CA Pub. Decisions

At issue in this appeal is a civil penalty, assessed under Labor Code section 226.3, for appellant's failure to provide itemized wage statements to all of its employees as statutorily required. Appellant unsuccessfully challenged the penalty below, first at an administrative hearing and later in the trial court, arguing that its noncompliance was inadvertent within the meaning of the statute and that respondent erred in determining otherwise. Appellant renews those arguments here.
Interpreting the pertinent statutory language as a matter of first impression, we conclude that the statute's references to â€

Plaintiffs,[1] who are labor organizations, an association of contractors, and two City of Marina taxpayers, prevailed in their action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Cypress Marina Heights LP (CMH). CMH had acquired Fort Ord land from the City of Marina's Redevelopment Agency (MRDA) for the development of CMH's Marina Heights project. MRDA had acquired that land from the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA). Deed covenants in the FORA/MRDA deeds required payment of the prevailing wage to workers on all development of the land. CMH refused to commit to pay the prevailing wage to workers on the Marina Heights project. It claimed that its purchase agreement with MRDA did not require payment of the prevailing wage. The trial court granted plaintiffs' summary adjudication motion and found that it was undisputed that CMH was required to pay the prevailing wage on the Marina Heights project. The court thereafter entered judgment for plaintiffs and awarded plaintiffs their attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
CMH appeals. It claims that triable issues of fact precluded summary adjudication of the prevailing wage issue. CMH also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiffs their attorney's fees and awarded plaintiffs an excessive amount of fees. We find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs,[1] who are labor organizations, an association of contractors, and two City of Marina taxpayers, prevailed in their action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Cypress Marina Heights LP (CMH). CMH had acquired Fort Ord land from the City of Marina's Redevelopment Agency (MRDA) for the development of CMH's Marina Heights project. MRDA had acquired that land from the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA). Deed covenants in the FORA/MRDA deeds required payment of the prevailing wage to workers on all development of the land. CMH refused to commit to pay the prevailing wage to workers on the Marina Heights project. It claimed that its purchase agreement with MRDA did not require payment of the prevailing wage. The trial court granted plaintiffs' summary adjudication motion and found that it was undisputed that CMH was required to pay the prevailing wage on the Marina Heights project. The court thereafter entered judgment for plaintiffs and awarded plaintiffs their attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
CMH appeals. It claims that triable issues of fact precluded summary adjudication of the prevailing wage issue. CMH also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiffs their attorney's fees and awarded plaintiffs an excessive amount of fees. We find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings and affirm the judgment.

In 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to commit defendant Ramiro Gonzales as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the SVP Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)[1] A jury found the defendant qualified as an SVP, and the court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) for an indeterminate term.
On appeal from the commitment order, defendant claims the trial court erred in releasing psychological records to the prosecution and admitting the testimony of a former therapist. He claims there is insufficient evidence that his circumstances had materially changed since a previous determination that he did not qualify as an SVP. He claims the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that mental retardation could not be considered a mental disorder in determining whether he qualified as an SVP. He claims the indeterminate commitment violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and also the constitutional protections against ex post facto legislation and double jeopardy. Finally, he claims the SVP law, as amended, violates his First Amendment rights.
We conclude that the court committed reversible error in releasing privileged psychotherapeutic records and admitting testimony concerning privileged information. Accordingly, we reverse the commitment order.

In 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to commit defendant Ramiro Gonzales as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the SVP Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)[1] A jury found the defendant qualified as an SVP, and the court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) for an indeterminate term.
On appeal from the commitment order, defendant claims the trial court erred in releasing psychological records to the prosecution and admitting the testimony of a former therapist. He claims there is insufficient evidence that his circumstances had materially changed since a previous determination that he did not qualify as an SVP. He claims the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that mental retardation could not be considered a mental disorder in determining whether he qualified as an SVP. He claims the indeterminate commitment violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and also the constitutional protections against ex post facto legislation and double jeopardy. Finally, he claims the SVP law, as amended, violates his First Amendment rights.
We conclude that the court committed reversible error in releasing privileged psychotherapeutic records and admitting testimony concerning privileged information. Accordingly, we reverse the commitment order.

A modification decision.

In this case, we consider whether registration of a marriage certificate was vital to the validity of a marriage under the Family Law Act (former Civil Code section 4000 et seq.). [1]
In 1991, a judge conducted a marriage ceremony for Joseph S. Cantarella (husband) and Tanya M. Cantarella (wife). The marriage certificate, however, was twice rejected for registration due to a technical error on the document. After the second rejection, the parties decided not to resubmit the certificate for registration, possibly to avoid the tax consequences of marriage.[2] As a result, the 1991 marriage was never registered. Nine to 11 years later (between 2000 and 2002), the parties were married in a new ceremony.
In 2008, the parties dissolved the marriage. As part of the dissolution judgment, the family court ordered husband to pay wife spousal support for several years in accordance with an agreement between the parties.[3]
Husband subsequently sought modification of the spousal support order. At the hearing on his order to show cause, the parties disagreed about how long they had been married. Husband argued the parties were married in 2000. But wife -- contrary to a filing she had made earlier in the dissolution proceeding -- claimed the parties were married in 1991. The court found the marriage was of long duration and therefore awarded wife permanent spousal support.
Husband appeals from the spousal support order.[4] We affirm, holding the 1991 marriage is valid even though the marriage certificate was never registered.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of an employer and an employee-supervisor on the ground the one‑year statute of limitations had run against a former employee's claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. It is clear to us that there would be a triable issue of material fact whether the former employee was sexually harassed. But it is equally clear the statute of limitations ran on her claims. The last act of harassment or retaliation occurred in January 2007, and the administrative complaint was not filed until May 2008, long after the applicable statute ran.
Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment entered in this case. The undisputed material facts establish that (1) Irene Trovato failed to initiate her case against her former employer, Beckman Coulter, Inc. (Beckman), and her former supervisor, Michael Allyn, within the statutory time limits, and (2) the continuing violation doctrine does not save Trovato's untimely action because the unlawful conduct stopped no later than January 31, 2007. Additionally, we conclude the trial court properly denied Trovato's motion for a new trial, because the evidence Trovato claimed was newly discovered would not have produced a different result.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

It has long been recognized in this state that â€

It has long been recognized in this state that â€

Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 sets forth orders a court may issue when a minor is adjudged a ward of the court including an order to commit the ward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (Division of Juvenile Facilities), â€

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents Dennis Hagobian, Sandy L. Vartan, Victoria Hagobian, Judith Yeramian, Russell Davidson, William Davidson, Michael Hedberg, The Dennis Vartan Family Trust, The Dennis and Sandy L. Vartan Family Trust, The Lee Yeramian Family Trust, The Lee Yeramian Exempt Qtip Trust, The Judith Mary Yeramian Family Trust, The Victoria Hagobian Residential Trust, The

Dennis Hagobian Residential Trust, Yosemite Technologies, Inc., Rod Christensen, Taft & Traner, Inc., Fruit Marketing of California, Inc., Traner & Taft Partnership, T&T Partnership, Eco Farms Field, Inc., Eco Farms Sales, Inc., Norman Traner, and Steven Taft.
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This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. We hold that a prefiling order, issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, subdivision (a), does not require a vexatious litigant who is represented by counsel to obtain permission from the presiding judge to present litigation for filing. Accordingly, we reverse.