Woods v. Whims

Filed 8/29/06 Woods v. Whims CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard G. Kolostian, Sr., Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Barry Fischer and Barry Fischer for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of Joan L. Adams and Joan L. Adams for Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * * *

A successor trustee objected to the accounting of her predecessor trustee on the ground that unnecessary and excessive legal fees were paid for legal services rendered to the trust. The trial court agreed with the objector and based on a finding that payment of the fees was a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty, surcharged the former trustee $134,424 for the excess payments. This appeal followed. We reject the contentions that the trial court was biased against the former trustee and that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Trust

William T. Carney, settlor of the William T. Carney Revocable Living Trust, died on April 16, 2002. Appellant, Cheri Woods, was named trustee and his niece, Jean Whims, successor trustee under the terms of the trust. The trust provided that after certain enumerated gifts were made, the remaining assets were to be liquidated and distributed to Carney’s niece and nephews who were the residuary beneficiaries. Woods and her daughter were included as beneficiaries of cash gifts of $50,000 and $30,000 respectively, and Whims was a residual beneficiary.

Appointment as Trustee; Accountings

Woods was appointed temporary trustee on June 6, 2002 and confirmed as trustee on July 31, 2002. Trust attorney David Smith handled all proceedings in the probate court with respect to administration of the trust estate. According to the account and report of temporary trustee for the period from June 6, 2002 to July 31, 2002, the trust had assets in excess of $1.4 million at the time of Woods’s initial appointment. During that period, Woods made the specific cash distributions in accordance with the terms of the trust and sold some of the real property assets of the trust. She paid $6,095 in attorney fees to attorney Smith and $33,846 to attorney Lee Grant for litigation instituted on behalf of the trust, plus $15,220 to herself as trustee fees. The accounting was approved and settled on January 24, 2003.

On August 27, 2003, after Whims challenged Woods’s handling of trust assets, Woods resigned as trustee and Whims was appointed trustee in her place. Whims discharged attorney Grant after she was appointed trustee. At that point, no distributions had been made to the residual beneficiaries.

On October 24, 2003, Woods filed her first and final account as trustee, for the period from August 1, 2002 to October 2, 2003, indicating that although she resigned as trustee on August 27, 2003, she continued to perform services on behalf of the trust until the October date. Woods reported in the final account that the value of the estate was then approximately $1.2 million, and that she had paid Grant an additional $123,277.56 for attorney fees for legal services rendered to the trust during the accounting period on six separate matters. She had also paid attorney fees of $29,833 to David Smith for his work in the administration of the trust. In accordance with this and a supplemental accounting, Woods paid herself an additional $24,287.84 for her services as trustee.

Whims filed objections^[1] to Woods’s account and report, alleging that Woods had authorized excessive and unconscionable attorney fees payments to Grant for the following matters^[2]:

1. Paying attorney fees of over $20,000 to Grant to obtain a civil judgment of $26,652 against Sharon Villavicencio, Carney’s former bookkeeper, who had been criminally prosecuted for the same embezzlement and ordered to make restitution of $30,000;

2. Paying over $30,000 in attorney fees to Grant, primarily in an unsuccessful attempt to resist contractual arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Grant against California Federal Bank (Cal Fed) to recover $28,000 in penalties Carney had incurred for the early withdrawal of funds from an annuity he purchased from the bank;

3. Paying attorney fees in excess of $18,000 to prosecute a counterclaim for fraud against Nick Davidovich who sued the trust in small claims court for payment of a $5,000 promissory note, after which the matter was transferred to superior court and Davidovich filed a $650,000 defamation claim; which ultimately ended with both sides filing dismissals;

4. Paying attorney fees of over $33,000 to institute probate proceedings to recover on a promissory note secured by real property held by the trust with a principle balance of $25,000. After the owner Danny Dixon died, leaving the note in default, instead of foreclosing, Grant initiated probate proceedings, had Woods appointed Dixon’s administrator and sold the property for which the trust received $25,000;

5. Paying attorney fees of $7,600 for services rendered in relation to the sale of a 60-acre parcel of land adjoining the Dixon property in Mariposa County when the transaction was handled by a broker and the transfer by an escrow company;

6. Paying attorney fees of $5,000 to file a lawsuit to establish an easement of access for a land locked parcel of land owned by the trust that was situated on a slope and would require construction of a prohibitively expensive road and bridge.

The Trial

The matter was tried in December 2004. Woods’s principal defense was that she had relied on the advice of counsel in executing her trust duties, including authorizing Grant’s activities. The trial court found that her reliance on counsel and her payment of Grant’s fees were unreasonable and in violation of her fiduciary duty to the residual beneficiaries. The court specifically found that Woods and Grant were not credible witnesses and that they were “‘milking’” the trust. The court made a determination of reasonable attorney fees on each of the contested matters, allowing a total of $22,700. Woods was surcharged for the balance as overpayments. The court also sanctioned Woods for a bad faith motion to remove Whims as trustee. A judgment was entered against Woods on April 27, 2005 for $134,424 in surcharges and $1,500 in sanctions, which Woods appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Contentions on Appeal and Standards of Review

Woods contends that the trial court was biased against her and that it applied the wrong standard of care in evaluating her conduct as trustee. She further contends that the trial court made erroneous factual determinations with respect to the reasonableness of her reliance on counsel’s advice and her authorization of Grant’s fees.^[3]

Woods asserts that she is entitled to de novo review of the issue of whether she breached the standard of care as a trustee. But because all of the issues she raises go to the factual question of whether her conduct was reasonable or breached the applicable standard of care, the correct standard of review is whether substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made by the court. (Estate of Gump (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 582, 595 (Gump).) Under this standard “the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in support of the judgment. (Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1454 (Paneno).) When conflicting inferences can be drawn from the facts, we cannot substitute our deductions for those drawn by the trial court. (Kazanteno v. Cal.-Western etc. Ins. Co. (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 361, 363.)

II. The Standard of Care Required of Trustees

Section 16040, subdivision (a) of the California Probate Code describes the standard of care for a trustee: “The trustee shall administer the trust with reasonable care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims to accomplish the purposes of the trust as determined from the trust instrument.”

The Probate Code further provides that a trustee is liable for the acts of an agent “[w]here the trustee does not use reasonable prudence in the selection of the agent or the retention of the agent selected by the trustee.” (Prob. Code, § 16401, subd. (b)(3).)

Woods agrees that as a trustee, she was obliged to act as a reasonably prudent person, but she appears to argue that she met the applicable standard of care as a matter of law because she relied on the advice of counsel and that the trial court thus erred in finding her negligent.

“Negligence, which is the failure to meet the standard of care, is also a breach of trust. . . .” (Gump, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.) While the law may require a trustee to seek expert help where appropriate, such as in legal matters, there is nothing in the statutory or case law that permits a trustee to abdicate her duty to exercise prudence simply because she hired a lawyer. Woods could not blindly follow the advice of counsel no matter how unreasonable and thereby avoid liability as a matter of law. (See Estate of Talbot (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 309 [trustee must exercise independent judgment].)

We have been directed to nothing in the record to support appellant’s assertion that the court made its determination of negligence based on an improper standard of care. In his written ruling, Judge Kolostian noted that a trustee’s actions must be reasonable and commented that Woods was an experienced realtor and that she knew she was wasting trust money in paying the attorney fees that she did. As such, he found that Woods’s actions were not reasonable. Woods has failed to demonstrate any error in the standard of care applied by the trial court to her actions as trustee.

III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Judgment

A. Witness Credibility

The trial court specifically found that Woods and Grant were not credible witnesses. We must accept the trial court’s determinations on credibility because the trial court is in the better position to assess the veracity of witnesses appearing before it. (Maslow v. Maslow (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 237, 243, overruled on another ground in Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278, 287, fn. 3.) Evidence will be disregarded on appeal for credibility reasons only if “inherently improbable“ or “implausible” in the strictest sense: i.e., it must appear that the truth of the testimony was physically impossible or the falsity of the testimony must otherwise “be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” (Evje v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492.)

We find no inherent improbability or implausibility here. The court discounted Grant’s veracity because many of his fees were grossly out of proportion to and in some cases exceeded the amount of money in dispute. In addition, the court noted that Grant merely “glossed over” his description of services in his attachment to Woods’s accounting. The evidence showed that Woods herself questioned Grant’s veracity while he served as the trust’s lawyer. For example, she contended that Grant failed to fully apprise her of the fact that most of his fees in the Cal Fed litigation were earned contesting the contractual arbitration clause. And she complained in a letter to Whims of Grant’s unresponsiveness.

