CA Pub. Decisions

Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying severance motion of defendant facing three murder charges. The were offenses of same class of crimes. None of the cases was especially weak because defendant admitted to shooting one of the victims and there was strong eyewitness evidence as to the other victims. None of the three killings, all of which were committed for seemingly trivial reasons and involved excessive force, was especially likely to inflame jury's passions and joining murder charge for beating victim to charges for shooting victims, which sufficed to support multiple-murder special circumstance, did not expand defendant's death penalty liability.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying severance motion of defendant facing three murder charges. The were offenses of same class of crimes. None of the cases was especially weak because defendant admitted to shooting one of the victims and there was strong eyewitness evidence as to the other victims. None of the three killings, all of which were committed for seemingly trivial reasons and involved excessive force, was especially likely to inflame jury's passions and joining murder charge for beating victim to charges for shooting victims, which sufficed to support multiple-murder special circumstance, did not expand defendant's death penalty liability.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying severance motion of defendant facing three murder charges. The were offenses of same class of crimes. None of the cases was especially weak because defendant admitted to shooting one of the victims and there was strong eyewitness evidence as to the other victims. None of the three killings, all of which were committed for seemingly trivial reasons and involved excessive force, was especially likely to inflame jury's passions and joining murder charge for beating victim to charges for shooting victims, which sufficed to support multiple-murder special circumstance, did not expand defendant's death penalty liability.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying severance motion of defendant facing three murder charges. The were offenses of same class of crimes. None of the cases was especially weak because defendant admitted to shooting one of the victims and there was strong eyewitness evidence as to the other victims. None of the three killings, all of which were committed for seemingly trivial reasons and involved excessive force, was especially likely to inflame jury's passions and joining murder charge for beating victim to charges for shooting victims, which sufficed to support multiple-murder special circumstance, did not expand defendant's death penalty liability.

Under Meyers-Milias-Brown Act--which governs labor-management relations at the local government level and requires that a city meet and confer with an employee association about a matter within the scope of representation concerning, among other things, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment but provides an exception for fundamental managerial or policy decisions, which are deemed to be outside scope of representation--city was not required to meet and confer with the police officer's association before implementing study of racial profiling that required officers on all vehicle stops to complete a preprinted form that included questions regarding the driver's perceived race/ethnicity and the officers' prior knowledge of driver's race/ethnicity. The form is to take two minutes to complete. There is no obligation to meet and confer with regard to a management action that lacks a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees. If an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees, the action is within the scope of representation only if the employer's need for unencumbered decision making in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.

Where trial court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting schools from withholding diplomas from students who failed to pass the high school exit exam but met all other graduation requirements. The trial court's determination that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their primary equal protection claim--that it is a violation of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution to apply the exit exam diploma requirement to students who have passed all the course requirements for graduation but who have not been provided with the educational resources necessary to enable them to pass the exam--was supported by substantial evidence and legally proper. Although the court's determination as to their secondary claim--that the manner in which supplemental funding for remedial instruction for the class of 2006 had been distributed also violated equal protection--was not. The trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it balanced the factors it was legally required to consider in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction--and in concluding that the injunction was necessary to maintain the status quo while the underlying litigation proceeded--where trial court gave virtually no weight to schools' proof that at least in some cases, students' failure to pass exam would only result in a delay in their receipt of their high school diplomas rather than a permanent denial of them. In addition, students have nine options available to them by which they can continue their education and obtain either a high school diploma or a similar certificate. Court failed to consider evidence establishing that granting the relief students sought would cause substantial harm to others and--more significantly--to the public interest and failed to balance that harm against that which the students would suffer without the relief and where it was based on the false premise that the harm to plaintiffs was not the loss of educational opportunity but the denial of a diploma, and failed to take into account the public interest in enforcing the exam requirement as an integral part of the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature in an effort to raise academic standards in California public schools. The remedy exceeded what the court had the legal authority to impose and was otherwise overbroad in its scope where it prohibited every school district in the state, regardless of educational materials available to its students, from denying diplomas to those students who failed to pass the exam, and where so-called interim relief, an order that students be given diplomas, in fact does not maintain the status quo of the litigation but ends it.

Where trial court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting schools from withholding diplomas from students who failed to pass the high school exit exam but met all other graduation requirements. The trial court's determination that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their primary equal protection claim--that it is a violation of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution to apply the exit exam diploma requirement to students who have passed all the course requirements for graduation but who have not been provided with the educational resources necessary to enable them to pass the exam--was supported by substantial evidence and legally proper. Although the court's determination as to their secondary claim--that the manner in which supplemental funding for remedial instruction for the class of 2006 had been distributed also violated equal protection--was not. The trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it balanced the factors it was legally required to consider in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction--and in concluding that the injunction was necessary to maintain the status quo while the underlying litigation proceeded--where trial court gave virtually no weight to schools' proof that at least in some cases, students' failure to pass exam would only result in a delay in their receipt of their high school diplomas rather than a permanent denial of them. In addition, students have nine options available to them by which they can continue their education and obtain either a high school diploma or a similar certificate. Court failed to consider evidence establishing that granting the relief students sought would cause substantial harm to others and--more significantly--to the public interest and failed to balance that harm against that which the students would suffer without the relief and where it was based on the false premise that the harm to plaintiffs was not the loss of educational opportunity but the denial of a diploma, and failed to take into account the public interest in enforcing the exam requirement as an integral part of the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature in an effort to raise academic standards in California public schools. The remedy exceeded what the court had the legal authority to impose and was otherwise overbroad in its scope where it prohibited every school district in the state, regardless of educational materials available to its students, from denying diplomas to those students who failed to pass the exam, and where so-called interim relief, an order that students be given diplomas, in fact does not maintain the status quo of the litigation but ends it.

Liberal construction of a parent's notice of appeal from an order terminating parental rights encompasses the denial of the parent's petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 388 provided the trial court issued its denial during the 60-day period prior to the parent's filing the notice of appeal.

Local ordinance requiring landlords to pay 5 percent interest on security deposits did not constitute an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Where landlords were not compelled to invest the funds in instruments paying a return of less than 5 percent. Any losses resulting from the investment in money market was small, avoidable--since the ordinance only applied if the deposit was held more than a year--and offset by the benefit to the landlord of holding the security.

Local ordinance requiring landlords to pay 5 percent interest on security deposits did not constitute an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Where landlords were not compelled to invest the funds in instruments paying a return of less than 5 percent. Any losses resulting from the investment in money market was small, avoidable--since the ordinance only applied if the deposit was held more than a year--and offset by the benefit to the landlord of holding the security.

Where murder-robbery suspect who made confession during police interview requested at conclusion of interview to call his mother privately. The man's motivation for call was his desire to receive emotional support and comfort rather than any kind of prompting by police interviewers, and police never attempted to influence conversation by contacting man's mother or telling her or man that they would be listening to or recording conversation, trial court did not err in admitting police's secret recording of man's telephonic confessions to family members on basis that calls were entirely were voluntarily, even though court had ruled his prior confession to police had been coerced.

Juvenile court judge's handwritten orders denying applications for rehearing of referee's decision within 20 days of filing satisfied the timeliness requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 252. The code provides that an application for rehearing of the decision of a juvenile court referee not sitting as a temporary judge is granted by operation of law if not ruled on within 20 days.

A defendant whose request to substitute counsel is granted cannot complain on appeal that the trial court should have denied that request. The defendant's only contention on appeal in such circumstances can be that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel.

A defendant whose request to substitute counsel is granted cannot complain on appeal that the trial court should have denied that request. The defendant's only contention on appeal in such circumstances can be that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel.