CA Pub. Decisions

Trial court's ruling granting defendant's motion to set aside default and default judgment was void where defendant used wrong zip code when mailing notice of motion to plaintiff and plaintiff denied receiving it. In reconsideration of defendant's motion to set aside default and default judgment, trial court incorrectly placed burden on plaintiff to convince the court the previous orders should have been overturned. The burden should have been placed on defendant to show that default and default judgment should have been set aside.

Criminal defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied where defendant did not fully appreciate that he would be forgoing right to assistance of appointed counsel if permitted to represent himself. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever capital murder charge from remaining charges where the charges were all the same class and evidence of each charge was relevant to the other charges to show motive, identity, opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. Defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions were properly denied where prosecutor's notes showed race-neutral reasons for peremptory excusal of each of the prospective jurors scrutinized in connection with the motions, even though prosecutor had difficulty articulating reasons and merely said that each of the jurors showed sympathy for the defendant. Trial court did not err in not dismissing juror where, on second day of trial, juror read newspaper article about the case that described defendant as an ex-convict and summarized opening arguments and discussion involving defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions. However, the juror said mostly what he remembered was summary of opening statements that indicated he had no recollection of having read anything about defendant's prior criminal record or about defendant having discussed the racial makeup of the jury with the court; did not discuss article with other jurors; and said nothing he read would affect his ability to be a fair juror. Where felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance instruction given to jury contained a one-word error that resulted in the first and second paragraphs of the instruction being stated in the disjunctive ("or") rather than the conjunctive ("and") effectively omitting the intent element of the special circumstance instruction. The error was not prejudicial given the delivery of another specially requested defense instruction as well as the closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Where defendant voluntarily excused himself from courtroom during his brother's testimony. The court did not have sua sponte duty to caution the jury not to draw any inferences from defendant's absence. Defendant was erroneously sentenced under three robbery counts to three one-year full consecutive terms for the deadly weapon enhancements whereas, because he was consecutively sentenced on more than two robbery convictions involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, and none of the robberies qualified as a serious felony, the subordinate term for each subsequent robbery conviction should have been limited to one-third the middle term of imprisonment and one-third the enhancement. Which would have reduced his aggregate determinate sentence by two years from nine to seven years.

Criminal defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied where defendant did not fully appreciate that he would be forgoing right to assistance of appointed counsel if permitted to represent himself. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever capital murder charge from remaining charges where the charges were all the same class and evidence of each charge was relevant to the other charges to show motive, identity, opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. Defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions were properly denied where prosecutor's notes showed race-neutral reasons for peremptory excusal of each of the prospective jurors scrutinized in connection with the motions, even though prosecutor had difficulty articulating reasons and merely said that each of the jurors showed sympathy for the defendant. Trial court did not err in not dismissing juror where, on second day of trial, juror read newspaper article about the case that described defendant as an ex-convict and summarized opening arguments and discussion involving defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions. However, the juror said mostly what he remembered was summary of opening statements that indicated he had no recollection of having read anything about defendant's prior criminal record or about defendant having discussed the racial makeup of the jury with the court; did not discuss article with other jurors; and said nothing he read would affect his ability to be a fair juror. Where felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance instruction given to jury contained a one-word error that resulted in the first and second paragraphs of the instruction being stated in the disjunctive ("or") rather than the conjunctive ("and") effectively omitting the intent element of the special circumstance instruction. The error was not prejudicial given the delivery of another specially requested defense instruction as well as the closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Where defendant voluntarily excused himself from courtroom during his brother's testimony. The court did not have sua sponte duty to caution the jury not to draw any inferences from defendant's absence. Defendant was erroneously sentenced under three robbery counts to three one-year full consecutive terms for the deadly weapon enhancements whereas, because he was consecutively sentenced on more than two robbery convictions involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, and none of the robberies qualified as a serious felony, the subordinate term for each subsequent robbery conviction should have been limited to one-third the middle term of imprisonment and one-third the enhancement. Which would have reduced his aggregate determinate sentence by two years from nine to seven years.

