CA Pub. Decisions

In this personal injury case arising out of an automobile-versus-motorcycle traffic collision, the jury found that defendant Irene Huerta was the sole negligent cause of the accident and awarded plaintiff Frankie Najera total damages of $728,703.83. According to the verdict form, the damages consisted of past medical expenses ($45,908.83), past wage loss ($12,540), future medical expenses ($480,855), future wage loss ($114,400) and future pain and suffering ($75,000). After judgment was entered on the verdict, defendant moved for a new trial on two grounds: (i) the award of future damages was excessive, and (ii) plaintiff's counsel engaged in improper conduct during trial. The trial court agreed that relief was warranted on the first ground and granted a new trial on the issue of future damages only. Meanwhile, in his memorandum of costs, plaintiff claimed entitlement to expert witness fees and prejudgment interest because defendant had allegedly failed to accept plaintiff's Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer of settlement (section 998 offer).[1] Defendant moved to tax said costs, arguing that plaintiff's section 998 offer--which was served at the time of the original summons and complaint--was not made in good faith. The trial court granted defendant's motion and thereby denied recovery of the challenged costs.
Plaintiff appeals from both the order granting a new trial and the order taxing costs, arguing that each ruling constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Defendant's response includes a protective cross-appeal contending that if the order granting a new trial on the ground of excessive damages is not affirmed, a new trial should still be required on the alternative basis of attorney misconduct. For reasons that follow, we affirm both of the trial court's orders and dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's request for a preliminary injunction. An order denying a preliminary injunction is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6); see Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 338, fn. 1.) Appellant, plaintiff Ralphs Grocery Company, contends two California laws protecting labor picketing violate constitutional protections of free speech. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings on appellant's motion for preliminary injunction.

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's request for a preliminary injunction. An order denying a preliminary injunction is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6); see Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 338, fn. 1.) Appellant, plaintiff Ralphs Grocery Company, contends two California laws protecting labor picketing violate constitutional protections of free speech. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings on appellant's motion for preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered against them after defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged causes of action including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, rescission and reformation; plaintiffs alleged they signed a written agreement with defendant, but they were induced to do so by defendant's oral misrepresentations of the terms contained in the written agreement, made at the time of execution of the agreement. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment after ruling that plaintiffs' evidence of misrepresentations was inadmissible pursuant to the parol evidence rule, and therefore plaintiffs had not presented admissible evidence raising a triable issue of material fact that would prevent entry of judgment against them. We find the evidence fell within the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule and should have been admitted to raise a triable issue of material fact in opposition to defendant's motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

Jesse Espinoza (Defendant), an inmate in state prison, petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking reversal of a decision of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) denying family visitation privileges on the grounds that Defendant had been found guilty of narcotics distribution while incarcerated in state prison. The trial court granted the petition and ordered CDCR to reconsider Defendant's request based only upon consideration of his conduct during his current term of incarceration and without consideration of his past prison disciplinary violations for institutional narcotics trafficking. CDCR appeals, contending (1) Defendant's challenge to CDCR's decision is untimely, and (2) the trial court erred in interpreting California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3177.[1] We reverse.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs and appellants, Leisha Hendrix, Kathy Sellers, Jane Folmer, Eva Sager, and Phillip Livoni (collectively referred to as plaintiffs), all of whom are official court reporters employed by defendant and respondent, The Superior Court of San Bernardino County (hereafter the Court), from the judgment entered against them and in favor of the Court and defendant and respondent, Tressa Sloan Kentner, the Court's executive officer, on plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate.[1] In that petition plaintiffs sought to compel defendants to pay them at the higher rate specified in Government Code section 69950, subdivision (a) any time plaintiffs had to recreate a previously transcribed reporter's transcript. In the published portion of this opinion we hold that the higher rate of compensation applies only to the first transcription of the reporter's notes. In the unpublished portion we hold that plaintiffs also failed to establish a contractual right to the higher rate of compensation. Therefore we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant not guilty of either attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) or attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 664), but guilty of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). An enhancement for the personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)) and an enhancement for the personal infliction of great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)) were both found true. Defendant admitted two 1-year prior prison term enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 13 years in prison.
We find no error affecting the conviction. However, we do agree with defendant that the imposition of separate and unstayed sentences on both the firearm use enhancement and the great bodily injury enhancement violated Penal Code section 654 (section 654). Hence, we will stay the firearm use enhancement.