Of course, this evidence also reflects badly on Woods’s continued employment of Grant. The record supports the separate conclusion that she was guilty of more than just poor judgment. While Woods claimed to be ignorant of Grant’s expending fees to contest the arbitration clause, the evidence included her signed declaration used to oppose contractual arbitration. Furthermore, she received and approved billing statements clearly describing those services. Although Woods was a licensed real estate agent, she testified she did not understand the difference between a foreclosure and the probate proceeding initiated with respect to the Dixon property. There were also numerous instances in the transcript where Woods appeared evasive in her testimony. In short, the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility was well-grounded in the record.

B. The Fees Awarded Were Reasonable

Because there was no evidence at trial of a fee agreement for any of the matters, Grant was entitled only to the reasonable value of his efforts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6147, 6148.) Rule 4-200 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct provides that the reasonableness of fees is to be judged against a number of factors including the time actually spent, the benefit to the client, the necessity and complexity of the litigation and the experience of the attorney. With respect to Grant’s experience, the trial court had evidence that he was an experienced civil litigator who typically charged $350 an hour.

Although the issue of the reasonableness of Grant’s fees is separate from the reasonableness of Woods’s payment of those fees, both issues are essentially based on the same facts.^[4] In a few instances those facts were not seriously disputed. For example, Woods paid over $14,000 in fees that were not substantiated by any statements, and Woods conceded that there were mathematical errors of at least $1,500 in the accountings of Grant’s fees. But the balance of the trial evidence was in sharp dispute. In our discussion of the evidence that follows, we resolve all factual disputes in favor of the judgment. (Paneno, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454.)

1. California Federal Bank

Woods authorized the payment of $37,600 in attorney fees and costs to Grant to pursue a lawsuit against Cal Fed. The trial court determined that reasonable fees for those services were $10,000.

There were two issues involved in this litigation. First, Grant recommended and was authorized to pursue a conversion claim against the bank for freezing the trust’s account due to confusion over Woods’s authority as trustee. Woods claimed that this lawsuit was necessary to obtain money urgently needed for the operation of trust assets. Whims, on the other hand, testified that funds from another account were available to pay immediate trust expenses. In the meantime, Smith sought confirmation of Woods as trustee in the probate court, for which he was also paid attorney fees, and shortly after Woods was confirmed as temporary trustee, $130,000 was released. The evidence of duplicative services supports the finding that Grant’s fees and Woods’s authorization of them were unreasonable.

Second, Carney had been charged $28,000 in penalties for the early withdrawal of money from an annuity he purchased from Cal Fed. Grant included a claim for fraud against the bank for selling a 10-year annuity to a 91-year-old. Whims argued that the most the trust could likely recover on the claim was Carney’s actual damages of $28,000. Whims also presented evidence that Grant’s legal fees were largely attributable to an ill-advised attempt to avoid contractual arbitration, that the lawsuit risked potential trust liability for the bank’s attorney fees if it lost, and that Grant and Woods eventually concluded that the matter should be dismissed. Grant testified that his fees were justified given the potential for recovering punitive damages. Woods defended by claiming she did not know most of Grant’s fees were attributable to resisting arbitration.

The evidence supports the finding that Grant’s fees were unreasonable because they exceeded the actual damages in the case and the risk of incurring liability for Cal Fed’s attorney fees far outweighed any potential for recovering punitive damages. Woods’s claim that she was unaware of Grant’s resisting arbitration is contradicted by her signed declaration filed in opposition to Cal Fed’s motion to compel arbitration and by Grant’s delineation on his attorney fees statements of the time spent on that issue. We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Woods’s authorization of these fees was unreasonable and that the fees awarded by the court were reasonable. Discounting as duplicative and unnecessary Grant’s fees with respect to freeing the frozen funds, $10,000 in fees is proportionate to a potential recovery of $28,000.

