CA Pub. Decisions

Admission of testimony of supervising criminalist who reviewed the report of another laboratory employee, who did not testify, to establish that substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine did not violate Confrontation Clause since the laboratory report was not testimonial and was not offered as a substitute for live testimony and the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the supervising criminalist.

Redevelopment Agency erroneously interpreted Community Redevelopment Law in determining that vacant rectangular lots in project area were of irregular form and shape, and therefore constituted a blighted area, because they lacked legal and physical access to a right-of-way.

Trial court correctly ruled that modified substantial relationship test, when met, shifts burden to the targeted attorney to prove that he or she was not exposed to material confidential information, as opposed to proving that he or she had no opportunity to acquire confidential information. In denying defendants' attorney disqualification motion, substantial evidence supported court's finding that targeted attorney, who formerly worked for law firm representing defendants, carried his burden of proving that confidential information material to plaintiffs' lawsuit was not imparted to him at luncheon meetings he attended at former firm during the initial stages of case where attorney's declaration stated the case was not discussed at the meetings he attended; former colleague's declaration stated he did not recall whether the attorney attended any lunch meetings where case was discussed; and declarations showed attorney viewed documents relevant to case on computer only after they had been filed and served.

When defendant's attorney, at time set for sentencing, stated that defendant wanted to withdraw his plea, and defendant provided the court with a letter detailing alleged misconduct by the attorney, defendant made a clear and unequivocal request to discharge and replace his attorney and it was error for court not to hold a Marsden hearing.

Bid on a public agency contract cannot be declared nonresponsive by the public agency on the ground that the bidder has listed an unlicensed subcontractor on the bid forms; nothing in statutes requires that subcontractors be licensed as of the time of the submission of the prime bid. Where agency erroneously declared plaintiff's bid nonresponsive, trial court's order canceling contract and requiring agency to contract the remainder of the work to plaintiff based on its bid was error; correct remedy was to require agency to conduct a due process hearing to determine whether plaintiff was a responsible bidder.

Public employee may not be terminated or otherwise disciplined for invoking Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions during internal investigation into employee's alleged misconduct unless immunized against having his responses used against him or her in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Deputy public defender who, in seeking to have witness declared unavailable to introduce hearsay statements into evidence, asserted as a fact that he had "not sent [his] investigator out to try to find" the witness "in large part" because witness "has a warrant out for his arrest," and if the police had failed to serve that warrant, "I think that my investigator is going to be very hard put to find an individual who is avoiding contact with anybody that has to do with the judicial system" when in fact deputy public defender knew that the witness was at home, engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee, regardless of whether judge found the attorney's conduct to be improper in the context of the criminal case. Witness' statements to deputy public defender, as reported by witness, were not shielded by work-product privilege from being used in employee discipline proceeding. Where personnel board properly found employee to have engaged in conduct unbecoming but improperly found him to be insubordinate, board was required to reconsider the case and to determine whether conduct unbecoming was, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for termination.

Public employee may not be terminated or otherwise disciplined for invoking Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions during internal investigation into employee's alleged misconduct unless immunized against having his responses used against him or her in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Deputy public defender who, in seeking to have witness declared unavailable to introduce hearsay statements into evidence, asserted as a fact that he had "not sent [his] investigator out to try to find" the witness "in large part" because witness "has a warrant out for his arrest," and if the police had failed to serve that warrant, "I think that my investigator is going to be very hard put to find an individual who is avoiding contact with anybody that has to do with the judicial system" when in fact deputy public defender knew that the witness was at home, engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee, regardless of whether judge found the attorney's conduct to be improper in the context of the criminal case. Witness' statements to deputy public defender, as reported by witness, were not shielded by work-product privilege from being used in employee discipline proceeding. Where personnel board properly found employee to have engaged in conduct unbecoming but improperly found him to be insubordinate, board was required to reconsider the case and to determine whether conduct unbecoming was, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for termination.

Public employee may not be terminated or otherwise disciplined for invoking Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions during internal investigation into employee's alleged misconduct unless immunized against having his responses used against him or her in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Deputy public defender who, in seeking to have witness declared unavailable to introduce hearsay statements into evidence, asserted as a fact that he had "not sent [his] investigator out to try to find" the witness "in large part" because witness "has a warrant out for his arrest," and if the police had failed to serve that warrant, "I think that my investigator is going to be very hard put to find an individual who is avoiding contact with anybody that has to do with the judicial system" when in fact deputy public defender knew that the witness was at home, engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee, regardless of whether judge found the attorney's conduct to be improper in the context of the criminal case. Witness' statements to deputy public defender, as reported by witness, were not shielded by work-product privilege from being used in employee discipline proceeding. Where personnel board properly found employee to have engaged in conduct unbecoming but improperly found him to be insubordinate, board was required to reconsider the case and to determine whether conduct unbecoming was, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for termination.

Mobilehome Residency Law does not preempt local rent control ordinances permitting mobilehome park owners to separately charge park residents for property taxes imposed on park land.

Mobilehome Residency Law does not preempt local rent control ordinances permitting mobilehome park owners to separately charge park residents for property taxes imposed on park land.

Vehicle Code Sec. 14602.6(b)'s provision that mitigating circumstances may be considered in determining whether unlicensed drivers may retrieve their impounded vehicles is not unconstitutionally vague on its face nor does it violate non-delegation doctrine where both statute and case law construing it provide examples of mitigating circumstances. Sec. 14602.6 does not violate equal protection clause by authorizing the automatic release of an impounded vehicle to a rental car agency while simultaneously requiring private individuals to appear at a storage hearing and satisfy one of the statutory circumstances for an early release. Sec. 23109.2(a), which provides that a vehicle "may be impounded for not more than 30 days," does not violate non-delegation doctrine.

Vehicle Code Sec. 14602.6(b)'s provision that mitigating circumstances may be considered in determining whether unlicensed drivers may retrieve their impounded vehicles is not unconstitutionally vague on its face nor does it violate non-delegation doctrine where both statute and case law construing it provide examples of mitigating circumstances. Sec. 14602.6 does not violate equal protection clause by authorizing the automatic release of an impounded vehicle to a rental car agency while simultaneously requiring private individuals to appear at a storage hearing and satisfy one of the statutory circumstances for an early release. Sec. 23109.2(a), which provides that a vehicle "may be impounded for not more than 30 days," does not violate non-delegation doctrine.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Defendant pled no contest to committing a lewd act upon a child; in exchange for “no immediate state prison” and dismissal of a remaining charge. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on five years formal probation on conditions, among others, that he serve 90 days in county jail and “obey all the general terms [of probation], including the fines necessary to be paid.” One of the general terms of defendant’s probation was to “[p]ay fines, restitution and fees as specified on the FINANCIAL OBLIGATION PAGE attached and as ordered by the Court.” The financial obligation page specified $2,570 in fines and fees, including a $700 fine for the underlying offense, a $200 restitution fine, a $700 sex offender fine, a $25 criminal justice administration fee, a $445 fee for the presentence investigation report, a $420 public defender fee, a $25 work program fee, a $20 court security fee, and a $35 administrative fee.
Defendant appeals having failed to obtain a certificate of probably cause.
The matter is remanded to the trial court for an express determination as to whether all of the fines should be included. Should the trial court determine that some or all of those fines and/or fees should have been included in the abstract of judgment, the trial court is directed to amend the abstract and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Judgment otherwise affirmed.

A modification decision.