CA Pub. Decisions

Statements by defendant, a mental health professional and the author of a scholarly article, that plaintiff the subject of a controversial study of recovered memories of child sexual abuse engaged in "destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney," and that plaintiff was in the Navy related to newsworthy events and could not be the subject of an action for disclosure of private facts. Statement that was made by defendant at a professional conference attended by other mental health professionals and was related to the subject of the conference was protected by statutory common interest privilege where plaintiff failed to present evidence that would reasonably support an inference that defendant acted with actual malice. For purposes of anti SLAPP motion, plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on claim that defendant's disclosure of the initials of plaintiff's first and last names at a deposition in an unrelated case constituted disclosure of private facts where plaintiff was not well enough known that the disclosure of her initials would have led to widespread identification, and plaintiff had, by the time of the deposition, publicly identified herself by full name as being the subject of the study in question. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intrusion into private matters based upon defendant's collection and dissemination of information contained in court records in absence of showing that such records were of confidential juvenile matters. Plaintiff established prima facie case that defendant committed the tort of intrusion into private matters in obtaining personal information about plaintiff from plaintiff's former foster mother by intentionally misrepresenting defendant's relationship with mental health professional who had treated plaintiff as a child.

Statements by defendant, a mental health professional and the author of a scholarly article, that plaintiff the subject of a controversial study of recovered memories of child sexual abuse engaged in "destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney," and that plaintiff was in the Navy related to newsworthy events and could not be the subject of an action for disclosure of private facts. Statement that was made by defendant at a professional conference attended by other mental health professionals and was related to the subject of the conference was protected by statutory common interest privilege where plaintiff failed to present evidence that would reasonably support an inference that defendant acted with actual malice. For purposes of anti SLAPP motion, plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on claim that defendant's disclosure of the initials of plaintiff's first and last names at a deposition in an unrelated case constituted disclosure of private facts where plaintiff was not well enough known that the disclosure of her initials would have led to widespread identification, and plaintiff had, by the time of the deposition, publicly identified herself by full name as being the subject of the study in question. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intrusion into private matters based upon defendant's collection and dissemination of information contained in court records in absence of showing that such records were of confidential juvenile matters. Plaintiff established prima facie case that defendant committed the tort of intrusion into private matters in obtaining personal information about plaintiff from plaintiff's former foster mother by intentionally misrepresenting defendant's relationship with mental health professional who had treated plaintiff as a child.

Public entities, such as cities, are not "persons" who may bring qui tam actions on behalf of other agencies of government under California False Claims Act.

Public entities, such as cities, are not "persons" who may bring qui tam actions on behalf of other agencies of government under California False Claims Act.

California Public Records Act does not require disclosure to a newspaper publisher of records of county commission relating to a peace officer's administrative appeal of a disciplinary matter. Penal Code Sec. 832.7(a) which provides that certain peace officer records are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Secs. 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code is not limited to criminal and civil proceedings. Commission records of disciplinary appeals, including the officer's name, are protected under Sec. 832.7. Sec. 832.7 is not unconstitutional for permitting nondisclosure of such records.

California Public Records Act does not require disclosure to a newspaper publisher of records of county commission relating to a peace officer's administrative appeal of a disciplinary matter. Penal Code Sec. 832.7(a)which provides that certain peace officer records are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Secs. 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code is not limited to criminal and civil proceedings. Commission records of disciplinary appeals, including the officer's name, are protected under Sec. 832.7. Sec. 832.7 is not unconstitutional for permitting nondisclosure of such records.

Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.

Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.

Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court-ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.

Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.

Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.

Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.

Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.

Temporary disability during a seasonal employee's in season period of regular employment is payable based on two thirds of the employee's in season average weekly earnings, subject to the minimum and maximum levels established under Labor Code Sec. 4453. Where employee does not have any off season earnings and does not compete in open labor market during a portion of the year, employee is not entitled to temporary disability payments during that season.