CA Pub. Decisions

A "cold hit" from a DNA database where the suspect is first identified by a database search or "trawl" is not subject to the Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility when it is used merely to identify a possible suspect. Warrantless collection of blood samples and saliva from inmate convicted of sexual offense under aggravated circumstances for use in DNA database does not violate Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

A "cold hit" from a DNA database where the suspect is first identified by a database search or "trawl" is not subject to the Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility when it is used merely to identify a possible suspect. Warrantless collection of blood samples and saliva from inmate convicted of sexual offense under aggravated circumstances for use in DNA database does not violate Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

A "cold hit" from a DNA database where the suspect is first identified by a database search or "trawl" is not subject to the Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility when it is used merely to identify a possible suspect. Warrantless collection of blood samples and saliva from inmate convicted of sexual offense under aggravated circumstances for use in DNA database does not violate Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

In reviewing city's termination of police officer for failing to report sexual abuse of minor, trial court correctly treated officer's duty under department policy to be coextensive with statutory duty to report such abuse if he learned of it while on duty or otherwise acting in a professional capacity, absent showing that department intended its policy to apply more broadly. Evidence that officer, after learning in private capacity of sexual relationship between adult and minor, gave advice to minor as to how to handle relationship did not establish that officer was acting in a professional capacity when he gave that advice and thus did not undermine trial court's finding that officer was not obligated to report relationship to department. Termination of officer was an abuse of discretion where only finding of misconduct sustained by trial court after independent review of the evidence was that officer lied during course of a criminal investigation, department policy did not mandate termination for lying, officer had no prior disciplinary record, officer retracted false statement and told truth before conclusion of interview in which he initially lied, department never relied on false statement for any purpose, and it was unlikely--based on police chief's testimony--that department would have terminated officer had it not made the additional findings of misconduct that were rejected by trial court. Award of attorney fees to terminated peace officer under Government Code Sec. 800 need not be accompanied by factual findings to support trial court's determination that termination was arbitrary or capricious unless employer requests statement of decision, and where officer awarded fees under that section prevails on appeal, fees should normally be awarded for the appeal.

In reviewing city's termination of police officer for failing to report sexual abuse of minor, trial court correctly treated officer's duty under department policy to be coextensive with statutory duty to report such abuse if he learned of it while on duty or otherwise acting in a professional capacity, absent showing that department intended its policy to apply more broadly. Evidence that officer, after learning in private capacity of sexual relationship between adult and minor, gave advice to minor as to how to handle relationship did not establish that officer was acting in a professional capacity when he gave that advice and thus did not undermine trial court's finding that officer was not obligated to report relationship to department. Termination of officer was an abuse of discretion where only finding of misconduct sustained by trial court after independent review of the evidence was that officer lied during course of a criminal investigation, department policy did not mandate termination for lying, officer had no prior disciplinary record, officer retracted false statement and told truth before conclusion of interview in which he initially lied, department never relied on false statement for any purpose, and it was unlikely--based on police chief's testimony--that department would have terminated officer had it not made the additional findings of misconduct that were rejected by trial court. Award of attorney fees to terminated peace officer under Government Code Sec. 800 need not be accompanied by factual findings to support trial court's determination that termination was arbitrary or capricious unless employer requests statement of decision, and where officer awarded fees under that section prevails on appeal, fees should normally be awarded for the appeal.

In reviewing city's termination of police officer for failing to report sexual abuse of minor, trial court correctly treated officer's duty under department policy to be coextensive with statutory duty to report such abuse if he learned of it while on duty or otherwise acting in a professional capacity, absent showing that department intended its policy to apply more broadly. Evidence that officer, after learning in private capacity of sexual relationship between adult and minor, gave advice to minor as to how to handle relationship did not establish that officer was acting in a professional capacity when he gave that advice and thus did not undermine trial court's finding that officer was not obligated to report relationship to department. Termination of officer was an abuse of discretion where only finding of misconduct sustained by trial court after independent review of the evidence was that officer lied during course of a criminal investigation, department policy did not mandate termination for lying, officer had no prior disciplinary record, officer retracted false statement and told truth before conclusion of interview in which he initially lied, department never relied on false statement for any purpose, and it was unlikely--based on police chief's testimony--that department would have terminated officer had it not made the additional findings of misconduct that were rejected by trial court. Award of attorney fees to terminated peace officer under Government Code Sec. 800 need not be accompanied by factual findings to support trial court's determination that termination was arbitrary or capricious unless employer requests statement of decision, and where officer awarded fees under that section prevails on appeal, fees should normally be awarded for the appeal.

A decision regarding damages for wrongful death and abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependant Adult Civil Protection Act.

A decision regarding conditions warranting terminating sanctions.

A decision regarding action for wrongful death, negligence and elder abuse.

A decision regarding liability of a public entity for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property.

A decision regarding breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and malicious prosecution.

A decision regarding giveing the auditor or tax collector discretion to deny cancellation of penalties if and when the taxpayer's proof has established the factual predicates set out in subdivisions (a) and (b).

Penal Code Sec. 296.1--mandating collection of DNA samples and print impressions for collection and storage in a state database from every person convicted of a felony, every person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity, and every person adjudicated as a juvenile offender based on commission of a felony--does not violate Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement since benefits of such collection and storage outweigh felons' limited privacy rights. Sec. 296.1 does not violate the equal protection rights of convicted felons, who are not similarly situated to other persons with respect to the purposes that DNA sample collection and storage are intended to serve. Extension of DNA sample collection requirement to all felons does not violate due process even as amended to include all felony offenders within the DNA testing requirement since statute is minimally intrusive, does not infringe on privacy rights that are recognized as reasonable, and serves a compelling state interest. Section 296.1 does not impose punishment so its extension of DNA sampling requirements does not violate ex post facto clauses as applied to defendant convicted after statute's effective date of offense that would not have subjected him to such requirements under law in effect on date of crime.

Penal Code Sec. 296.1--mandating collection of DNA samples and print impressions for collection and storage in a state database from every person convicted of a felony, every person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity, and every person adjudicated as a juvenile offender based on commission of a felony--does not violate Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement since benefits of such collection and storage outweigh felons' limited privacy rights. Sec. 296.1 does not violate the equal protection rights of convicted felons, who are not similarly situated to other persons with respect to the purposes that DNA sample collection and storage are intended to serve. Extension of DNA sample collection requirement to all felons does not violate due process even as amended to include all felony offenders within the DNA testing requirement since statute is minimally intrusive, does not infringe on privacy rights that are recognized as reasonable, and serves a compelling state interest. Section 296.1 does not impose punishment so its extension of DNA sampling requirements does not violate ex post facto clauses as applied to defendant convicted after statute's effective date of offense that would not have subjected him to such requirements under law in effect on date of crime.