CA Pub. Decisions

Board of trustees of university system abused discretion when it approved environmental impact report--for expansion of small campus on former military base into a major institution that will enroll 25,000 students--that disclaimed responsibility for mitigating off-campus effects such as water drainage problems, increased water demand, increased traffic, increased wastewater, and increased need for fire protection because the only way to make such effects insignificant would be to improve the base's off-campus infrastructure to the extent called for by base's civilian governing authority's master plan.

Trial court properly denied motion for discovery of police personnel records where defendant's explanation of alleged misconduct--that defendant was innocently standing on street in vicinity of drug activity and rather than arresting persons involved in such activity, the contingent of police officers arrested defendant and conspired to frame defendant using drugs seized in unrelated cases solely because he had a prior criminal record--was implausible.

Crop growers who sold crops to processor have lien on proceeds of sale of processor's product, which has priority over processor's secured lender's lien on processor's inventory, accounts receivable and proceeds.

Trial court erred in relying on the reported findings of parole authorities to limit defendant's presentence confinement credits without considering defendant's objections to those findings.

Employment contract providing that employment was at will and could be terminated at any time was not ambiguous and meant employment could be terminated at any time with or without cause.

Evidence supported a finding that defendant took personal property from the immediate presence of another by force or fear. Therefore supported a conviction for robbery, where it showed that, while watching surveillance camera, store's loss-prevention officer saw defendant take goods from store without paying. Once outside the store, defendant resisted officer's efforts to get the merchandise back by repeatedly threatening to shoot officer and pulling a gun from defendant's car. Jury instruction was not erroneous where it instructed the jury that the force or fear element of robbery can be satisfied during the asportation or carrying away phase of "taking" rather than only during the "gaining possession" phase of taking. Where jury asked for clarification of law as to where the actual act of robbery ends, judge's response that "commission of the crime of robbery continues so long as the stolen property is being carried away to a place of temporary safety" and that "if the initial taking of the property was without force or fear, but during the carrying away of the property, force or fear is then used against the victim by the perpetrator to retain or escape with the property, the required element of force or fear is established," properly addressed jury's question, was not an improper "pinpoint" instruction, and trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's counsel's request to be allowed to make additional arguments to the jury after the instruction.

Insurance Code Sec. 1748.5--which provides that if a "subject person" has been charged with certain types of felony crimes and if the insurance commissioner finds that a failure to issue a suspension order threatens an insurer's solvency or may cause financial or other injury to any person. Then the commissioner shall immediately suspend that subject person from participating in the business of an insurer or production agency and allows no right of presuspension hearing. It limits a postsuspension hearing to issues other than the truth of the criminal charges but provides that if the charges result in anything other than a conviction, the suspension will be revoked as if it had never been issued--does not violate constitutional due process rights. Is not impermissibly vague and applies only to natural persons.

Constitutional limitations on shackling of defendant in presence of jury apply to trial of petition to extend commitment of defendant previously found not guilty by reason of insanity. Trial court erred in permitting shackling of defendant in presence of jury based solely on determination of court security personnel without independent evaluation of relevant facts.

Evidence that juvenile was a gang member and was found in possession of a knife. Combined with expert opinion that such possession benefited the gang because, "it helps provide them protection should they be assaulted by rival gang members," was insufficient to support finding that juvenile possessed the knife for the benefit of street gang. Expert's opinion usurped role of trier of fact and did not compensate for lack of evidence that minor had any reason for possessing knife other than self-protection such as evidence that the minor was in gang territory. Had gang members with him, or had reason to expect to use the knife in a gang-related offense.

Where condominium unit owner claimed that former owner of unit was responsible to pay homeowners association for roof repairs. Former owner sued association and current owner seeking declaration of her rights as to responsibility for repairs. The suit amounted to attempt to enforce association's obligations to current owner under CC&Rs and trial court properly dismissed former owner's actions for lack of standing to enforce CC&Rs. Where suit was properly dismissed, trial court properly awarded fees to association, and former owner did not offer evidence showing that amount of award was unreasonable.

Defendants who fail to file an anti-SLAPP motion before the voluntary dismissal of all causes of actions against them cannot recover fees or costs under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Trial court order setting aside administrative suspension of driver's license of suspected drunk driver. Suspension was supported by substantial evidence where sole evidence of suspect's blood alcohol content came from preliminary alcohol screening test that was of questionable. Because the officer performed the test only nine minutes after suspect spit chewing gum from his mouth the reliability of the test is questionable. The officer explained he did not observe the suspect for the standard 15 minutes because he only considered the test a field sobriety test.

Where plaintiff offered evidence of medical expenses that were not actually paid and the trial court correctly denied motion in limine while postverdict reduction of jury's award of medical expenses may be appropriate in those circumstances. The defendant cannot prevent the jury from hearing evidence regarding reasonable medical costs for plaintiff's care in the first instance. Defendant's failure to request that award of past medical expenses be determined by special verdict waived contention that damage award included medical expenses not actually paid or incurred.

Trial court order directing state hospital to administer antipsychotic drugs against defendant's will in effort to restore his competency was not supported by substantial evidence, thus falling short of constitutional and statutory requirements, where (1) prosecutor made no showing that subjecting petitioner to involuntary antipsychotic medication would further any governmental interest, (2) medical experts presented conflicting opinions regarding defendant's condition, did not specify actual medication defendant should be treated with, and did not articulate any side effects defendant might experience if he took particular antipsychotic drugs, (3) medical experts provided no specific information concerning alternatives or less intrusive methods likely to have same results as forcible medication, and (4) medical experts presented no specific evidence that administration of antipsychotic medication was in defendant's best medical interests in light of his actual condition.