CA Pub. Decisions

A jury convicted Wahid Yossuf Nazary of embezzlement by an employee (Pen. Code,[1] § 508; count 1) and grand theft by an employee (§ 487, subd. (b)(3); count 2). The trial court sentenced Nazary to two years in prison on count 1 and stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Nazary appeals, contending he cannot be convicted of both grand theft and embezzlement because they are the same crime, or alternatively, grand theft is a lesser included offense of embezzlement which must be stricken. He also claims the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the prosecutor to play a videotaped confrontation with him in his private workplace office in violation of section 632 and his privacy rights, in denying his motion to strike the testimony of a witness at trial, and in overruling hearsay objections to certain receipts admitted into evidence. Nazary finally asserts the cumulative effect of the multiple evidentiary errors denied him due process and a fair trial. We affirm.

A jury convicted Wahid Yossuf Nazary of embezzlement by an employee (Pen. Code,[1] § 508; count 1) and grand theft by an employee (§ 487, subd. (b)(3); count 2). The trial court sentenced Nazary to two years in prison on count 1 and stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Nazary appeals, contending he cannot be convicted of both grand theft and embezzlement because they are the same crime, or alternatively, grand theft is a lesser included offense of embezzlement which must be stricken. He also claims the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the prosecutor to play a videotaped confrontation with him in his private workplace office in violation of section 632 and his privacy rights, in denying his motion to strike the testimony of a witness at trial, and in overruling hearsay objections to certain receipts admitted into evidence. Nazary finally asserts the cumulative effect of the multiple evidentiary errors denied him due process and a fair trial. We affirm.

In this case we are presented with an issue of first impression in California: Does the remedy of rescission in a securities fraud claim brought under Corporations Code sections 25504 and 25504.1[1] require privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant? In other words, can a purchaser of securities sue for rescission under sections 25504 and 25504.1, which provide for liability against "control persons" and "aiders and abettors," if those persons or entities did not sell the security to the plaintiff? We conclude that privity of contract is necessary to maintain an action for rescission under sections 25504 and 25504.1, and therefore a purchaser of securities may not maintain such a claim against someone other than the direct seller. That is so because rescission requires the contracting parties to be placed in the position they were in prior to contracting, and a non-seller, who did not receive any money from the purchaser, cannot return that money to the purchaser. We affirm.

In this case we are presented with an issue of first impression in California: Does the remedy of rescission in a securities fraud claim brought under Corporations Code sections 25504 and 25504.1[1] require privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant? In other words, can a purchaser of securities sue for rescission under sections 25504 and 25504.1, which provide for liability against "control persons" and "aiders and abettors," if those persons or entities did not sell the security to the plaintiff? We conclude that privity of contract is necessary to maintain an action for rescission under sections 25504 and 25504.1, and therefore a purchaser of securities may not maintain such a claim against someone other than the direct seller. That is so because rescission requires the contracting parties to be placed in the position they were in prior to contracting, and a non-seller, who did not receive any money from the purchaser, cannot return that money to the purchaser. Court affirm.

Defendants Sadiq Saibu and Antonio Valentino appeal from their convictions and sentences after a jury trial. Saibu and Valentino were convicted for their roles in committing a robbery of a video store, two attempted robberies of a liquor store, and a murder in the same liquor store during one of the attempted robberies.
On appeal, Saibu and Valentino jointly argue that the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence concerning a bank robbery for which both men were previously convicted; (2) admitting digitally enhanced photographs created from surveillance video of the liquor store, as well as expert testimony regarding the enhancement process; and (3) admitting a videotape of an interview of Saibu's cousin conducted by police detectives. Saibu also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 703 with respect to the felony-murder special circumstance allegation, and that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder. Valentino contends that his abstract of judgment contains a number of errors, and that these errors must be corrected. Finally, both defendants assert that their convictions must be reversed due to the collective prejudice from the court's cumulative errors.

Defendants Sadiq Saibu and Antonio Valentino appeal from their convictions and sentences after a jury trial. Saibu and Valentino were convicted for their roles in committing a robbery of a video store, two attempted robberies of a liquor store, and a murder in the same liquor store during one of the attempted robberies.
On appeal, Saibu and Valentino jointly argue that the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence concerning a bank robbery for which both men were previously convicted; (2) admitting digitally enhanced photographs created from surveillance video of the liquor store, as well as expert testimony regarding the enhancement process; and (3) admitting a videotape of an interview of Saibu's cousin conducted by police detectives. Saibu also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 703 with respect to the felony-murder special circumstance allegation, and that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder. Valentino contends that his abstract of judgment contains a number of errors, and that these errors must be corrected. Finally, both defendants assert that their convictions must be reversed due to the collective prejudice from the court's cumulative errors.

