CA Pub. Decisions

Trial court erred in finding that university "satisfactorily addressed" a coach's internal administrative complaint solely on basis that it addressed complaint in timely manner. Coach's failure to seek review of university's adverse decision before pursuing an action for damages had the effect of establishing propriety of university's action.

A modification decision.

Fact that petitioner is a federal prisoner is not, in and of itself, a "substantial and principled" reason for denying a petition for change of name.

An independent contractor who is able to exert significant influence over the contracting decisions of a public agency is an "employee" for purposes of Government Code Sec. 1090, even if the contractor would not be an employee under common law tort principles, and cannot be financially interested in the contract. Any error in denying a summary judgment motion is harmless where the issue is fully and fairly litigated at trial.

An independent contractor who is able to exert significant influence over the contracting decisions of a public agency is an "employee" for purposes of Government Code Sec. 1090, even if the contractor would not be an employee under common law tort principles, and cannot be financially interested in the contract. Any error in denying a summary judgment motion is harmless where the issue is fully and fairly litigated at trial.

Court did not violate alleged kidnapper's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine witnesses in admitting statements that a nontestifying witness/victim made to police officers when they arrived to execute a search warrant at the kidnapping site where the officers, meeting with a group of victims who were screaming and hysterical after the kidnapper had fled, directed their inquiry not to serving the warrant but at determining what had happened, what might happen in the next few minutes, and the nature of the emergency involved.

Where student's Consumer Legal Remedies Act lawsuit against university contained class action allegations, court properly denied university's motion to compel arbitration where, though some of the potential class members had signed a contract including an arbitration clause, the individual plaintiff had never agreed to arbitrate her claims.

Nonparty may bring motion to disqualify attorney, rather than file an independent action to protect movant's substantive rights as former client, where attorney was disqualified in previous action involving movant, and new action in which ex client was not named as a party but could have been added later by Doe amendment was an obvious attempt at evading prior disqualification order. Where prior disqualification order had become final, and grounds for motion to disqualify in new action involving same adverse party were identical, doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded attorney from opposing disqualification in new action.

Objection to probation condition on ground that it is vague or overbroad and thus facially unconstitutional, is not forfeited by failure to object at the time the condition is imposed. Probation condition requiring that defendant not associate with anyone "disapproved of" by "probation" was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad but may be modified to require that probationer not associate with persons known to the probationer to be disapproved of by probation officer.

Objection to probation condition on ground that it is vague or overbroad and thus facially unconstitutional, is not forfeited by failure to object at the time the condition is imposed. Probation condition requiring that defendant not associate with anyone "disapproved of" by "probation" was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad but may be modified to require that probationer not associate with persons known to the probationer to be disapproved of by probation officer.

Rule 8.104(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, which in prescribing how a superior court clerk properly gives notice of a judgment or appealable order refers to "a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a file stamped copy of the judgment, showing the date either was mailed," requires a single, self sufficient document that satisfies all the rule's conditions. Where clerk mailed parties two documents to inform them of superior court's order denying class certification, one a minute order that was not file stamped, and the other a "Statement of Decision" rather than a "Notice of Entry," mailing of documents did not commence the 60 day period for the filing of a notice of appeal.

Community college district's districtwide reorganization, under which professional deans would be hired for managerial positions previously filled on a part time basis by faculty members, was not subject to state regulations requiring consultation with faculty senate on "academic and professional matters."

Where officer smelled odor of marijuana from parked car occupied by defendant and a companion, and defendant upon inquiry initially produced a quantity of marijuana within limit allowed by Compassionate Use Act, fact that defendant stated he had a medical marijuana prescription and could lawfully possess an amount of marijuana greater than that officer initially found did not detract from officer's probable cause to search the rest of defendant's car for additional quantities of marijuana.

Complaint by bank against its landlord, in which plaintiff alleged that insured landlord's failure to maintain premises breached lease and resulted in economic damage, including need to replace its safe deposit boxes to the first floor leased premises, which resulted in fewer boxes being rented and the consequent denial of the use of that space for other purposes, and did not allege any physical injury to tangible property or loss of use of tangible property that was not physically injured, did not raise possibility of coverage for an "occurrence" under landlord's commercial general liability policy. Insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify landlord, based on "wrongful eviction" aspect of "personal injury" coverage, where such coverage applied only to injury to "persons" and not to corporations or other organizations. "Supplementary payments" provision did not obligate insurer to pay costs and attorney fees imposed on insured in underlying action where there was no duty to defend or indemnify, as supplementary payments provision cannot be broader than the duty to defend.