CA Pub. Decisions

Following the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence, defendant pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine for sale, possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of methylenedioxy amphetamine for sale, possession of marijuana for sale, and possession of an assault weapon.
Defendant’s post-plea motion for reconsideration of the ruling on the suppression motion was denied, as was his petition for referral to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for three years, eight months.
On appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and abused its discretion in rejecting his bid for a CRC referral. The court agrees that the suppression motion should have been granted, and reverses the judgment.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Statute of limitations under Penal Code Sec. 647.6(c)(2)--making it a felony to annoy or molest a child if the defendant has been previously convicted of a lewd act in violation of Sec. 288--is three years. On appeal, defendant claims evidentiary error, instructional error, and that the prosecution of the charged offense was not commenced within the applicable limitations period. All are claims rejected. Judment Affirmed.

Insurer's conversion claim against bank--for honoring checks that were fraudulently endorsed by agent, thus subjecting insurer to potential liability on policies sold by agent even though insurer was unaware of the policies and received no premiums--was time-barred where brought more than three years after bank honored the checks. Discovery rule normally does not apply to conversion of instruments--and if it did, any cause of action necessarily accrued when bank negotiated the checks--because there could have been no conversion unless insurer was entitled to possess the checks at that time. Conversion claim was time barred. Judgment Affirmed.

Substantial evidence supported finding that defendant police officers were liable for civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 where evidence showed that defendants engaged in, or authorized, a series of law enforcement actions--including traffic stops, equipment compliance citations, and a vehicle impoundment--to retaliate against plaintiff after he complained to CHP management about an officer. Plaintiff did not need to prove that the officers lacked probable cause when they participated in the law enforcement contacts forming the basis for the section 1983 action where plaintiff's claims were not brought on a retaliatory prosecution theory and the claimed damages did not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency, and defendants waived issue on remaining claims. Punitive damages awards of $1 million and $3 million against officers were excessive where they would have indisputably resulted in officers' financial ruin.

Substantial evidence supported finding that defendant police officers were liable for civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 where evidence showed that defendants engaged in, or authorized, a series of law enforcement actions--including traffic stops, equipment compliance citations, and a vehicle impoundment--to retaliate against plaintiff after he complained to CHP management about an officer. Plaintiff did not need to prove that the officers lacked probable cause when they participated in the law enforcement contacts forming the basis for the section 1983 action where plaintiff's claims were not brought on a retaliatory prosecution theory and the claimed damages did not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency, and defendants waived issue on remaining claims. Punitive damages awards of $1 million and $3 million against officers were excessive where they would have indisputably resulted in officers' financial ruin.

Substantial evidence supported finding that defendant police officers were liable for civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 where evidence showed that defendants engaged in, or authorized, a series of law enforcement actions--including traffic stops, equipment compliance citations, and a vehicle impoundment--to retaliate against plaintiff after he complained to CHP management about an officer. Plaintiff did not need to prove that the officers lacked probable cause when they participated in the law enforcement contacts forming the basis for the section 1983 action where plaintiff's claims were not brought on a retaliatory prosecution theory and the claimed damages did not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency, and defendants waived issue on remaining claims. Punitive damages awards of $1 million and $3 million against officers were excessive where they would have indisputably resulted in officers' financial ruin.

Substantial evidence supported finding that defendant police officers were liable for civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 where evidence showed that defendants engaged in, or authorized, a series of law enforcement actions--including traffic stops, equipment compliance citations, and a vehicle impoundment--to retaliate against plaintiff after he complained to CHP management about an officer. Plaintiff did not need to prove that the officers lacked probable cause when they participated in the law enforcement contacts forming the basis for the section 1983 action where plaintiff's claims were not brought on a retaliatory prosecution theory and the claimed damages did not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency, and defendants waived issue on remaining claims. Punitive damages awards of $1 million and $3 million against officers were excessive where they would have indisputably resulted in officers' financial ruin.

When, at the commencement of a derivative lawsuit, a shareholder-plaintiff voluntarily posts security under Corporations Code Sec. 800, a prevailing defendant seeking attorney fees at the conclusion of the lawsuit need not retrospectively show the lawsuit had no reasonable possibility of benefiting the corporation. In shareholder derivative suit that was dismissed without prejudice, the practical definition of prevailing party applies with respect to award of attorney fees. Where shareholder-plaintiff dismissed suit without prejudice after special litigation committee composed of newly elected board of directors decided that it was not in the company's best interest to proceed with suit, defendant was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees.

When, at the commencement of a derivative lawsuit, a shareholder-plaintiff voluntarily posts security under Corporations Code Sec. 800, a prevailing defendant seeking attorney fees at the conclusion of the lawsuit need not retrospectively show the lawsuit had no reasonable possibility of benefiting the corporation. In shareholder derivative suit that was dismissed without prejudice, the practical definition of prevailing party applies with respect to award of attorney fees. Where shareholder-plaintiff dismissed suit without prejudice after special litigation committee composed of newly elected board of directors decided that it was not in the company's best interest to proceed with suit, defendant was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees.

Where a judgment did not expressly award attorney fees but left the issues of entitlement and amount for later proceedings, appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the issue where the party ordered to pay attorney fees did not file a notice of appeal from the postjudgment order on the matter but only appealed the judgment.

Where a judgment did not expressly award attorney fees but left the issues of entitlement and amount for later proceedings, appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the issue where the party ordered to pay attorney fees did not file a notice of appeal from the postjudgment order on the matter but only appealed the judgment.