telephoned Viola Amaral and was informed by her that there was a will in existence, prepared and signed by her deceased husband Edward. Willeford was a named beneficiary of her uncle's property in that will. According to Willeford, Viola Amaral told her that if Willeford would not contest the Spousal Property Petition, then upon Viola's death the property of Edward Amaral would be left to Willeford.[4]

In her petition, Willeford claimed that the amendments should be set aside on the following grounds:^[5] 1) Viola Amaral lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the amendments (First Ground); 2) the amendments were not executed in conformance with the law (Second Ground); 3) the amendments were procured through undue influence (Third Ground) and 4) the amendments were procured by fraud and/or duress (Fifth Ground).

Respondents filed a response, followed by a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication. Among other things, respondents presented evidence in the form of a declaration from attorney Robert Sturges that at the time Viola Amaral executed the amendments, she "knew the nature and quality of her acts, the natural objects of her bounty and the nature and extent of her property . . . ." Furthermore, she had no difficulty in expressing herself or putting her thoughts together with logical connections between cause and effect. In addition, respondents presented evidence in the form of a declaration by Patricia Sanchez^[6] that Sanchez had accompanied Viola Amaral to Mr. Sturges's office at her aunt's request and Viola Amaral was articulate and had no difficulty expressing her thoughts, views, questions, requests or instructions. Furthermore, during all of her meetings with Mr. Sturges, her aunt's conversations were fully rational and logical. Respondents' attorney Stephen Heller executed a declaration to which he attached selected pages of testimony given by Roberta Willeford when he deposed her on July 30, 2004.

The hearing on the summary judgment motion was heard on December 30, 2004. On January 4, 2005, Judge Edwards issued a decision granting summary judgment. The judgment from which this appeal is taken followed on March 8, 2005.

On appeal, essentially, Willeford contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment. Alternatively, even if the court was correct in granting summary judgment, it erred in not granting her request to amend the pleadings.

Standard of Review

As we said recently, "[s]ince both summary judgment and summary adjudication motions involve purely questions of law, we review the granting of summary judgment or summary adjudication de novo to ascertain from the papers whether there is a triable issue of material fact. [Citations.] In doing so, we 'consider[ ] all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.)

"In performing an independent review of the granting of summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving party's favor, and (3) the opposition--assuming movant has met its initial burden--to 'decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue. [Citation.]' [Citations.] We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale. [Citation.]" (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.)

As noted, Willeford claimed that there were four grounds for setting aside the amendments: 1) Viola Amaral lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the amendments (First Ground); 2) the amendments were not executed in conformance with the law (Second Ground); 3) the amendments were procured through undue influence (Third Ground) and 4) the amendments were procured by fraud and/or duress (Fifth Ground). We address each of these grounds separately.

Lack of Testamentary Capacity

In a conclusory manner, Willeford alleged that at the time Viola Amaral executed the amendments, she "was not of sound and disposing mind and lacked testamentary and legal capacity . . . ."

Probate Code section 6100.5 sets forth the standard for determining testamentary capacity to execute a testamentary instrument. "(a) An individual is not mentally competent to make a will if at the time of making the will either of the following is true: [¶] (1) The individual does not have sufficient mental capacity to be able to (A) understand the nature of the testamentary act, (B) understand and recollect the nature and situation of the individual's property, or (C) remember and understand the individual's relations to living descendants, spouse, and parents, and those whose interests are affected by the will. [¶] (2) The individual suffers from a mental disorder with symptoms including delusions or hallucinations, which delusions or hallucinations result in the individual's devising property in a way which, except for the existence of the delusions or hallucinations, the individual would not have done."

Although section 6100.5^[7] refers to testamentary capacity in relation to the execution of a will, we see no reason not to apply the same standard when evaluating the validity of a trust instrument.

To support their position that Viola Amaral was of sound and disposing mind at the time she executed the amendments, respondents submitted the declaration of Patricia Sanchez^[8] and that of Viola Amaral's attorney Robert Sturges, who prepared and witnessed the execution of the amendments. Both Patricia Sanchez and Robert Sturges testified that at the time Viola Amaral executed the amendments she was articulate and had no difficulty expressing her thoughts, views and questions. She was intellectually vigorous, capable, rational and logical and mentally alert. She demonstrated that she understood the nature and effect of the changes she was making by executing the amendments. Furthermore, she showed no indication of any confusion, mental impairment or mental disorder. In addition, respondents presented evidence that in her deposition, Willeford admitted that she had no personal knowledge and no information from any other source as to whether Viola Amaral was mentally or physically impaired in any way at the time she executed the amendments. Thus, we conclude the court below properly granted summary adjudication of the first ground for setting aside the amendments.

Execution of Trust Amendments

Again, in a conclusory manner Willeford alleges that the amendments "were not executed by the decedent in the manner and form required by law."