Defendants Sadiq Saibu and Antonio Valentino appeal from their convictions and sentences after a jury trial. Saibu and Valentino were convicted for their roles in committing a robbery of a video store, two attempted robberies of a liquor store, and a murder in the same liquor store during one of the attempted robberies.
On appeal, Saibu and Valentino jointly argue that the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence concerning a bank robbery for which both men were previously convicted; (2) admitting digitally enhanced photographs created from surveillance video of the liquor store, as well as expert testimony regarding the enhancement process; and (3) admitting a videotape of an interview of Saibu's cousin conducted by police detectives. Saibu also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 703 with respect to the felony-murder special circumstance allegation, and that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder. Valentino contends that his abstract of judgment contains a number of errors, and that these errors must be corrected. Finally, both defendants assert that their convictions must be reversed due to the collective prejudice from the court's cumulative errors.

In this case the developer of a condominium project recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&R's) which required that a homeowners association arbitrate any construction defect claim the association might have against the developer. As we explain more fully below, we find CC&R's are not an effective means of obtaining an agreement to arbitrate a homeowners association's construction defect claims against a developer.[1]
Although both federal and state law favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements, neither federal nor state law countenance imposition of arbitration where no agreement to waive judicial remedies exists. Admittedly, in other circumstances our cases and Civil Code section 1354 treat CC&R's as equitable servitudes which bind homeowners and homeowners associations with respect to claims they may have against each other. This treatment of CC&R's is not based on any determination the parties bound by them are in privity of contract with either their co-owners or a homeowners association. Rather, CC&R's are made binding in disputes between homeowners or between homeowners and a homeowners association because of their shared and continuing interest in the equitable and efficient operation of common interest developments. Here, the recorded CC&R's, standing alone, are not a contract between the developer and the homeowners association, which only came into existence after the CC&R's were recorded. Thus here there has been no showing the association entered into a binding arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the developers' motion to compel arbitration.

Mother, Sonya C., appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to T.C. Mother contends that because the permanent plans for two-year-old T.C. and her almost 13-year-old half sister, R.B., were different, an actual conflict arose for minor's counsel and the trial court prejudicially erred in not recognizing this conflict and appointing separate counsel. We shall affirm.

In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Randy Kemp (petitioner), we conclude that irrespective of the date a prisoner's judgment became final, federal and state constitutional principles of equal protection require that the amendments to ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 23 s BSKWUT000001 l "Penal Code § 4019" Penal Code section 4019[1] provided by ADDIN BA xc <@leg> xl 18 s BSKWUT000002 l "Senate Bill No. 18" Senate Bill No. 3X 18 (2009-2010 3d Ex. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 3X 18) (see Stats. 2009, ch. 28, § 50), effective January 25, 2010 (January 25 amendment), and ADDIN BA xc <@leg> xl 18 s BSKWUT000003 l "Senate Bill No. 76" Senate Bill No. 76 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 76) (see Stats. 2010, ch. 426), effective September 28, 2010 (September 28 amendment), which increase the rate at which a specified class of prisoners earns conduct credits, must be applied retroactively.

Lose your sobriety, lose your driver's license, lose your job. That is one of the serious consequences for commercial motor vehicle operators who drive under the influence of alcohol.
Vehicle Code section 15300 prohibits a person from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one year if the person is â€

Petitioner Damian M. Miranda petitions this court for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) violated his due process rights at a parole-suitability hearing in 2007 because its determination that he was not suitable for parole was not supported by â€

In the course of a home invasion robbery, Michael Jay Loveless (defendant) shot Robert DeRungs in the head, killing him in front of DeRungs's 14-year-old son. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 15 years to life in state prison. On the 22nd anniversary of the murder, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found defendant unsuitable for parole and issued a two-year denial. The superior court granted defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding there was no evidence to support the Board's denial of parole, and ordering the Board to conduct a â€

Nine years after the City of Stockton (City) initiated eminent domain proceedings to acquire real property owned by Andrew C. Cobb, as trustee of the Andrew C. Cobb 1992 Revocable Trust (the Trust), and after the City constructed a public roadway across the condemned property, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of prosecution (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.360). Plaintiff, Michael A. Cobb, as successor trustee, then initiated this action in inverse condemnation to collect for the taking of the property by virtue of the extant roadway.
The City demurred to the complaint, arguing the inverse condemnation claim is time-barred, inasmuch as the taking occurred more than five years before the complaint was filed. The trial court agreed, sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and entered judgment for the City. Plaintiff appeals.