2. Villavicencio

Grant was paid $23,636 to recover money embezzled by Carney’s former bookkeeper, Sharon Villavicencio. Grant charged for instituting a civil suit against Villavicencio and for conferring with the district attorney in the criminal action against her. Villavicencio was ultimately imprisoned for her crime and ordered to pay restitution of $30,000 in monthly payments of $200. In the meantime, Grant obtained a civil judgment against Villavicencio for $26,652 for the same wrongdoing. Less than $1,000 was ultimately collected from Villavicencio.

Whims objected on the grounds that Villancencio earned under $10 an hour as a bookkeeper and was imprisoned, so could not satisfy either the restitution order or the duplicative civil judgment. She testified that the trust had received virtually no benefit from Grant’s efforts. Woods offered Grant’s deposition testimony to show that his involvement in the criminal prosecution contributed to the issuance of the restitution order and that Grant had evidence that Villavicencio had embezzled over $56,000, which justified pursuing a civil judgment. He denied that the civil judgment was duplicative of the restitution order.

The court’s allowance of $5,000 and a surcharge against Woods for excessive fees is supported by this record. Neither Woods nor Grant provided any explanation for pursuing a civil judgment against a woman with few or no assets. The decision to do so is even more inexplicable given the existence of the restitution order for the same funds.

3. Davidovich

Nick Davidovich sued the trust in small claims court on a $5,000 promissory note, purportedly signed by Carney. Woods believed that the note was forged and authorized a counterclaim for $9,000 plus punitive damages for fraud, causing the case to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court and forcing a transfer to the superior court. Davidovich then added a slander claim against Woods for $650,000. Eventually both sides dismissed their claims. Grant charged the trust $18,900 in attorney fees.

Whims objected that the fees were disproportionate to the $5,000 risk posed by the original suit. She also testified that she believed Carney’s signature on the note was genuine. Woods argued that because Carney and Davidovich had a contentious history, she vigorously opposed the small claims action in order to deter future claims. Grant testified that he advised Woods to transfer the case to superior court because she was more likely to get a fair trial when represented by an attorney, which was not possible in small claims court. He also testified that his services benefited the trust by $609,000.

Calling this case the “poster child of Trustee incompetence or dishonesty,” the trial court allowed $200 in legal fees. We agree with the trial court that no rational explanation was ever offered by either Grant or Woods as to why a superior court judgment could better deter future fraudulent claims than a small claims judgment. We are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that attorney fees of $200 were reasonable under the circumstances.

4. Mariposa Property and Dixon Estate

The trust had interests in two adjacent parcels of land in Mariposa County. Grant was paid $45,498.35 in fees for services related to the sale of those properties, of which the trial court allowed $5,000.

Most of Grant’s fees related to the parcel owned by Danny Dixon. Dixon owed the Trust $25,000 on a promissory note secured by a first trust deed on the property. The note was in default when Dixon died. Rather than foreclose on the property to collect the debt, Woods authorized the filing of a probate action and was named administratrix of Dixon’s estate. At the same time, Grant and Woods took steps to sell the other parcel. While it was not established whether the two parcels were sold to the same buyer, there was evidence that it was their intent to do so.

Whims contended that a foreclosure would have cost the trust $1,925 for the same result and that even if the probate was warranted, because it was not contested, the amount of fees charged was not justified. She also contended that the personal involvement of Grant and Woods in selling the other parcel was unnecessary as it was sold through a local real estate agent and the transfer was handled by an escrow company. Additionally, she presented evidence that many of the specific fees were for unnecessary services, including a charge of $875 for time spent in notarizing a deed and charges for multiple trips to Mariposa for activities that could have been handled over the telephone. She also established that Woods was paid an additional fee by the trust to administer the Dixon estate.

Woods presented evidence that a foreclosure was not possible after Dixon died until probate proceedings were instituted, and that clear title to the Dixon property added value to the adjoining parcel as the two could be sold together. She testified that while she considered foreclosure rather than probate, she nevertheless “followed the advice of my two attorneys . . . .” But Grant testified that he relied on Woods and Smith’s judgment in bringing the probate matter instead of foreclosing.

The trial court’s conclusion that $5,000 in fees was reasonable is supported by the fact that the most the trust could receive on the Dixon promissory note was $25,000. Given that the sale of the other parcel, either with or without the Dixon parcel, was handled by a local real estate agent and Woods was a licensed real estate agent, no reasonable basis was provided for the necessity of Grant’s involvement in that sale. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Woods’s authorization of any fees over $5,000 under these circumstances was unreasonable.

