Williams v. Meyer
Filed 7/3/13 Williams v. Meyer CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
CHRISTINA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
ROGER MEYER,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Civil No.
B243491
(Super. Ct. No.
56-2009-00357893-
CU-OR-VTA)
(Ventura
County)
ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)
THE
COURT:
IT
IS ORDERED that the opinion filed herein on June 4, 2013, be modified
as follows:
1. On page 5, second line from the top of the
page, following the sentencing ending with "disturb.", add the
following text:
(Accord,
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304 ["'a trial court has broad discretion in
allowing relief from a late filing [seeking attorney's fees under the
predecessor to Rule 3.1702(b)(1)] where . . . there is an absence of a showing
of prejudice to the opposing party'"].)
There
is no change in the judgment.
Plaintiff
and Appellant Williams's petition for rehearing is denied.
>
Filed
6/4/13 (unmodified version)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
CHRISTINA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
ROGER MEYER,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Civil No. B243491
(Super. Ct. No.
56-2009-00357893-
CU-OR-VTA)
(Ventura
County)
In their appeals,
Christina Williams (Williams) and Roger Meyer (Meyer) each challenge the trial
court's award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717.
consider whether to grant Williams's request for an offset.
Since 2000, Williams has
been the sole owner of a home in Newbury Park, California. In 2008, she and her estranged husband
cosigned a promissory note and deed of trust for a $35,000 loan from Meyer
secured by her home (First Note). A few
months later, Williams's husband signed a second promissory note and deed of
trust for a $143,775 loan from Meyer, also secured by Williams's home (Second
Note). Williams had no knowledge of the
second loan or deed of trust. Both notes
have attorney fees provisions.
Williams sued Meyer to
invalidate both notes. Among other
things, she alleged that the First Note had a usurious interest rate and that
her husband had repaid the note in full through his labor, entitling her to
reconveyance of the deed of trust. She
further alleged that Meyer's recording of the Second Note constituted a slander
of her title to the home that had clouded title, causing her to be ineligible
for refinancing to a lower interest rate and to incur attorney fees. Meyer counter-sued, alleging that Williams
breached and committed fraud with regard to the Second Note.
On the eve of trial, the
parties effectively settled their dispute over the First Note by stipulating to
(1) reduce the face amount of that note from $35,000 to $33,450; (2) lower the
interest rate from 12.99 percent to 7 percent; and (3) reset the accrual date
for interest from December 2008 to June 2009.
Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ruled that Meyer had
slandered the title to Williams's home and awarded her $29,639 in damages due
to lost refinancing opportunities. The
final judgment stated that Williams was "the prevailing party . . .
entitled to her costs." Williams
then filed an unopposed cost bill seeking $7,121.75, and asked the trial court
to offset her damages award and costs against the First Note's outstanding
balance.
The parties filed
cross-motions for attorney fees. The trial court analyzed each Note
separately. As to the First Note, the
court ruled that Meyer had prevailed because Meyer was still to receive $33,450
on the $35,000 note. The court awarded
Meyer $43,750 in attorney's fees under section 1717. As to the Second Note, the court ruled that
Williams was the prevailing party and awarded her $122,500 in attorney fees as
an element of her damages for slander of title and under section 1717.
I. Attorney's
Fees Award on the First Note
A. Prevailing
Party
Williams contends that
the trial court erred in concluding that Meyer (rather than she) was the
prevailing party as to the First Note.
Section 1717 authorizes the award of attorney fees to "the
prevailing party on [a] contract" if the contract "specifically
provides" for such fees. (
(a).) The "party prevailing"
is statutorily defined as the "party who recovered a greater relief in the
action on the contract." (
(b)(1).) It is determined by
"compar[ing] the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the
parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as
disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statement and similar
sources." (Hsu v. Abarra (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876.) Except where one party "obtains a
'simple, unqualified win'" (id. at
p. 877), the trial court has "wide discretion" to decide who is
deemed the "prevailing party."
(Cussler v. Crusader Entertainment
LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 356, 366).