Criminal defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied where defendant did not fully appreciate that he would be forgoing right to assistance of appointed counsel if permitted to represent himself. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever capital murder charge from remaining charges where the charges were all the same class and evidence of each charge was relevant to the other charges to show motive, identity, opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. Defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions were properly denied where prosecutor's notes showed race-neutral reasons for peremptory excusal of each of the prospective jurors scrutinized in connection with the motions, even though prosecutor had difficulty articulating reasons and merely said that each of the jurors showed sympathy for the defendant. Trial court did not err in not dismissing juror where, on second day of trial, juror read newspaper article about the case that described defendant as an ex-convict and summarized opening arguments and discussion involving defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions. However, the juror said mostly what he remembered was summary of opening statements that indicated he had no recollection of having read anything about defendant's prior criminal record or about defendant having discussed the racial makeup of the jury with the court; did not discuss article with other jurors; and said nothing he read would affect his ability to be a fair juror. Where felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance instruction given to jury contained a one-word error that resulted in the first and second paragraphs of the instruction being stated in the disjunctive ("or") rather than the conjunctive ("and") effectively omitting the intent element of the special circumstance instruction. The error was not prejudicial given the delivery of another specially requested defense instruction as well as the closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Where defendant voluntarily excused himself from courtroom during his brother's testimony. The court did not have sua sponte duty to caution the jury not to draw any inferences from defendant's absence. Defendant was erroneously sentenced under three robbery counts to three one-year full consecutive terms for the deadly weapon enhancements whereas, because he was consecutively sentenced on more than two robbery convictions involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, and none of the robberies qualified as a serious felony, the subordinate term for each subsequent robbery conviction should have been limited to one-third the middle term of imprisonment and one-third the enhancement. Which would have reduced his aggregate determinate sentence by two years from nine to seven years.

Criminal defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied where defendant did not fully appreciate that he would be forgoing right to assistance of appointed counsel if permitted to represent himself. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever capital murder charge from remaining charges where the charges were all the same class and evidence of each charge was relevant to the other charges to show motive, identity, opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. Defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions were properly denied where prosecutor's notes showed race-neutral reasons for peremptory excusal of each of the prospective jurors scrutinized in connection with the motions, even though prosecutor had difficulty articulating reasons and merely said that each of the jurors showed sympathy for the defendant. Trial court did not err in not dismissing juror where, on second day of trial, juror read newspaper article about the case that described defendant as an ex-convict and summarized opening arguments and discussion involving defendant's Batson-Wheeler motions. However, the juror said mostly what he remembered was summary of opening statements that indicated he had no recollection of having read anything about defendant's prior criminal record or about defendant having discussed the racial makeup of the jury with the court; did not discuss article with other jurors; and said nothing he read would affect his ability to be a fair juror. Where felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance instruction given to jury contained a one-word error that resulted in the first and second paragraphs of the instruction being stated in the disjunctive ("or") rather than the conjunctive ("and") effectively omitting the intent element of the special circumstance instruction. The error was not prejudicial given the delivery of another specially requested defense instruction as well as the closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Where defendant voluntarily excused himself from courtroom during his brother's testimony. The court did not have sua sponte duty to caution the jury not to draw any inferences from defendant's absence. Defendant was erroneously sentenced under three robbery counts to three one-year full consecutive terms for the deadly weapon enhancements whereas, because he was consecutively sentenced on more than two robbery convictions involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, and none of the robberies qualified as a serious felony, the subordinate term for each subsequent robbery conviction should have been limited to one-third the middle term of imprisonment and one-third the enhancement. Which would have reduced his aggregate determinate sentence by two years from nine to seven years.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Self-represented defendant may relinquish right to continue representing self in absence of substantial evidence of mental incompetence. Excusal of potential juror for cause in capital case was appropriate where answers to questions about death penalty were equivocal and included statement that potential juror would never vote for death penalty for nonshooter, which prosecution was seeking. Comparative analysis showing that minority venire members were challenged based on responses to questionnaires, while white venire members who gave similar answers were not challenged, did not establish that challenges were racially motivated where jurors were not similarly situated but differed with respect to such characteristics as level of knowledge of the subject matter. The vehemence and consistency or lack thereof with which they asserted views that could be construed as antipolice, antiprosecution, or antideath penalty. Trial court did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present at proceedings by allowing verdict to be read while defendant was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Where defendant's condition was serious, it was unknown when he would be able to return to court. He suffered no prejudice. Prosecution argument that jurors in penalty phase should take into consideration fact that murders occurred in a church did not constitute improper use of religious imagery. Trial judge is not required to augment record with personal, handwritten notes relied on in denying motion for modification of death penalty verdict.

Where officer in violation of knock-and-announce rule entered home and arrested youth on suspicion of violating parole condition. In search incident to arrest, discovered drugs in youth's inner jacket pocket. The youth's counsel at trial on drug possession charges was not ineffective in failing to move to suppress drug evidence discovered in search incident to arrest, since knock-and-announce violation does not require suppression.

Where plaintiff sued police officers for injuries sustained when officers used police dog to find plaintiff who was injured by dog and by officers when they were trying to stop plaintiff from fighting with dog. Trial court correctly refused to instruct jury on definition of deadly force, instead instructing jury on definition of unreasonable force. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding general report made by retired judge on procedures involving excessive use of force as hearsay and excluding police summaries regarding injuries caused by police dogs as hearsay and because their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Cause of action alleging liability under Civil Code Sec. 52.1(b) was properly dismissed where plaintiff had not alleged that sheriff's department's excessive force policies were motivated by a discriminatory animus.