CA Pub. Decisions

The district sued alleging improper repaired of levee underlying their property, trial court properly sustained district's demurrers without leave to amend as to taking causes of action, plaintiffs pled guilty only to standard allegations of inadequate maintenance rather than a faulty plan involving the design, construction, and maintenance of a levee, it is not an adequate basis for an inverse condemnation claim; and as a tort causes of action, plaintiffs failed to plead that the district was under a mandatory duty to prevent leakage of its levees within the meaning of Government Code Sec. 815.6's exception to the general governmental immunity provision.

Under Government Code Sec. 1780, which sets forth when an election must be held to fill a vacancy created on a special district's governing board, a person appointed to fill a vacancy on the governing board may serve only until the person elected at the next general election has qualified to fill that vacancy; the person elected in that election is to hold office for the unexpired balance of the term of office, at which time an election is to be held to fill the office for the next full term.The district's petition for a writ of mandate was denied and its appeal dismissed as moot.

Trial court properly dismissed union's complaint challenging state's refusal to permit work site distribution of material supporting a ballot proposition, where union prior to filing complaint failed to follow any of the informal or formal grievance and arbitration procedures under its collective bargaining agreement with the state, in order to resolve the question of whether distributed materials were of a partisan political nature as prohibited by collective bargaining agreement, and union did not present rare and egregious facts sufficient to excuse its failure to exhaust its contractual remedies.The court of appeals affirmed the judgement of dismissal.

Application of force against property is not a crime in which the offender used force or violence for purposes of qualifying as a mentally disordered offender for commitment pursuant to Penal Code Sec. 2962(e)(2)(P). Trial court erred in ruling that defendant's commitment offense of felony vandalism involved the use of force or violence, thereby qualifying him for treatment as a mentally disordered offender.

After passage of Proposition 64--which requires private plaintiffs in suit under state's unfair competition law to have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition--to establish standing in UCL class action against cigarette makers, individual plaintiffs and all class members were required to show injury in fact consisting of lost money or property caused by the unfair competition. The requirement of individual reliance meant the individual issues predominate over the common issues, thus making the case unsuitable for a class action. Where class had been certified before passage of Proposition 64, trial court correctly decertified class after it passed since Proposition 64's new standing requirements apply to pending cases.

Where an income beneficiary of real property held by a testamentary trust died and was succeeded by another income beneficiary, there was a change in ownership under Proposition 13--thereby allowing the property to be reassessed at its current market value for property tax purposes--because the beneficiary's death caused a transfer of the property's primary economic value to the successor beneficiary, who acquired a present beneficial interest in the property.

Substantial evidence did not support jury's verdict that employee was subject of actionable retaliation where what employee contended was a continuous course of retaliatory conduct by her superiors in response to her filing an employment discrimination claim was in fact a series of unrelated events, occurring for different reasons and involving different persons; individual events did not amount to demotion, public humiliation, harassment, or otherwise affect terms and conditions of employment; and regarding transfer of employee to another worksite, employer stated valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for her transfer, including significant deterioration of her relationship with coworkers and her taking nonindustrial leave for nearly a year, which reasons employee did not show were pretextual.

Redemption of marketable securities at maturity generates gross receipts that are includible in the formula used to calculate a multistate entity's tax under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. Where corporation's income and receipts from its short-term investments in marketable securities were extremely small in comparison with the income and receipts from the rest of its business activities, Franchise Tax Board properly used alternative UDITPA formula to determine portion of corporation's sales attributable to California as part of formula by which corporation's business income for state tax purposes is calculated.

Redemption of marketable securities at maturity generates gross receipts that are includible in the formula used to calculate a multistate entity's tax under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. Where corporation's income and receipts from its short-term investments in marketable securities were extremely small in comparison with the income and receipts from the rest of its business activities, Franchise Tax Board properly used alternative UDITPA formula to determine portion of corporation's sales attributable to California as part of formula by which corporation's business income for state tax purposes is calculated.

Court properly rejected oil company's cross-complaint against drilling company stemming from damages caused by blowout, on basis that exculpatory and limitation of liability provisions in parties' contract were valid--rather than improper attempt under Civil Code Section 1668 to exempt a contracting party from responsibility for fraud, willful injury, or violations of law--where drilling company did not seek or obtain complete exemption from culpability on account of its potential negligence or violation of any applicable regulations, but only sought to limit its liability for economic harm suffered by oil company. The parties foresaw possibility that a blowout could occur and agreed between themselves concerning where the losses would fall. The agreement required drilling company responsibility for damage to its equipment, injury to its employees and certain pollution and contamination removal and control activities. Thus not adversely affecting public or drilling company's employees.

Court properly rejected oil company's cross-complaint against drilling company stemming from damages caused by blowout, on basis that exculpatory and limitation of liability provisions in parties' contract were valid--rather than improper attempt under Civil Code Section 1668 to exempt a contracting party from responsibility for fraud, willful injury, or violations of law--where drilling company did not seek or obtain complete exemption from culpability on account of its potential negligence or violation of any applicable regulations, but only sought to limit its liability for economic harm suffered by oil company. The parties foresaw possibility that a blowout could occur and agreed between themselves concerning where the losses would fall. The agreement required drilling company responsibility for damage to its equipment, injury to its employees and certain pollution and contamination removal and control activities. Thus not adversely affecting public or drilling company's employees.

Trial court erred in granting party's petition for reconsideration of arbitrator's award where arbitrator stated that award was final. Parties in arbitration agreement explicitly waived any right to appeal or challenge final arbitration award except where it was result of arbitrator's corruption, misconduct, or conflict, which did not occur. Arbitrator's error in stating reasons for his decision, contrary to arbitration agreement, could easily be corrected by deleting surplusage from award so as to limit it to amount due to party.

Evidence supported jury's finding that defendant acted with specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose, thereby supporting defendant's torture conviction under Penal Code Sec. 206, where defendant attacked victim after she refused to submit to rape. He attacked her for significant time involving different episodes with breaks during which he had time to reflect on his conduct and continued attack despite being able to see cruel and extreme pain he was inflicting on victim and he used several different methods of inflicting pain, including choking victim, dragging her by hair, stomping her face with his boot heels, and breaking picture frame so he could cut her with glass shards.

Plaintiff who did repair work on defendant's roof despite lack of licensure was not precluded from suing defendant, who lacked workers' compensation insurance, for alleged negligence resulting in plaintiff being injured in a fall. Brief averment in defendant's summary judgment motion that "[t]he evidence...establishes that no act or omission on the part of Defendant caused Plaintiff's injury" did not shift burden to plaintiff to present evidence of duty, negligence, or causation. Grant of summary judgment was error where defendant put forth no evidence regarding the exact circumstances of the accident and injury.