In this contract indemnity action, plaintiff and appellant Searles Valley Minerals Operations Inc. (Searles) appeals the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendants and respondents Ralph M. Parsons Service Company and Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group, Inc. (Parsons), following an order sustaining Parsons's demurrer, without leave to amend, to Searles's cause of action for express indemnity.
Searles contends it adequately alleged a cause of action for express indemnity by alleging that Parsons was required, under an indemnity contract between Parsons and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation (KM), to provide KM with a defense and indemnify KM for losses arising from a wrongful death action against KM, Parsons, and Parsons's subcontractor. Searles argues that, as an assignee of KM's indemnity rights, it was entitled to reimbursement for paying KM's defense costs.
While there appears to be no case law directly on point, we conclude that an assignee of contract indemnification rights stands in the shoes of the indemnitee. Therefore, if the indemnitor refuses to pay an indemnitee's defense costs, the indemnitee, and in turn the assignee, can pay the costs and seek reimbursement from the indemnitor. Searles, as KM's assignee, was entitled under the indemnity agreement to recover defense costs it paid on KM's behalf. The trial court thus erred in sustaining, without leave to amend, Parsons's demurrer to Searles's cause of action for express indemnity, and we reverse the judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiffs and appellants Karan and Stan Eriksson are the parents of Mia Erikkson.[1] Mia was an avid horse rider and equestrian competitor. Defendant and respondent Kristi Nunnink was Mia's riding coach. In November 2006, Mia participated in an equestrian competition at Galway Downs (Galway) in Temecula. She was 17 years old at the time. Although Mia's horse was recently injured in another competition, Nunnink persuaded Mia's mother, Karan, that the horse was fit to ride in the Galway event. Based on Nunnink's representations, Karan allowed Mia to compete. During the cross-country portion of the competition, Mia's horse tripped over a hurdle. With the Erikssons looking on, Mia fell off the horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing Mia's death.

Plaintiffs and appellants Karan and Stan Eriksson are the parents of Mia Erikkson.[1] Mia was an avid horse rider and equestrian competitor. Defendant and respondent Kristi Nunnink was Mia's riding coach. In November 2006, Mia participated in an equestrian competition at Galway Downs (Galway) in Temecula. She was 17 years old at the time. Although Mia's horse was recently injured in another competition, Nunnink persuaded Mia's mother, Karan, that the horse was fit to ride in the Galway event. Based on Nunnink's representations, Karan allowed Mia to compete. During the cross-country portion of the competition, Mia's horse tripped over a hurdle. With the Erikssons looking on, Mia fell off the horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing Mia's death.

Plaintiffs and appellants Karan and Stan Eriksson are the parents of Mia Erikkson.[1] Mia was an avid horse rider and equestrian competitor. Defendant and respondent Kristi Nunnink was Mia's riding coach. In November 2006, Mia participated in an equestrian competition at Galway Downs (Galway) in Temecula. She was 17 years old at the time. Although Mia's horse was recently injured in another competition, Nunnink persuaded Mia's mother, Karan, that the horse was fit to ride in the Galway event. Based on Nunnink's representations, Karan allowed Mia to compete. During the cross-country portion of the competition, Mia's horse tripped over a hurdle. With the Erikssons looking on, Mia fell off the horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing Mia's death.

Plaintiffs and appellants Karan and Stan Eriksson are the parents of Mia Erikkson.[1] Mia was an avid horse rider and equestrian competitor. Defendant and respondent Kristi Nunnink was Mia's riding coach. In November 2006, Mia participated in an equestrian competition at Galway Downs (Galway) in Temecula. She was 17 years old at the time. Although Mia's horse was recently injured in another competition, Nunnink persuaded Mia's mother, Karan, that the horse was fit to ride in the Galway event. Based on Nunnink's representations, Karan allowed Mia to compete. During the cross-country portion of the competition, Mia's horse tripped over a hurdle. With the Erikssons looking on, Mia fell off the horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing Mia's death.

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Joseph Gene Federico was convicted of attempting to commit a lewd act with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 288, subd. (a), 664, count 1) and attempting to send harmful matter to a minor with the intent of seducing the minor (§§ 288.2, subd. (b), 664, count 2). Defendant admitted he had a prior strike conviction for manslaughter with the use of a firearm (§ 192) within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1) and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). He was sentenced to prison for a total term of six years eight months. He appeals.

PROCEEDINGS in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Petition denied; request for stay denied.
Kevin R. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. He contends the court erred when it found that reasonable services were offered or provided to him, and terminated reunification services. We deny the petition.