5. Sun Valley Property

Grant was paid a $5,000 retainer to obtain an access easement over adjoining property for the land-locked Sun Valley parcel. The trial court allowed $2,500 in fees.

Whims testified that after Grant had already generated legal costs toward obtaining an easement, attorney Smith and Woods informed her that the property, which was located in a gully, was useless and did not warrant seeking an easement. Even if an easement were obtained, a 750-foot access road and bridge have had to be built, lowering the value of the property. Whims also provided evidence that Grant was not diligent in pursuing the easement and that his services did not justify the retainer. Woods defended her initial decision to pursue an easement based on appraisals showing that the property was worth between $4,000 and $10,000 without an easement and $300,000 with an easement.

The evidence that Woods eventually concluded that an easement would add little or nothing to the value of the property and that Grant performed only limited services toward procuring the easement supports the court’s surcharge of $2,500.

We conclude that the trial court’s determination of reasonable and necessary attorney fees in each of the foregoing matters was supported by substantial evidence.

C. Imposition of the Surcharge was Warranted

Woods does not dispute that the trust paid a total of $157,124 to Grant for attorney fees. The trial court deemed that a total of $22,700 in fees was reasonable and surcharged Woods $134,424 for the excess. Woods does not challenge the calculation of the surcharge per se except to argue, without legal support or citation to the record, that the award should be reduced by an unspecified amount. “We discuss those arguments that are sufficiently developed to be cognizable. To the extent [appellant] perfunctorily asserts other claims, without development and, indeed, without a clear indication that they are intended to be discrete contentions, they are not properly made, and are rejected on that basis.” (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 214, fn. 19.)

IV. No Indication of Judicial Bias

Woods claims the trial court was biased against her because she had a criminal record of incarceration for prostitution and pandering. We find no indication of judicial bias in our review of the record.

Woods rests her allegation of bias on the following trial excerpt, which occurred near the end of plaintiff’s case-in-chief and refers to the attorney fees the trust paid in the Davidovich lawsuit:

“THE COURT: That was the question. What did it [the Davidovich case] cost? I can’t imagine spending $18,500 on a five-thousand-dollar note. That is incompetent or dishonest.

“MR. WILLIAMS: If I may, Your Honor, if Your Honor would reserve judgment until you reviewed the deposition testimony [of Grant].

“THE COURT: Counsel, five-thousand-dollar note you are going to spend $18,000? How is that not incompetence or dishonesty?

“MR. WILLIAMS: Well, may I stand to address the court?

“THE COURT: No. Counsel, you don’t spend $18,000 to get rid of a five-thousand-dollar debt.

“MR. WILLIAMS: You do if you think forged notes are going to follow.

“THE COURT: This theory is bogus and anyone who says that is dishonest. You know any argument like that. Any lawyer that makes that is ridiculous.

“You go to small claims and you bring your expert in. You can show it is forged or whatever but [$18,000] is absurd.

“Let’s go on. Continue cross-examination.”

While the judge’s comments were terse, we find that rather than bias they reflect the trial court’s view of the defendant’s evidence and legal theories at that stage of the litigation. Such statements by the court are well within the mandate of a court in carrying out its duties as a trier of fact. “It is well settled in this state that the expressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he conceives to be a discharge of his official duties, are not evidence of bias or prejudice. [Citations.]” (Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 310-311.) The conduct of a fair trial “often . . . requires an expression of the conclusions of the trial judge up to the moment, in order that counsel may be advised what course to chart,” and do not necessarily support an inference that the judge’s mind is closed to further evidence and argument. (Gary v. Avery (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 574, 579.)

Here, the judge had reviewed the entire file before the trial began and was familiar with the parties’ legal theories and factual contentions. By any objective standard, the fees in the Davidovich matter were disproportionate without some rational justification. Under these circumstances, the judge’s comments signaled to appellant’s counsel that he bore a heavy burden to dispel the evidence already before the court. But the comments did not indicate that the judge would not consider hearing appellant’s evidence. Indeed, the record shows that appellant had ample opportunity to explain her case. Grant’s testimony explaining his reasons for his handling of the Davidovich matter was offered by way of deposition transcript which the court considered, partially by viewing a DVD and partially by reading the transcript. Woods testified and explained her role in authorizing payment of the fees. Woods’s expert also opined that the fees were reasonable and explained the bases for his opinion. It is clear that Woods had every opportunity to convince the court that the expenditure of fees was reasonable. Ultimately the court ruled against Woods on this issue, but we see no indication that the ruling was based on anything other than the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and its weighing of all of the evidence.

