CA Pub. Decisions

Lawsuit challenging federal savings and loan association's prepayment penalty formula is preempted by Home Owners' Loan Act and regulations promulgated by Office of Thrift Supervision.

Statute purporting to grant California Supreme Court jurisdiction over appeals from judgments in superior court actions challenging Indian gaming compacts violated constitutional provision granting court of appeal jurisdiction over appeals from superior courts other than as specified in the constitution. Action challenging constitutionality of statute approving gaming compacts, which provided that tribes would pay certain revenues to a state entity to be used to securitize transportation bonds, was effectively a reverse validation action subject to 60-day statute of limitations and to 30-day limit on time to appeal.

Statute purporting to grant California Supreme Court jurisdiction over appeals from judgments in superior court actions challenging Indian gaming compacts violated constitutional provision granting court of appeal jurisdiction over appeals from superior courts other than as specified in the constitution. Action challenging constitutionality of statute approving gaming compacts, which provided that tribes would pay certain revenues to a state entity to be used to securitize transportation bonds, was effectively a reverse validation action subject to 60-day statute of limitations and to 30-day limit on time to appeal.

In action for breach of oral contract and quantum meruit based on services allegedly rendered to defendant, a professional boxer, plaintiff's allegations that he rendered those services in the capacity of a manager constituted a binding judicial admission fatal to the claims because plaintiff was unlicensed, and California law requires that boxing managers be licensed and that contracts be in writing on a form approved by the State Athletic Commission. Plaintiff's allegations that he agreed to assume responsibility as defendant's manager in accord with the established custom in the professional boxing industry in exchange for a percentage of defendant's earnings; that he played a direct role "in all matters" pertaining to defendant's boxing career, "including, without limitation, managing his business and personal affairs;" that he negotiated defendant's promotional contract; that he made diligent efforts to settle three lawsuits involving defendant to extricate defendant from "career turmoil;" that he played a direct and instrumental role in settlement of three lawsuits, "thereby allowing [defendant] to continue with his professional boxing career;" and that he worked with an attorney to extricate defendant from tax problems and helped him obtain medical clearances "which could have otherwise hampered or damaged his career" established as a matter of law that plaintiff was acting in the capacity of a manager. Plaintiff's allegations that he performed 400 or more hours of work on defendant's behalf did not entitle him to recovery in quantum meruit where it was established that plaintiff acted in the capacity of a boxing manager despite the lack of a license and a written contract. To allow recovery in that circumstance would be contrary to the regulatory purpose of the Boxing Act. Where plaintiff entered into purported manager's contract with defendant in California and sued to enforce it in a California court, state's "unusually strong" public policy interest in regulating boxing supported application of California law to activities in connection with a bout that took place in another state.

Court of appeal ruling reversing trial court's award of fees to defendant as to contract claims was not a final judgment within the meaning of the attorney fee clause in franchise agreement, which provided that "the party in whose favor final judgment shall be entered shall be entitled to recover from the other reasonable attorney's fees." Court's prior judgment of nonsuit in defendant's favor, which had been affirmed on appeal and as to which supreme court denied review, was controlling judgment and thus entitled defendants to attorney fees.

Statutory procedure for disqualification of judges for cause does not apply to final judgments; trial judge's failure to answer or strike defendants' statement of disqualification, which was filed and served after final judgment, did not constitute consent to retroactive disqualification, and did not require that the allegations of the statement of disqualification be deemed true. Denial of motion to dissolve injunction, made on ground that judge lacked mental capacity, was not an abuse of discretion where nothing in the trial transcript showed such a lack of capacity, and counsel for moving party admitted that his belief that judge lacked capacity was based solely on events that occurred after the injunction was granted.

Statutory procedure for disqualification of judges for cause does not apply to final judgments; trial judge's failure to answer or strike defendants' statement of disqualification, which was filed and served after final judgment, did not constitute consent to retroactive disqualification, and did not require that the allegations of the statement of disqualification be deemed true. Denial of motion to dissolve injunction, made on ground that judge lacked mental capacity, was not an abuse of discretion where nothing in the trial transcript showed such a lack of capacity, and counsel for moving party admitted that his belief that judge lacked capacity was based solely on events that occurred after the injunction was granted.

Victim's comments to officers accusing her husband of having thrown gas on her and ignited it, given within minutes of incident, were admissible under spontaneous statements exception to hearsay rule. Admission of victim's spontaneous statements did not violate Confrontation Clause since such statements were not testimonial in nature and were not the products of formal interrogation. Videotaped demonstration of arson investigator lighting a paper towel and throwing it to the ground was properly admitted to rebut defense expert's claim that paper does not continue to burn when tossed.

Prior Court of Appeal ruling that defense counsel made a reasonable tactical decision by foregoing defense of "battered woman syndrome" -- now known as "intimate partner battering" -- in favor of claim that defendant, accused of murder of her partner, shot him accidentally, does not preclude habeas corpus relief under Penal Code Sec. 1473.5, which permits such relief where BWS evidence could have been, but was not, presented. Relief under Sec. 1473.5 is appropriate in case where defense counsel's belief that accident and BWS defenses were mutually inconsistent was reasonable under state of law at the time, but later cases made it clear that defendant did not have to testify she intentionally shot victim for expert evidence regarding battering and its psychological effects to be admissible in support of an imperfect self defense theory of voluntary manslaughter, and it was reasonably probable based on evidence as a whole, that jury would have accepted such theory if supporting evidence had been presented.

Prior Court of Appeal ruling that defense counsel made a reasonable tactical decision by foregoing defense of "battered woman syndrome" -- now known as "intimate partner battering" -- in favor of claim that defendant, accused of murder of her partner, shot him accidentally, does not preclude habeas corpus relief under Penal Code Sec. 1473.5, which permits such relief where BWS evidence could have been, but was not, presented. Relief under Sec. 1473.5 is appropriate in case where defense counsel's belief that accident and BWS defenses were mutually inconsistent was reasonable under state of law at the time, but later cases made it clear that defendant did not have to testify she intentionally shot victim for expert evidence regarding battering and its psychological effects to be admissible in support of an imperfect self defense theory of voluntary manslaughter, and it was reasonably probable based on evidence as a whole, that jury would have accepted such theory if supporting evidence had been presented.

Trial court had no jurisdiction to consider appeal by defendant who pled no contest where no certificate of probable cause was obtained, notice of appeal attacked validity of plea and did not state intent to appeal on any grounds not requiring a certificate of probable cause, and defendant's motion to construe appeal as addressing noncertificate grounds was not supported by a declaration from defendant, trial counsel, or counsel for defendant on appeal.

Domestic violence is continuing tort for which limitations period does not begin to run until last alleged act of violence.

A dependency court referee's order is not automatically vacated when a party's request for rehearing before a judge is granted. Rather, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 250, that order remains in force until a new order is made after rehearing of the original order or pursuant to other procedures authorizing the court to modify an existing order.

City's proposal to hire retirees as temporary employees in response to an abrupt shortage in the staffing of the police force, which could not be remedied through the ordinary processes of recruitment and hiring, was a fundamental managerial policy decision designed to maintain the existing level of public safety in the community and was not itself subject to city's duty to meet and confer with union representing officers, even if it represented a change in the status quo with respect to the terms and conditions of employment. Where proposal included principle that nothing in its implementation was to affect the terms and conditions of employment of unit members, the details of implementation were not subject to the duty to meet and confer, and individual unit members who experienced detriment as a result of the proposal's implementation were entitled to whatever remedies existed under grievance process.