CA Pub. Decisions

When there are two successive unaccepted Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998 offers tendered by a successful plaintiff in personal injury litigation. Plaintiff subsequently recovers a judgment in excess of either offer, prejudgment interest awarded pursuant to Civil Code Sec. 3291 begins to run from the date of the first offer.

Declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions whereby owners converted form of ownership of building in which they lived from a stock cooperative to a condominium, with each unit owner casting a number of votes in proportion to number of shares said owner had in cooperative, and with common area and other assessments being similarly apportioned, did not violate state common interest development, unfair business practices, or nonprofit corporation laws.

Declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions whereby owners converted form of ownership of building in which they lived from a stock cooperative to a condominium, with each unit owner casting a number of votes in proportion to number of shares said owner had in cooperative and with common area and other assessments being similarly apportioned, did not violate state common interest development, unfair business practices, or nonprofit corporation laws.

Metal "wallet," which was about 5-1/2 inches long when folded and had five one-inch long metal spikes embedded in the leather along one edge with the middle three spikes spaced about 3/4 of an inch apart from one another, and which--when held in a man's palm--would allow the person to fit the metal spikes between his fingers and would protrude if he closed his hand around the "wallet" in a fist, constituted "metal knuckles" within meaning of statute prohibiting the possession thereof.

Contract clause providing that any controversy arising under the contract shall be submitted to a general judicial reference was not rendered unenforceable by state supreme court ruling that contractual waivers of jury trial are unenforceable.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.

Where defendant was accused of murdering victim to keep him from testifying about previous robbery and of robbing victim again at time of murder. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of theft regarding the second robbery where there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the intent to steal from the victim was not formed until after the murder, making the offense theft rather than robbery. California's practice of charging by information after a preliminary hearing does not violate the federal Constitution, even in capital cases.

Where defendant was accused of murdering victim to keep him from testifying about previous robbery.

When an unrelated person renders substantial, ongoing health services to a dependent adult, that person may be a care custodian for purposes of statutory scheme that presumptively disqualifies care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide such services, notwithstanding that the service relationship between the individuals arose out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection.