CA Pub. Decisions

Sixth Amendment does not require that predicate offenses under Sexually Violent Predators Act be limited to those that have been admitted by defendant to involve substantial sexual conduct or which were found by jury to involve such conduct at the time. Trier of fact in proceeding under act may find that the past offense involved substantial sexual conduct. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to due process by precluding him from calling victim of past crime as a witness where defendant proffered that such testimony would show the offense did not involve substantial sexual conduct, contrary to victim's prior statements, but there was no showing that victim had made recent suggestion that his prior statements were inaccurate. Reliance on victim's post plea hearsay statements to prove that prior conviction was for an offense involving substantial sexual conduct violated right to due process where trial court precluded defendant from calling victim as a witness, prosecution made no showing that witness was unavailable, prosecution did not call victim as its witness, and neither party introduced victim's testimony from previous trial, which resulted in a hung jury prior to defendant's plea. Federal constitutional error in SVPA proceeding requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Erroneous reliance upon inadmissible hearsay to prove one of three alleged predicate convictions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it is unknown which of the alleged predicate convictions jury found to be proven, and jury might not have found defendant to be a SVP if hearsay statements had not been admitted. Judge is not required to instruct jury in SVPA proceeding that they must unanimously agree on which prior convictions involved substantial sexual conduct or that must unanimously agree on which acts constituted substantial sexual conduct.

Sixth Amendment does not require that predicate offenses under Sexually Violent Predators Act be limited to those that have been admitted by defendant to involve substantial sexual conduct or which were found by jury to involve such conduct at the time. Trier of fact in proceeding under act may find that the past offense involved substantial sexual conduct. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to due process by precluding him from calling victim of past crime as a witness where defendant proffered that such testimony would show the offense did not involve substantial sexual conduct, contrary to victim's prior statements, but there was no showing that victim had made recent suggestion that his prior statements were inaccurate. Reliance on victim's post plea hearsay statements to prove that prior conviction was for an offense involving substantial sexual conduct violated right to due process where trial court precluded defendant from calling victim as a witness, prosecution made no showing that witness was unavailable, prosecution did not call victim as its witness, and neither party introduced victim's testimony from previous trial, which resulted in a hung jury prior to defendant's plea. Federal constitutional error in SVPA proceeding requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Erroneous reliance upon inadmissible hearsay to prove one of three alleged predicate convictions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it is unknown which of the alleged predicate convictions jury found to be proven, and jury might not have found defendant to be a SVP if hearsay statements had not been admitted. Judge is not required to instruct jury in SVPA proceeding that they must unanimously agree on which prior convictions involved substantial sexual conduct or that must unanimously agree on which acts constituted substantial sexual conduct.

Governor's denial of parole was supported by "some evidence" where the underlying crime was the kidnap and murder of a 10 year old child, the motive for which was to obtain money and to prevent victim from testifying against an accused child molester; defendant admitted participating in the planning of the kidnapping, which was actually executed by others; and defendant's ambiguous testimony at parole hearing supported governor's determination that she helped plan murder and that she remains a danger to public safety. Reliance upon commitment offense as primary basis for denial of parole is not a due process violation where circumstances of the crime reliably established by evidence in the record rationally indicate that the offender will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison, taking into consideration such factors as the offender's age, post release plans, and institutional behavior, and giving high degree of deference to governor's balancing of the factors.

Where length of time actually served by prisoner under indeterminate sentence prior to release plus credits for his time in custody before prison and post conviction credits for good conduct exceeded base term as determined by parole board, prisoner was not required to serve any period of parole.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Denial of venue change in highly publicized murder case did not deprive defendant of fair trial where neither defendant nor his victims were prominent in community; publicity largely ceased nine months before trial; venire members, in particular those who were eventually seated as jurors, did not indicate that they were much affected by publicity; and jury was seated without exhaustion of defense peremptory challenges. Admission of expert testimony, based on crime scene analysis, that the six murders with which defendant was charged were all committed by same person was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process where expert had extensive training and experience and thus had an ability to make comparisons that lay jurors might not have been able to draw by sheer observation. Such testimony does not constitute inadmissible profile evidence where it makes no mention of defendant. Evidence of incident in which defendant followed and stared at witness, but did not attack her, was properly admitted to show common scheme or plan where it occurred in area where murders with which defendant was charged occurred; witness, like victims, was a young white woman; and other evidence showed that defendant had observed and followed victims in a similar manner. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to a public trial by closing courtroom during brief portion of FBI agent's testimony that described a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation, and which defense claimed may have been committed by someone who also committed murders with which defendant was charged; public interest in protecting integrity of ongoing probe justified closing a "very minor" portion of proceedings. Admission of 25 minute videotape of interview given by victim some months before she was murdered, as victim impact evidence in penalty phase, was not unduly prejudicial where interview was a "calm, even static, discussion of [victim's] accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting," without accompanying music or cuts to other shots of victim, and did not appear to affect jurors more sharply than other victim impact evidence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating California determinate sentencing law to extent it permits imposition of longer prison term based on judicial fact finding has no application to capital sentencing.

Permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating certain defamatory statements about plaintiff was overly broad where it applied not just to defendant but to "her agents, all persons acting on her behalf or purporting to act on her behalf and all other persons in active concert and participation with her" even though there was no evidence that anyone other than defendant personally defamed plaintiff, and the injunction did not provide for defendant to be able to present her grievances to government officials and barred defendant from initiating any type of contact with a known employee of plaintiff anywhere at any time regarding any subject. Defendant's right to free speech would not be infringed by a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating statements about plaintiff that were determined at trial to be defamatory.

Permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating certain defamatory statements about plaintiff was overly broad where it applied not just to defendant but to "her agents, all persons acting on her behalf or purporting to act on her behalf and all other persons in active concert and participation with her" even though there was no evidence that anyone other than defendant personally defamed plaintiff, and the injunction did not provide for defendant to be able to present her grievances to government officials and barred defendant from initiating any type of contact with a known employee of plaintiff anywhere at any time regarding any subject. Defendant's right to free speech would not be infringed by a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating statements about plaintiff that were determined at trial to be defamatory.