Section 15402 provides that a revocable trust instrument may be modified by the settler, "by the procedure for revocation." Section 15401, subdivision (a) provides that a "trust that is revocable by the settlor may be revoked in whole or in part by any of the following methods: [¶] (1) By compliance with any method of revocation provided in the trust instrument. [¶] (2) By a writing (other than a will) signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee during the lifetime of the settlor." Paragraph 1.02 of Viola Amaral's trust provides that "[w]hile living and competent, the Trustor may, at any time and from time to time, by written notice signed by the Trustor and delivered to the Trustee: [¶] (a) Revoke or change the interest in any trust created or to be created pursuant to this Declaration of any beneficiary named in this Declaration or in any amendment to this Declaration. [¶] (b) Amend any provision of this Declaration or any amendment to this Declaration to such extent as may be acceptable to the Trustee."

The record reflects that the amendments are both written instruments signed by Viola Amaral. One was signed on September 3, 1998, the other on September 26, 2000. Since Viola Amaral was the Settlor, the Trustor and the Trustee we can safely assume that the amendments were delivered to the Trustee.

Accordingly, we conclude the court below properly granted summary adjudication of the second ground for setting aside the amendments.

Undue Influence

Willeford alleged that at the time Viola Amaral executed the amendments she was acting under the undue influence of "all or some of respondents."^[9]

"Undue influence is pressure brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome the testator's free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the testator's free agency. [Citations.]" (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 96.)

Essentially, respondents' evidence was the same as that presented to refute the first ground for setting aside the amendments. That is, the declarations of Patricia Sanchez and attorney Robert Sturges. Again, respondents presented evidence that in her deposition Willeford admitted that she had no personal knowledge, no basis for any belief, and no information from any source to support her allegation that Viola Amaral had been subjected to any coercion, threats or undue influence at the time she executed the amendments. Accordingly, we conclude the court below properly granted summary adjudication of the third ground for setting aside the amendments.

Fraud and Duress

Willeford alleged that the amendments "were procured and obtained by fraud of decedent and duress upon decedent in that decedent either did not intend to fulfill her promise and representations to [Willeford] made to [Willeford] . . . ."

In order for the amendments to have been procured or obtained by deceit, the fraud had to be perpetrated against Viola Amaral, not by her. (See Estate of Newhall (1923) 190 Cal. 709, 718 ["In cases where fraud . . . is relied upon as a ground of contest it is the theory of the law that the testator, even though acting, in a manner of speaking, of his own free will, was, nevertheless, deceived by false data into doing that which he would not have done had he not been fraudulently imposed upon"].) The elements of fraud in the procurement of a testamentary instrument are the same as those required to vitiate a contract. "One of the necessary elements is an intent to deceive the decedent or an intent to induce decedent to execute his will. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 719, italics added.)[10]

Again, respondents presented evidence that Willeford conceded that the amendments were not the product of fraud or duress perpetrated on Viola Amaral.^[11]

In her memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Willeford argued that she had stated a cause of action against respondents for equitable relief justifying the imposition of a constructive trust over the property that belonged to her uncle, Edward Amaral. Willeford cited legal authority discussing the concept of equitable estoppel, quasi-contractual recovery and unjust enrichment. Willeford contended that under the facts presented, respondents should not be permitted to avoid or deny the existence of the "contract" Viola Amaral made with her. Willeford renews this argument on appeal.

" 'Quasi-specific performance' is a term used for enforcement of a contract to make a will because the court cannot compel the making of a will but rather declares a constructive trust upon the property in the hands of those who have succeeded to the estate, which is in effect the equivalent of specific performance. [Citations.]" (Walton v. Walton (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 277, 282, fn. 2.) In other words, "under certain circumstances equity will give relief equivalent to specific performance by impressing a constructive trust upon the property which decedent had promised to leave to plaintiff." (Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127, 130.)

Willeford asserts that it "has long been the law in California that equitable estoppel princip[les] are available to enforce oral agreements to make a will or devise." We agree. We point out, however, it has long been settled that equitable estoppel is a question of fact that must be pleaded and proved. (Fair Oaks Bank v. Johnson (1926) 198 Cal. 196, 201.) In addition, it is well settled that a party who has an opportunity to plead estoppel on which a cause of action is premised must do so, and that an eventual failure to so plead constitutes a waiver of estoppel. (California Teachers' Assn. v. Governing Board (1975) 145 Cal.App.3d 735, 746.)

Willeford argues that the trial court should have granted her request to amend the pleadings. She asserts, "while not specifically naming as a cause of action for equitable estoppel and/or quasi-specific performance", the petition "does contain most of the factual support for the claim. To the extent that the pleadings are imperfect, [she] should have been granted leave to amend her petition to correctly state the claim as a matter of law."

Initially, we note that Judge Edwards's decision reflects that he considered Willeford's request to amend her pleadings. It appears that Judge Edwards believed that even if he granted leave to amend, he did not have jurisdiction over an action for quasi-specific performance.

