Filed 4/30/18 Yue v. Trigmax Solutions CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


DONGXIAO YUE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TRIGMAX SOLUTIONS LLC ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants.

A151067

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. MSC16-01118)


Muye Liu and Trigmax Solutions LLC (collectively, defendants) appeal from the trial court’s partial denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dongxiao Yue has degrees in physics and computer science; his papers have been cited in “prestigious research journals.” From 2002 to 2008, Yue assisted a family in a “well publicized” custody dispute in Tennessee. In 2012, Yue established a “Chinese language . . . community Web site” called Zhen Zhu Bay (ZZB).
Yeyetown.com or Yeyeclub.com (Yeyeclub) is a competing Web site. Liu is affiliated with Yeyeclub. In 2015, Yue sued a third party, Wenbin Yang, for posting defamatory statements about him on Yeyeclub. Yue asked Yeyeclub to “ ‘preserve relevant records’ ” of Yang’s allegedly defamatory statements. In response, Liu posted “blog article[s]” about Yue on Yeyeclub.
Yue’s Lawsuit Against Defendants and Their Anti-SLAPP Motion
Yue filed a 65-paragraph, verified complaint in propria persona against defendants for unfair competition and defamation. As relevant here, the complaint alleged Liu and others made 11 defamatory statements about Yue. According to the complaint, Liu posted “a blog article” on Yeyeclub insinuating that Yue’s 2015 lawsuit against Yang used “ ‘improper methods to promote the influence of his website,’ ” that Yue openly “ ‘advocat[ed] theft of personal privacy,’ ” and that Yue “ ‘oppress[ed] others or profiteer[ed] by defamation lawsuit.’ ” In addition, the complaint alleged Liu criticized Yue for using “ ‘intimidation and extortion.’ ” The complaint alleged defendants’ statements were false, that defendants knew the statements were false, and that they published the statements on Yeyeclub with malice, and with the intent to injure Yue. Finally, the complaint alleged Yue suffered reputational harm and emotional distress, and sought damages and other relief.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion. They argued Yue’s complaint arose from protected activity because Yue was a public figure, and because their statements were made in connection with the Yang litigation. Defendants also claimed Yue could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing because the complaint’s allegations were “unsubstantiated” and “conclusory.” According to defendants, Yue was attempting to punish them for “not agreeing with him and not modifying their business practices to support [his] frivolous” lawsuit against Yang. Liu submitted a supporting declaration.
Yue’s opposition argued defendants failed to demonstrate their statements concerned “an issue of public interest.” He also argued the complaint stated prima facie claims for unfair competition and defamation. Yue filed a lengthy supporting declaration. Defendants’ reply characterized the complaint’s allegations as baseless and lacking credibility.
The Court’s Ruling
The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to paragraphs 35 and 54(11) of the complaint, which described Yue’s involvement in the custody dispute in Tennessee, and alleged a Doe defendant made false and defamatory statements about Yue relating to that dispute. The court determined these paragraphs “involve[d] topics of widespread, public interest,” and, as a result, were “protected activity.” Additionally, the court concluded Yue had “not shown a probability of prevailing as to those allegations.”
The court, however, denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to the complaint’s remaining allegations, concluding defendants failed to show the “allegations [were] protected activity.” It determined defendants’ statements were not made in connection with a court proceeding, nor in connection with an issue of public interest. As the court explained, the complaint’s references to statements Liu made about the Yang litigation were “related to a lawsuit, but there is no evidence that [the statements] were directed to individuals with some interest in that lawsuit. Therefore, Defendants have not shown that [the allegations] involve protected activity.” Next, the court determined Yue was not a public figure or in the public eye, because there were no facts showing Yue was “known nationally or internationally” or that there was a “public fascination” with him.
DISCUSSION
Lawsuits against persons sued for exercising their constitutional right to free speech “in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless . . . the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) We review de novo a trial court order on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Where the trial court has denied an anti-SLAPP motion, we first determine whether the defendant “demonstrate[d] that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendants’] right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Defendants argue their comments were made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest: the Yang litigation. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Assuming Yeyeclub constitutes a “public forum,” this contention fails because defendants have not demonstrated their statements were made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” Courts broadly construe the phrase “public interest” (see Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 372) but defendants present no coherent argument, no persuasive authority, and no evidence supporting their contention that the Yang litigation was an issue of public interest. (See Abuemeira v. Stephens (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1298 [no evidence establishing “the dispute was anything other than a private controversy”].) Defendants’ statements arose out of a private business dispute between competing Web sites. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion supports this conclusion: in their motion, defendants characterized the dispute as arising out of their refusal to modify their “business practices” for Yue. “[A] defendant in an ordinary private dispute cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because the complaint contains some references to speech . . . by the defendant.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) We conclude defendants’ statements did not “concern a person in the public eye, conduct that could directly affect large numbers of people beyond the participants, or a topic of widespread public interest.” (D.C. v. R.R. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1230.)
This case does not, as defendants claim, come within “section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), which includes statements made in connection with civil court litigation.” (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) A “ ‘statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Ibid.) There is no evidence defendants’ statements were directed to individuals with an interest in the Yang litigation. Defendants’ reliance on Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 is unavailing. Briggs held “a defendant moving to strike a cause of action arising from a statement made before, or in connection with an issue under consideration by, a legally authorized official proceeding need not separately demonstrate that the statement concerned an issue of public significance.” (Id. at p. 1123.) Briggs has no application here.
Because defendants failed to make the required showing on the first step of the section 425.16 analysis, we do not reach the second step. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80–81.) We conclude the trial court did not err by partially denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
DISPOSITION
The order partially denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Yue is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)





_________________________
Jones, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
Simons, J.


_________________________
Needham, J.