This decision will not be upset unless the trial court "'act[ed] in
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.'" (
188 Cal.App.4th 602, 615-616.)
Williams asserts that
she prevailed on the First Note because she obtained all the relief she
sought—namely, reformation of the note's usurious interest rate. Williams certainly prevailed in this aspect
of her action. But when Williams agreed
to pay $33,450 of the $35,000 note, Meyer
largely prevailed on Williams's broader claim that the note was already paid
off through her husband's labor. Where
each party prevails on different aspects of a claim, the trial court may name
as the prevailing party the party who prevailed on the "most
important" issue. (
Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540.) Williams contends that the "most
important" issue was her usury claim because her victory on this issue
effectuated the constitutional prohibition against usury. (Cal.
Const., art. 15, § 1.) Whether or not
the substantive basis for a claim bears on its importance for purposes of
section 1717, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in focusing on the
relief sought and obtained, and in concluding that the continued validity of
over 95 percent of the note's value was more important than reduction in the
note's interest rate.
Williams also contends
that the trial court's declaration, in the final judgment, that
on the First Note precludes its contrary conclusion in the attorney's fees
order. This argument mixes apples and
oranges. The "prevailing
party" for purposes of assessing costs
is not necessarily the same as for attorney
fees under section 1717 because the governing statutes use different
standards. Courts awarding attorney's
fees under section 1717 look to who obtained the "greater relief" as
to each contract, while courts awarding costs look to who obtained a "net
monetary recovery" in the "overall action." (See Sears
v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142-1143; Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc. (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 230, 239 (Barnhart); see
also Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032.) There is
no inconsistency in the trial court's rulings.
B. Timeliness
Williams alternatively
contends that Meyer's request for attorney fees on the First Note was four days
late and therefore untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702
(b)(1). The parties brought this issue
to the trial court's attention, and the court nonetheless considered Meyer's
request on its merits. Trial courts have
the authority to grant extensions of rule 3.1702's deadline for "good
cause"; they may do so implicitly and even after the deadline has
run. (Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owner Ass'n., Inc. (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 128, 135.) The trial court's
decision to rule on the merits, notwithstanding the untimeliness brought to its
attention, constitutes an implicit finding of "good cause" that we
have no basis to disturb.
II.
Attorney's Fees Award on the
Second Note
Meyer challenges as
legally unfounded the trial court's grant of attorney fees on the Second
Note. Meyer asserts that Williams cannot
collect fees under section 1717 because she is not a signatory (and hence not a
party) to the Second Note. We review
this challenge de novo (Barnhart,
reject it for two reasons. First,
section 1717 "was designed to establish mutuality of remedy
. . . ." (
285.) Consequently, "[a] party is
entitled to recover its attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision . . .
when the party would have been liable for the fees of the opposing party if the
opposing party had prevailed." (
Pasadena (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 375, 382.)
Because Williams would have been liable to Meyer for attorney fees under
the Second Note if Meyer had convinced the trial court that Williams was liable
to him on that Note, Meyer is liable to Williams for these fees when she
prevailed in her claim that she was not.
(Accord, Santisas v. Goodin
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 611.) Second and
alternatively, attorney fees are a valid element of damages for slander of
title. (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030-1031.)
III.
Offset
Williams asked the trial
court to offset her damages against the outstanding balance of the First Note,
but the court apparently did not consider the issue. Because the offset decision can sometimes
rest on equitable considerations (Brienza
v. Tepper (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1847-1848), we remand the case to the
trial court for the limited purpose of considering Williams's request for an offset. We make no suggestion as to how the court
should rule.
The judgment is
affirmed, but remanded to the trial court to consider Williams's request for an
offset. Parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
HOFFSTADT,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
PERREN, J.
Henry
J. Walsh, Judge
Superior
Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Law Office of Richard L.
Francis & Associates, Richard L. Francis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Manfredi, Levine,
Eccles, Miller & Lanson, Don E. Lanson, David V. Hadek, for Defendant and
Appellant.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references
are to the Civil Code.
name="_ftn2" title=""> * (Judge
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. 6, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