Here, we are not required to determine if Judge Edwards was correct or not. As noted, "[w]e need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale. [Citation.]" (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.)

Assuming arguendo that Willeford had been granted leave to amend and that Judge Edwards had jurisdiction over the quasi-specific performance claim, we foresee another bar to her claim.

We are in no doubt this proceeding is equitable in nature and that the "clean hands" doctrine is applicable. That is, a party is barred from relief if he or she has engaged in any "unconscientious" conduct directly related to the transaction or matter before the court. (Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 562, 573.) "The general principle behind the 'clean hands' doctrine is that a court will neither aid in the commission of a fraud by enforcing a contract, nor relieve one of two parties to a fraud from its consequences, where both are in pari delicto." (Ibid.) " 'This maxim is far more than a mere banality. It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant. That doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of [a] court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. This presupposes a refusal on its part to be "the abetter of iniquity." ' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 573-574.)

Here, Willeford's claim of quasi-specific performance is premised on her refraining from contesting the spousal property petition filed by Viola Amaral. Accepting as true, for the sake of argument, Willeford's claims concerning the will and the divorce, Willeford was prepared to permit Viola Amaral to perpetrate a fraud on the court by asserting that there was no will and that she was married to Edward Amaral at the time he purchased certain property. Thus, in exchange for a promise that she would inherit Edward Amaral's property on Viola Amaral's death, Willeford permitted Viola Amaral to lie to the court in her spousal property petition. We find this behavior unconscionable.

The clean hands doctrine does not require the party seeking relief to be guilty of fraud; it is sufficient if he or she merely acted unconscionably. (DeGarmo v. Goldman (1942) 19 Cal.2d 755, 765.) Here, Willeford's evidence indicates she was willing to keep quiet to assist Viola Amaral's wrongful conduct. It is settled in California, " 'whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, good faith or other equitable principle' " in their prior conduct, " 'then the doors of the court will be shut against [them] in limine; the court will refuse to interfere' " on their behalf to acknowledge their right, or to afford them any remedy. (Moriarty v. Carlson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 51, 55.)

Accordingly, as to all grounds for setting aside the amendments, we affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Appellant is to bear the costs of appeal.

_____________________________

ELIA, J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________________

PREMO, Acting P. J.

_______________________________________

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

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[1] Essentially, the facts are not in dispute. They are taken from the moving defendants' statement of undisputed facts and/or from documents submitted in evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.

[2] Hereinafter, we refer to the 1998 amendment and 2000 amendment collectively as the amendments.

[3] The Spousal Property Petition stated that Edward Amaral had died intestate and requested that his property pass to his surviving spouse.

[4] In a separate statement of undisputed material facts, Willeford also alleged that she asked Viola Amaral if her attorney knew that Edward and Viola were divorced. The record indicates that an interlocutory judgment of divorce was filed in 1958. Attached to the judgment is a property settlement agreement. The agreement dated May 1958 was between Edward Amaral and Viola Amaral. They agreed that all property acquired would be the "sole and separate property of the party acquiring the same." The record does not indicate whether Edward and Viola finalized their divorce. However, we find nothing in the record from respondents disputing the validity of the foregoing documents. Respondents filed a reply memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion for summary adjudication dismissing Willeford's allegations as immaterial, without specifically refuting her allegations.

[5] The various grounds in the petition for setting aside the amendments are separately labeled in the petition similar to causes of action in a complaint. Although Willeford pleaded five grounds for setting aside the amendments, the "Fourth Ground" merely sets forth the names, ages and addresses of Viola Amaral's heirs. Thus, essentially, there are four not five grounds upon which the petition is predicated.

[6] Patricia Sanchez is the late Viola Amaral's niece and successor trustee of her Trust.

[7] Unless noted, all undesignated section references are to the Probate Code.

[8] It is noteworthy that Sanchez's share of Viola Amaral's trust was not changed by the amendments.

[9] Willeford named the following as respondents: Patricia Sanchez, Flora Paganelli, Dawn Waterhouse, Ralph Paganelli, Dolores Beneneto and Does 1 through 10.

[10] We note that this case is concerned with the execution of a will. Again, however, we see no reason not to apply the same standard when evaluating the validity of a trust instrument.

[11] In fact, Willeford conceded that grounds one, two and three had no basis in fact. Furthermore, before the hearing on the summary judgment motion she moved to dismiss without prejudice grounds one, two and three. After judgment was rendered, Willeford filed a "NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RENEWAL AND/OR CORRECTION OF RECORD RE ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE OF JURISDICTION AND VACATING PORTIONS OF THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION." Willeford argued that before the hearing on respondents' motion for summary judgment, she had dismissed grounds one through three. Thus, the court was divested of jurisdiction to rule on those grounds. We note that Willeford does not raise this as an issue on appeal.