CA Pub. Decisions

California Wildlife Conservation Board's approval of project involving the conversion of agricultural land into wildlife habitat, which requires active construction and ongoing maintenance, is not categorically exempt from California Environmental Quality Act and does not fall within the common sense exemption from CEQA.

California Wildlife Conservation Board's approval of project involving the conversion of agricultural land into wildlife habitat, which requires active construction and ongoing maintenance, is not categorically exempt from California Environmental Quality Act and does not fall within the common sense exemption from CEQA.

California Wildlife Conservation Board's approval of project involving the conversion of agricultural land into wildlife habitat, which requires active construction and ongoing maintenance, is not categorically exempt from California Environmental Quality Act and does not fall within the common sense exemption from CEQA.

Civil Code Sec. 1069--which states that "every grant by a public officer or body...is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor"--requires a court to interpret an ambiguous grant by a public body in favor of the grantor even where other rules of construction or extrinsic evidence support an interpretation in favor of the grantee. Trial court's error in not construing easement in favor of grantor public utilities district was prejudicial where reasonably probable that had court done so--so as to limit grant to personal ingress and egress of grantee--court would not have found that district's refusal to grant easement resulted in an inverse condemnation, and jury would have found district's refusal to grant the easement was not a breach of agreement. Where a main disputed issue at trial was the highest and best use of the subject property and whether a subdivision development on the property was feasible, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear various valuations of the property based on evidence that land was suitable for a subdivision development.

Civil Code Sec. 1069--which states that "every grant by a public officer or body...is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor"--requires a court to interpret an ambiguous grant by a public body in favor of the grantor even where other rules of construction or extrinsic evidence support an interpretation in favor of the grantee. Trial court's error in not construing easement in favor of grantor public utilities district was prejudicial where reasonably probable that had court done so--so as to limit grant to personal ingress and egress of grantee--court would not have found that district's refusal to grant easement resulted in an inverse condemnation, and jury would have found district's refusal to grant the easement was not a breach of agreement. Where a main disputed issue at trial was the highest and best use of the subject property and whether a subdivision development on the property was feasible, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear various valuations of the property based on evidence that land was suitable for a subdivision development.

Civil Code Sec. 1069--which states that "every grant by a public officer or body...is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor"--requires a court to interpret an ambiguous grant by a public body in favor of the grantor even where other rules of construction or extrinsic evidence support an interpretation in favor of the grantee. Trial court's error in not construing easement in favor of grantor public utilities district was prejudicial where reasonably probable that had court done so--so as to limit grant to personal ingress and egress of grantee--court would not have found that district's refusal to grant easement resulted in an inverse condemnation, and jury would have found district's refusal to grant the easement was not a breach of agreement. Where a main disputed issue at trial was the highest and best use of the subject property and whether a subdivision development on the property was feasible, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear various valuations of the property based on evidence that land was suitable for a subdivision development.

Where husband's attorney misrepresented himself as representing wife, thus procuring judgment favorable to husband in an ostensibly uncontested proceeding, trial court's inherent power to protect itself from fraud permitted it to vacate judgment without regard to statutory time limits for setting aside family law judgments.

Where husband's attorney misrepresented himself as representing wife, thus procuring judgment favorable to husband in an ostensibly uncontested proceeding, trial court's inherent power to protect itself from fraud permitted it to vacate judgment without regard to statutory time limits for setting aside family law judgments.

Winery employee, who borrowed storage bin without permission to transport grapes for his own personal stock of wine, was acting outside scope of employment while en route to purchase harvested grapes for himself during off-work hours--an errand of which the winery was unaware--so winery was not vicariously liable to plaintiff, who was allegedly injured when the storage bin fell off the truck. Court properly found there were no triable issues of fact as to winery's direct negligence where winery never gave employee permission to use storage bin, and no one at winery saw him take the bin or knew he was using it; bins were not intended to be used to transport harvested grapes; and there was no evidence that winery giving employee permission on several prior occasions to make small quantities of wine on premises for his personal use constituted ratification of dangerous or risky conduct.

Winery employee, who borrowed storage bin without permission to transport grapes for his own personal stock of wine, was acting outside scope of employment while en route to purchase harvested grapes for himself during off-work hours--an errand of which the winery was unaware--so winery was not vicariously liable to plaintiff, who was allegedly injured when the storage bin fell off the truck. Court properly found there were no triable issues of fact as to winery's direct negligence where winery never gave employee permission to use storage bin, and no one at winery saw him take the bin or knew he was using it; bins were not intended to be used to transport harvested grapes; and there was no evidence that winery giving employee permission on several prior occasions to make small quantities of wine on premises for his personal use constituted ratification of dangerous or risky conduct.

California Youth Authority is not authorized to release on parole a person committed under Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 1800, authorizing extended commitment of person who has reached the age of 25 and is considered dangerous to society, but may grant such person conditional release if qualified under Sec. 1766 or Sec. 1802.

California Youth Authority is not authorized to release on parole a person committed under Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 1800, authorizing extended commitment of person who has reached the age of 25 and is considered dangerous to society, but may grant such person conditional release if qualified under Sec. 1766 or Sec. 1802.

Defendant's statements to physicians, one who was appointed by court to evaluate his competency and the other who was employed by the state and evaluated defendant while he was confined to state hospital pending restoration of competency, were inadmissible at sanity phase of trial. Defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony constituted ineffective assistance.

Proceedings, by which city purchased former military property from the United States pursuant to base closure statute and then sold it to a developer, were not subject to validation statutes. So, taxpayer's action alleging that city illegally conveyed property for a fraction of its fair market value was not subject to shortened statute of limitations. Statute requiring that an appeal, from a "judgment entered pursuant to" the validation statutes, be filed within 30 days of entry of judgment did not apply to taxpayer's appeal from order erroneously dismissing his action as time-barred.