CA Pub. Decisions

Where one party to a memorandum of understanding brought a motion to compel mediation and arbitration of the other party's defamation action pursuant to an arbitration provision in the agreement that required mediation and arbitration of "[a]ny controversy among the parties involving the construction or application of any provision" of the agreement, trial court properly denied the motion on the ground that the defamation suit was essentially "a stand alone action" that did not involve contractual interpretation.

Lawsuit challenging a special assessment levied under the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 for failure to comply with Proposition 218 which requires that certain types of assessments be treated as taxes subject to a public vote is subject to special procedural rules applicable to "validation actions," including requirement that plaintiffs publish notice of the action and file proof of publication within 60 days after the filing of the complaint absent good cause for not doing so. Where plaintiffs made no effort to publish notice of the action until after 60 day period had run, trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that they lacked good cause for noncompliance with the validation statutes even if they acted in good faith by serving all affected property owners by mail and even if defendant municipality suffered no prejudice. Neither defendant's filing of answer and opposition brief addressing merits nor its failure to oppose plaintiffs' ex parte motion to amend summons to include "all interested persons" constituted a waiver of plaintiffs' failure to comply with validation statutes.

Lawsuit challenging a special assessment levied under the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 for failure to comply with Proposition 218 which requires that certain types of assessments be treated as taxes subject to a public vote is subject to special procedural rules applicable to "validation actions," including requirement that plaintiffs publish notice of the action and file proof of publication within 60 days after the filing of the complaint absent good cause for not doing so. Where plaintiffs made no effort to publish notice of the action until after 60 day period had run, trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that they lacked good cause for noncompliance with the validation statutes even if they acted in good faith by serving all affected property owners by mail and even if defendant municipality suffered no prejudice. Neither defendant's filing of answer and opposition brief addressing merits nor its failure to oppose plaintiffs' ex parte motion to amend summons to include "all interested persons" constituted a waiver of plaintiffs' failure to comply with validation statutes.

Where lease allowed prevailing party to recover attorney fees in any dispute between the parties, landlord prevailed before bankruptcy judge on motion to dismiss tenant's Chapter 11 petition on ground that it was filed in a bad faith effort to avoid paying rent despite tenant's solvency, tenant continued to not pay rent after petition was dismissed, and landlord sued for breach of lease, landlord properly stated claim for attorney fees incurred in the bankruptcy proceedings.

To extend commitment of defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity beyond maximum prison confinement time, trial court was required to find that defendant had a serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous behavior. Trial court finding that defendant had a serious difficulty controlling potentially dangerous behavior was supported by substantial evidence, including expert testimony that he suffered from a schizo affective disorder, bipolar type, which, among other things, caused him to suffer delusions that he wholeheartedly believed, that his reality testing remained "extremely impaired," that he also was paranoid, that he denied at least some of his delusions and paranoia, had not completed the hospital's mandated relapse prevention plan and, on at least one occasion, had only pretended to take his prescribed medication, together with defendant's own testimony that he believed he had inherited great wealth and that the president of the United States was personally aware of his impending release.

Accusations of sexual molestation by former high school athlete against coach did not establish probable cause for arrest where some of accuser's statements were generalized and not specific as to time, date, or other details; other accusations concerning more specific events either lacked sufficient detail or were inconsistent with respect to what coach allegedly did or where he did it; recorded conversations between accuser and coach consisted of her accusations and his vehement denials and statements of disbelief; school vice principal told police that she and others at school did not believe the accusations; and accuser acknowledged that she disapproved of how coach treated her as a player. Police officers and their employer were immune from liability for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with public statements and statements made in press releases where such statements were calculated to alert public that police were seeking information about possible criminal conduct and were thus within scope of investigation. Neither investigative immunity nor discretionary function immunity extends to a claim that plaintiff was arrested without probable cause in violation of civil rights protected under Civil Code Sec. 52.1. Erroneous jury instructions on defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which defendants were immune by statute, were prejudicial where it appeared likely from the arguments of counsel and the size of the award that the jury based its award of damages for past and future losses in large part on injuries to reputation, earning capacity, and emotional well being resulting from the defamatory statements. Defendants' failure to request that verdict segregate damages by cause of action did not waive claim of excessive damages where verdict exceeded maximum that a properly instructed jury would have reasonably awarded on the sole cause of action for which defendants were properly held liable.

Accusations of sexual molestation by former high school athlete against coach did not establish probable cause for arrest where some of accuser's statements were generalized and not specific as to time, date, or other details; other accusations concerning more specific events either lacked sufficient detail or were inconsistent with respect to what coach allegedly did or where he did it; recorded conversations between accuser and coach consisted of her accusations and his vehement denials and statements of disbelief; school vice principal told police that she and others at school did not believe the accusations; and accuser acknowledged that she disapproved of how coach treated her as a player. Police officers and their employer were immune from liability for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with public statements and statements made in press releases where such statements were calculated to alert public that police were seeking information about possible criminal conduct and were thus within scope of investigation. Neither investigative immunity nor discretionary function immunity extends to a claim that plaintiff was arrested without probable cause in violation of civil rights protected under Civil Code Sec. 52.1. Erroneous jury instructions on defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which defendants were immune by statute, were prejudicial where it appeared likely from the arguments of counsel and the size of the award that the jury based its award of damages for past and future losses in large part on injuries to reputation, earning capacity, and emotional well being resulting from the defamatory statements. Defendants' failure to request that verdict segregate damages by cause of action did not waive claim of excessive damages where verdict exceeded maximum that a properly instructed jury would have reasonably awarded on the sole cause of action for which defendants were properly held liable.

City failed to comply with statutory requirement that it prepare an EIR for any project that it "proposes to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the environment" where it obtained federal financing for project but deferred environmental review until after it reached agreements with developers seven months later.

City failed to comply with statutory requirement that it prepare an EIR for any project that it "proposes to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the environment" where it obtained federal financing for project but deferred environmental review until after it reached agreements with developers seven months later.

Rent control guidelines, under which it was presumed that "net operating income "gross income minus operating expenses--in base year provided landlord with a just and reasonable return above the required minimum absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but landlord could seek a discretionary increase, in which case preferred method was to adjust the base year NOI by 50 percent of the increase in the consumer price index from the base year to the comparison year, the latest calendar year or the latest fiscal year used by the applicant for accounting purposes, then grant an increase in the amount by which the sum of the applicant's base year NOI and the price level adjustment exceeds the applicant's comparison year NOI, but landlord could obtain a larger increase by presenting clear and convincing evidence that another method was more appropriate, did not "take" landlord's property or deprive landlord of substantive due process in violation of state and federal constitutions. Landlord's right to procedural due process did not require rent board to allow cross examination at administrative hearing.

Where defendant, who had been previously released on bond, appeared for arraignment, then left the courtroom despite being ordered not to do so after prosecution announced intent to seek remand, defendant was not "in custody" so trial court properly ordered bail forfeiture.

Party opposing a peremptory challenge need only prove by preponderance of the evidence that the explanation for the challenge is a pretext for discrimination. Trial court's "sincere and reasoned" evaluation of a challenge did not render erroneous application of clear and convincing standard harmless where there was no showing that court would have allowed challenge if it had applied the correct standard.

Following entry of jury's verdict, court's decision to allow jury to leave through a nonpublic exit pursuant to its request to leave courtroom without speaking to anyone did not violate defendant's due process right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 237, which provides for the sealing of confidential juror information and sets forth the procedure for disclosure of that information by petition to the trial court, did not violate defendant's due process right to an impartial jury when applied to permit jurors to control whether to discuss their deliberations.

A modification decision.