CA Pub. Decisions

Where court clerk's minutes of plea change, minutes of sentencing, and abstract of judgment did not reflect what occurred in proceedings and included items never orally imposed by trial judge in defendant's presence, minutes must be stricken to reflect what actually occurred and the judgment that the judge actually pronounced. Where clerk erroneously indicated in minutes of plea change that defendant changed his plea from not guilty to no contest, sentence on that count was unauthorized and must be vacated.

Under anti SLAPP statute, statements and conduct by public employee in denying plaintiff's administrative grievances are protected against civil rights action attacking her hearing, processing and decision of his claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that employee violated his rights in her capacity as hearing officer, and employee stated in her declaration that she did not harbor any unlawful prejudice against plaintiff and denied his grievances based on her review of the investigator's report, her belief it was adequate, her agreement with its conclusions, and absence of any reason for her to believe the investigator harbored an unlawful prejudice against plaintiff.

Under anti SLAPP statute, statements and conduct by public employee in denying plaintiff's administrative grievances are protected against civil rights action attacking her hearing, processing and decision of his claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that employee violated his rights in her capacity as hearing officer, and employee stated in her declaration that she did not harbor any unlawful prejudice against plaintiff and denied his grievances based on her review of the investigator's report, her belief it was adequate, her agreement with its conclusions, and absence of any reason for her to believe the investigator harbored an unlawful prejudice against plaintiff.

Where jury award to lemon law plaintiffs was less than amount of defendant's offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998, trial court erred in awarding plaintiffs their preoffer attorney fees and costs.

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 364, which extends the one year period in which to sue a health care provider by 90 days where the plaintiff has given timely notice of intent to sue, permits the notice of intent to be served by fax. Code provisions limiting fax service of certain documents to cases in which the parties have agreed to such service do not apply to prelitigation notices.

Availability of expert witness fees in a Federal Employers' Liability Act action filed in state court is controlled by federal law, which does not authorize an award of expert witness fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a FELA action. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff employee's motion for reconsideration on basis that employer had successfully argued in a previous case in favor of expert witness fees in a FELA action and was thus estopped from making opposite argument where court determined that inconsistent positions involved a legal rather than a factual issue.

Where trial judge recused himself based on his friendship with a judicial colleague whom defendant was rumored to be stalking, but disqualified judge was reassigned to the case over defense objection after prosecution notified the court that it had found no evidence to substantiate the rumors, such reassignment constituted a fundamental due process violation requiring reversal of the ensuing conviction even though defendant waived right to challenge the reassignment on statutory grounds by failing to seek a writ of mandate at the time.

Where trial judge recused himself based on his friendship with a judicial colleague whom defendant was rumored to be stalking, but disqualified judge was reassigned to the case over defense objection after prosecution notified the court that it had found no evidence to substantiate the rumors, such reassignment constituted a fundamental due process violation requiring reversal of the ensuing conviction even though defendant waived right to challenge the reassignment on statutory grounds by failing to seek a writ of mandate at the time.

Where trial judge recused himself based on his friendship with a judicial colleague whom defendant was rumored to be stalking, but disqualified judge was reassigned to the case over defense objection after prosecution notified the court that it had found no evidence to substantiate the rumors, such reassignment constituted a fundamental due process violation requiring reversal of the ensuing conviction even though defendant waived right to challenge the reassignment on statutory grounds by failing to seek a writ of mandate at the time.

Where, in premises liability action underlying her legal malpractice suit, plaintiff who had been raped in apartment complex by an intruder presented evidence that male intruders had made repeated unauthorized entries to the premises and that there was no evidence of forced entry at the time she was attacked and thus raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the complex owners' failure to properly maintain its doors and locks was a substantial factor in causing her injury trial court in malpractice case erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former attorneys on the ground that she would not have been able to establish the element of causation in the underlying action, which was dismissed on summary judgment.

Where, in premises liability action underlying her legal malpractice suit, plaintiff who had been raped in apartment complex by an intruder presented evidence that male intruders had made repeated unauthorized entries to the premises and that there was no evidence of forced entry at the time she was attacked and thus raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the complex owners' failure to properly maintain its doors and locks was a substantial factor in causing her injury trial court in malpractice case erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former attorneys on the ground that she would not have been able to establish the element of causation in the underlying action, which was dismissed on summary judgment.

A modification decision.

Jury finding that employee's exclusion from management and planning meetings and unwarranted disciplinary probation was sufficiently injurious to his career to constitute an adverse employment action was supported by substantial evidence, including proof that plaintiff had been harassed on the basis of sexual orientation, that he had complained unsuccessfully about the harassment, and that the probation and exclusion from meetings were the culmination of a series of negative responses by supervisor to employee's apparently justified complaints about behavior of supervisor and another employee. Supervisor may be held liable for retaliation under Fair Employment and Housing Act. Grant of new trial constituted reversible error where based on unduly restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes an adverse employment action. Trial court order granting new trial on ground of excessive damages did not satisfy statutory requirement for statement of reasons where court merely concluded that the award "bears no relationship to the special damages or facts in this case" and "effectively amounts to an award of punitive damages."

Jury finding that employee's exclusion from management and planning meetings and unwarranted disciplinary probation was sufficiently injurious to his career to constitute an adverse employment action was supported by substantial evidence, including proof that plaintiff had been harassed on the basis of sexual orientation, that he had complained unsuccessfully about the harassment, and that the probation and exclusion from meetings were the culmination of a series of negative responses by supervisor to employee's apparently justified complaints about behavior of supervisor and another employee. Supervisor may be held liable for retaliation under Fair Employment and Housing Act. Grant of new trial constituted reversible error where based on unduly restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes an adverse employment action. Trial court order granting new trial on ground of excessive damages did not satisfy statutory requirement for statement of reasons where court merely concluded that the award "bears no relationship to the special damages or facts in this case" and "effectively amounts to an award of punitive damages."