CA Pub. Decisions

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 170.6(a)(2), which permits a peremptory challenge to a judge to be exercised within 60 days of that judge being reassigned to a case after being reversed on appeal, applies to coordination proceedings, taking precedence over a rule of court that otherwise allows only 20 days for a peremptory challenge in coordinated cases.

To determine that bond funding arrangement between public entity and religiously affiliated schools is valid under state constitution's bar on government support of "sectarian" purposes or institutions, court must find that recipient school offers a broad curriculum in secular subjects and that school's secular classes consist of information and coursework that is neutral with respect to religion. Whether school is pervasively sectarian is not a controlling factor. Public bond program satisfying state constitution would not violate the establishment clause of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

To determine that bond funding arrangement between public entity and religiously affiliated schools is valid under state constitution's bar on government support of "sectarian" purposes or institutions, court must find that recipient school offers a broad curriculum in secular subjects and that school's secular classes consist of information and coursework that is neutral with respect to religion. Whether school is pervasively sectarian is not a controlling factor. Public bond program satisfying state constitution would not violate the establishment clause of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

To determine that bond funding arrangement between public entity and religiously affiliated schools is valid under state constitution's bar on government support of "sectarian" purposes or institutions, court must find that recipient school offers a broad curriculum in secular subjects and that school's secular classes consist of information and coursework that is neutral with respect to religion. Whether school is pervasively sectarian is not a controlling factor. Public bond program satisfying state constitution would not violate the establishment clause of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

To determine that bond funding arrangement between public entity and religiously affiliated schools is valid under state constitution's bar on government support of "sectarian" purposes or institutions, court must find that recipient school offers a broad curriculum in secular subjects and that school's secular classes consist of information and coursework that is neutral with respect to religion. Whether school is pervasively sectarian is not a controlling factor. Public bond program satisfying state constitution would not violate the establishment clause of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

Where murder defendant admitted killing victim, he forfeited his right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of prior hearsay statements victim made several weeks before the killing in which she had told police investigating a report of domestic violence that defendant had held a knife to her and threatened to kill her that were introduced to refute his claim of self defense.

Where murder defendant admitted killing victim, he forfeited his right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of prior hearsay statements victim made several weeks before the killing in which she had told police investigating a report of domestic violence that defendant had held a knife to her and threatened to kill her that were introduced to refute his claim of self defense.

Where murder defendant admitted killing victim, he forfeited his right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of prior hearsay statements victim made several weeks before the killing in which she had told police investigating a report of domestic violence that defendant had held a knife to her and threatened to kill her that were introduced to refute his claim of self defense.

In assessing whether a vexatious litigant has a reasonable probability of success on his claim for the purpose of determining whether he must post security, trial court may weigh the evidence presented on the security motion and is not required to assume the truth of plaintiff's alleged facts and determine only whether the claim is foreclosed as a matter of law.

When someone, intending to steal from a victim, causes property to become separated from victim's person by provoking victim to flee resulting in victim dropping property while running away and then gains possession of the property, the theft is "from the person of another" as required for grand theft conviction under Penal Code Sec. 487(c).

Isidro Delarosa Munoz was convicted of eight sex crimes committed during attacks on three victims on three different days. (Pen. Code, 209, subd. (b)(1), 261, subd. (a)(2), 288a, subd. (c)(2), 286, subd. (c)(2).)[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 133 years to life which included five terms of 25 years to life under the one-strike statute ( 667.61).[2] Munoz appeals, claiming the statute permits only one enhancement per incident and that there were only three incidents in this case. The Attorney General concedes the point and we agree that the sentence must be vacated. (Former 667.61, subd. (g) [a term of 25 years to life shall be imposed once for any offense or offenses committed against a single victim during a single occasion]; People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 100-101 [single occasion as used in section 667.61 means a close temporal and spatial proximity between offenses]; see also People v. Fuller (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1336.)[3]

Munoz raped and orally copulated Elvira H. inside his car within a few minutes, and committed his crimes against Nicole G. in the same manner. For this reason, there may be only one term of 25 years to life under section 667.61 for each victim. (People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 100-101.)

A modification decision.

Violations of statutory requirements that petition for extension of commitment of sexually violent predator be filed at least 90 days and that trial commence at least 30 days prior to expiration of previous commitment were prejudicial where defense counsel could not have properly prepared for trial within the statutory time frame. Unexplained failure of district attorney's office to respond to state hospital's paperwork, resulting in what trial court characterized as a "huge clerical error," did not constitute good cause for extension of statutory deadline for filing of petition to extend commitment. Fact that defendant ultimately received a fair trial on merits did not "cure" prejudice he suffered as a result of having his release delayed so that his counsel could prepare for trial, so erroneous denial of motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds was not harmless.

Defendant is not entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement limiting the amount of victim restitution to victim s out of pocket expenses of $280. Where court ordered defendant to pay over $34,000 in victim restitution for amounts paid by the state to the hospital that treated victim, defendant is entitled to the opportunity to withdraw her plea because court imposed a punishment more severe than that specified in agreement.