We find other deficiencies in Woods’s claim of judicial bias as well. The source of the bias was purportedly her criminal background. Yet the only reference to her background occurred after the judge had made the statements to which Woods now assigns error. At that time, the court sustained Woods’s objection to reference of Woods’s felony convictions as lacking a foundation in the evidence. (See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1206.) To the degree Woods relies on the fact that the judge may have been familiar with Woods’s record from prior proceedings, her argument fails. Woods has not provided a sufficient record on appeal to support her argument. While it appears that Woods’s felony convictions may have been introduced in the underlying litigation some three and one-half years prior to the proceedings at issue, no such evidence is part of the appellate record. (Osgood, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 435.) Additionally, while we note that the record indicates a reasonable level of frustration by the court with the conduct of the trial, the record shows that the court expressed frustration with both counsel, a fact that militates against Woods’s claim of bias.

The cases cited by Woods do not convince us otherwise. A number of those cases are simply inapposite. In re Marriage of Iverson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1495 and Catchpole v. Brannon (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 237 found gender bias in judicial comments that specifically referenced the parties’ gender. In contrast, the trial court here gave no basis to believe his comments on Davidovich resulted from Woods’s criminal history.

Woods’s other cases are easily distinguished. (See Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 786 [factual and procedural differences among cases finding judicial misconduct “make it essential that each case turn upon its own facts”].) In Webber v. Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 158 the trial court announced early in the case that it would not award support to a divorcing wife. During the wife’s evidence of the need for support the court repeatedly stated she was wasting the court’s time. When her attorney attempted to recall her on the same issue the court reiterated that it was not going to award support and again said her attempt to convince him otherwise was a waste of time. The court’s prejudgment was so obvious that the husband rested without presenting a defense. Pratt v. Pratt (1903) 141 Cal. 247 is even more egregious as the trial court there admitted that he would be prejudiced against any party that called the daughter as a witness in the parents’ divorce. (Id. at pp. 250-251 [“there is no depth of infamy to which people can sink more than to put their children on the stand . . . . I don’t know anything that would condemn your client in my eyes so completely as to put that girl on the stand . . . . I simply want you to understand that it opens the door to prejudice”].)

We are convinced based on our review of the entire record before us that judicial bias did not infect the outcome of this case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

DOI TODD

We concur:

____________________________, P. J.

BOREN

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

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^[1] As an example of the considerable difficulty the parties had settling the record in this appeal, this court was provided only a partial copy of Whims’s objection to the first and final account and report. We granted Whims’s request to submit copies of the trial exhibits that were apparently lost by both the superior court and Woods. We granted Woods’s motion to augment the record with 10 additional exhibits that were included in the trial court file. One of the augmented exhibits attaches documents that Whims now asserts were not attached to the original. Given the controversy over that exhibit and the fact that it was not referenced during the trial, we have not relied on it or its attachments in rendering our decision.

^[2] Because Woods challenges the trial court’s factual determinations, we include a detailed discussion of the evidence adduced as to each of these matters, post.

^[3] Woods’s opening brief also includes a laundry list of errors made by her trial counsel, which she claims were the primary cause of her loss below. Intermingled with this list are references to the trial court’s apparent denial of her attorney’s motion for a continuance “on the very eve of the trial date . . . .” But the record does not contain any documentation of that motion. The appellant bears the burden to supply a sufficient record for review on appeal. (Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 (Osgood).) Woods has failed to meet that burden here. Moreover, she does not adequately identify the denial of a continuance as an issue in her opening brief. Nor has she provided any legal basis for this court to review the acts of her trial counsel. Consequently, we do not reach that issue. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14 [each point requires heading, argument, legal authority]; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19 [reviewing court need not address contentions not properly briefed].)

^[4] Woods devotes a section of her opening brief to the argument that the surcharges against her should be reduced. That section is essentially a restatement of her argument that Grant’s fees were reasonable and that she acted prudently in paying them.