CA Pub. Decisions

The California Constitution provides that any act to increase taxes must be passed by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.[1] On the other hand, statutes that create or raise regulatory fees need only the assent of a simple majority.[2] In 2003, the Legislature passed amendments to the Water Code[3] by a 53 percent majority. Current section 1525 was enacted as part of these amendments. The threshold issue here is whether section 1525, subdivision (a) imposes a tax or a fee. We hold that the amendments and section 1525 do not explicitly impose a tax and, therefore, are not facially unconstitutional. However, because the record is unclear as to whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity's costs and the fees assessed, we direct the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make these findings.
A second issue is whether the Water Code amendments, or their implementing regulations, violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by over-assessing the beneficial interests of those who hold contractual rights to delivery of water from the federally administered Central Valley Project (hereafter, the federal contractors). We conclude that the statutes are not facially unconstitutional. We further determine that the constitutionality of the implementing regulations depends on whether they fairly assess and apportion the federal contractors' beneficial interests. However, because of conflicting factual assertions and an unclear record concerning the extent and value of those interests, we also direct remand to the trial court for findings on this issue.

The California Constitution provides that any act to increase taxes must be passed by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.[1] On the other hand, statutes that create or raise regulatory fees need only the assent of a simple majority.[2] In 2003, the Legislature passed amendments to the Water Code[3] by a 53 percent majority. Current section 1525 was enacted as part of these amendments. The threshold issue here is whether section 1525, subdivision (a) imposes a tax or a fee. We hold that the amendments and section 1525 do not explicitly impose a tax and, therefore, are not facially unconstitutional. However, because the record is unclear as to whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity's costs and the fees assessed, we direct the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make these findings.
A second issue is whether the Water Code amendments, or their implementing regulations, violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by over-assessing the beneficial interests of those who hold contractual rights to delivery of water from the federally administered Central Valley Project (hereafter, the federal contractors). We conclude that the statutes are not facially unconstitutional. We further determine that the constitutionality of the implementing regulations depends on whether they fairly assess and apportion the federal contractors' beneficial interests. However, because of conflicting factual assertions and an unclear record concerning the extent and value of those interests, we also direct remand to the trial court for findings on this issue.

A jury convicted defendant Bernard Albert Nelson of the first degree murder, robbery, and attempted carjacking of Richard Dunbar. It concluded, as a special circumstance, that the murder was committed in the course of the other two felonies. It also convicted him of robbing, inflicting great bodily injury upon, and attempting to murder Miguel Cortez. In addition, it found defendant guilty of attempting to murder Giovanni Boccanfuso, Charles Coleman, and â€

A jury convicted defendant Bernard Albert Nelson of the first degree murder, robbery, and attempted carjacking of Richard Dunbar. It concluded, as a special circumstance, that the murder was committed in the course of the other two felonies. It also convicted him of robbing, inflicting great bodily injury upon, and attempting to murder Miguel Cortez. In addition, it found defendant guilty of attempting to murder Giovanni Boccanfuso, Charles Coleman, and â€

A jury convicted defendant Richard Lonnie Booker of the first degree murders of Tricia Powalka, Amanda Elliot, and Corina Gandara. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] It also convicted him of arson (§ 451, subd. (b)) and the attempted murder of Eric S. (§§ 187, 664). It found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder as to each count of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) and a lewd act by force on a child under 14 (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)).[2] The jury further found that defendant had personally used a handgun and a knife in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23), 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury returned a verdict of death as to each of the victims. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death for the three murders and to life with the possibility of parole and determinate prison terms for the remaining counts and allegations.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Lonnie Booker of the first degree murders of Tricia Powalka, Amanda Elliot, and Corina Gandara. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] It also convicted him of arson (§ 451, subd. (b)) and the attempted murder of Eric S. (§§ 187, 664). It found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder as to each count of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) and a lewd act by force on a child under 14 (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)).[2] The jury further found that defendant had personally used a handgun and a knife in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23), 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury returned a verdict of death as to each of the victims. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death for the three murders and to life with the possibility of parole and determinate prison terms for the remaining counts and allegations.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Lonnie Booker of the first degree murders of Tricia Powalka, Amanda Elliot, and Corina Gandara. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] It also convicted him of arson (§ 451, subd. (b)) and the attempted murder of Eric S. (§§ 187, 664). It found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder as to each count of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) and a lewd act by force on a child under 14 (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)).[2] The jury further found that defendant had personally used a handgun and a knife in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23), 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury returned a verdict of death as to each of the victims. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death for the three murders and to life with the possibility of parole and determinate prison terms for the remaining counts and allegations.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Lonnie Booker of the first degree murders of Tricia Powalka, Amanda Elliot, and Corina Gandara. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] It also convicted him of arson (§ 451, subd. (b)) and the attempted murder of Eric S. (§§ 187, 664). It found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder as to each count of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) and a lewd act by force on a child under 14 (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)).[2] The jury further found that defendant had personally used a handgun and a knife in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23), 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury returned a verdict of death as to each of the victims. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death for the three murders and to life with the possibility of parole and determinate prison terms for the remaining counts and allegations.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

Ronald Wayne Moore was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 1998 murder of 11-year-old Nicole Carnahan, which occurred during the commission of burglary and robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) On automatic appeal, we affirm the judgment.

Ronald Wayne Moore was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 1998 murder of 11-year-old Nicole Carnahan, which occurred during the commission of burglary and robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) On automatic appeal, we affirm the judgment.

Ronald Wayne Moore was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 1998 murder of 11-year-old Nicole Carnahan, which occurred during the commission of burglary and robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) On automatic appeal, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Albert Jones of the first degree murders of James H. Florville and Madalynne Florville with personal use of a deadly weapon and, as to both murders, under the special-circumstances of robbery- and burglary-murder. It also found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17), 12022, subd. (b).)[1] The court then found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and three prior convictions for which he had served separate prison terms. (§§ 667, 667.5.) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4) and imposed that sentence. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Albert Jones of the first degree murders of James H. Florville and Madalynne Florville with personal use of a deadly weapon and, as to both murders, under the special-circumstances of robbery- and burglary-murder. It also found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17), 12022, subd. (b).)[1] The court then found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and three prior convictions for which he had served separate prison terms. (§§ 667, 667.5.) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4) and imposed that sentence. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Albert Jones of the first degree murders of James H. Florville and Madalynne Florville with personal use of a deadly weapon and, as to both murders, under the special-circumstances of robbery- and burglary-murder. It also found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17), 12022, subd. (b).)[1] The court then found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and three prior convictions for which he had served separate prison terms. (§§ 667, 667.5.) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4) and imposed that sentence. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.