CA Pub. Decisions

Where 26-year delay in prosecuting defendant for murder was not the result of negligence and not for the purpose of gaining an advantage over defendant but was caused solely due to the limits of forensic technology at the time of the initial investigation, which resulted in insufficient evidence to identify defendant as a suspect, and when forensic technology in the form of a DNA databank became available to identify defendant as a candidate for further investigation and testing, defendant was charged with murder, the delay between the date of the crime and the filing of the complaint did not violate defendant's right to due process of law. DNA evidence was properly presented to the jury where the DNA databank search merely identified defendant as a possible candidate as the murderer and was not the basis for declaring that his DNA matched DNA on the evidentiary samples. The latter determination was made based on further, complete testing using scientific techniques found to be reliable and admissible.

21 USC Sec. 337(a) which states that an action to enforce the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act must be by and in the name of the United States precludes private enforcement of the FDCA and impliedly preempts all of private plaintiffs' causes of action against store owners alleging that owners sold artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing to consumers the artificial coloring.

Trial court properly sustained defendant's demurrers to plaintiff's allegations of sexual abuse on ground that statute of limitations had expired where alleged sexual abuse occurred from 1970 to 1972, making his claims time barred as of 1977; and following Code of Civil Procedure amendment allowing for revival of time barred sexual abuse claims until December 31, 2003, plaintiff on December 31, 2003 filed only a Motion for Judicial Notice of Intent to Sue for Childhood Sexual Abuse instead of a complaint.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

In issuing order to extend convicted felon's commitment for bipolar disorder pursuant to Penal Code Sec. 1026.5(b)(1), trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to consider whether defendant had serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior, instead finding only that he did not in fact control it.

Superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear business's challenge to electric utility's decision that business did not qualify for 10 percent rate reduction available to qualifying small commercial customers. Public Utilities Commission had exclusive jurisdiction.

trustee with respect to reconveyance of a deed of trust after secured obligation is satisfied, imposes no obligations on escrow holder to record trustee's deed of reconveyance. Where individual sued escrow holder for failing to record a request for reconveyance of a deed of trust on his real property that secured a promissory note, trial court properly granted nonsuit in favor of escrow holder on basis that individual was not a party to escrow or escrow instructions whereby he claimed escrow holder owed him duty.

trustee with respect to reconveyance of a deed of trust after secured obligation is satisfied, imposes no obligations on escrow holder to record trustee's deed of reconveyance. Where individual sued escrow holder for failing to record a request for reconveyance of a deed of trust on his real property that secured a promissory note, trial court properly granted nonsuit in favor of escrow holder on basis that individual was not a party to escrow or escrow instructions whereby he claimed escrow holder owed him duty.

Noncompetition agreements between employees and employers that bar employee from performing services for former clients are invalid if not within statutory or trade secrets exceptions to Business and Professions Code Sec. 11660, which bars such agreements, even if restraints imposed are narrow and leave a substantial portion of market open to the employee. Where individual's noncompetition contract with former employer restricted his ability to practice his accounting profession, trial court erred in concluding that noncompetition contract, and subsequent agreement that employer demanded he sign in consideration for release from noncompetition contract, were valid and thus no basis for his claim of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against former employer. Where subsequent agreement contained broad release of liability for "any and all claims" arising out of employment, release amounted to waiver of his indemnity rights under Labor Code Sec. 2802 and requiring employee to sign agreement constituted independently wrongful act for purposes of intentional interference claim. Provision in subsequent agreement requiring that employee not disparage former employer or its affiliates did not violate Labor Code Sec. 1102.5, a whistleblower protection provision, where employee did not claim former employer retaliated against him for disclosing information and employer was not trying to enforce an overbroad, nondisparagement agreement.

Noncompetition agreements between employees and employers that bar employee from performing services for former clients are invalid if not within statutory or trade secrets exceptions to Business and Professions Code Sec. 11660, which bars such agreements, even if restraints imposed are narrow and leave a substantial portion of market open to the employee. Where individual's noncompetition contract with former employer restricted his ability to practice his accounting profession, trial court erred in concluding that noncompetition contract, and subsequent agreement that employer demanded he sign in consideration for release from noncompetition contract, were valid and thus no basis for his claim of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against former employer. Where subsequent agreement contained broad release of liability for "any and all claims" arising out of employment, release amounted to waiver of his indemnity rights under Labor Code Sec. 2802 and requiring employee to sign agreement constituted independently wrongful act for purposes of intentional interference claim. Provision in subsequent agreement requiring that employee not disparage former employer or its affiliates did not violate Labor Code Sec. 1102.5, a whistleblower protection provision, where employee did not claim former employer retaliated against him for disclosing information and employer was not trying to enforce an overbroad, nondisparagement agreement.

Where qui tam plaintiff in action under False Claims Act sought to name 130 new governmental entities in complaint, trial court abused its discretion in conditioning plaintiff's leave to amend upon each of the newly named governmental entities responding to defendants' detailed discovery demands, and then revoking leave to amend with respect to those newly named governmental entities that did not respond. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants as to Sec. 12651(a)(8) claim that they were knowing beneficiaries of a false claim submitted by their subsidiary, where sample testing and memoranda by one parent company could have supported conclusion that it was aware its subsidiary selling was substandard pipes to municipalities.

Where qui tam plaintiff in action under False Claims Act sought to name 130 new governmental entities in complaint, trial court abused its discretion in conditioning plaintiff's leave to amend upon each of the newly-named governmental entities responding to defendants' detailed discovery demands, and then revoking leave to amend with respect to those newly named governmental entities that did not respond. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants as to Sec. 12651(a)(8) claim that they were knowing beneficiaries of a false claim submitted by their subsidiary, where sample testing and memoranda by one parent company could have supported conclusion that it was aware its subsidiary selling was substandard pipes to municipalities.

When calculating a permanent disability award under workers' compensation law for an employee with a preexisting permanent disability, court should not apply a credit for or subtract amount of a previous permanent disability award but rather account for prior permanent disability by converting overall percentage of current disability into its monetary equivalent and then subtracting current dollar value of percentage of preexisting disability.