CA Pub. Decisions

These consolidated appeals concern two competing lawsuits brought in the name of a nonprofit charitable organization, Disability Services Corporation (DSC). The cases arise from a struggle between two rival factions of DSC’s board of directors (board) to control the corporation. In each of the two actions, one rival faction engaged separate counsel to file suit against the other rival faction for malfeasance in the management of DSC’s assets. Neither action is a shareholder derivative suit; in both DSC sues one board or the other in its individual corporate capacity.

These consolidated appeals concern two competing lawsuits brought in the name of a nonprofit charitable organization, Disability Services Corporation (DSC). The cases arise from a struggle between two rival factions of DSC’s board of directors (board) to control the corporation. In each of the two actions, one rival faction engaged separate counsel to file suit against the other rival faction for malfeasance in the management of DSC’s assets. Neither action is a shareholder derivative suit; in both DSC sues one board or the other in its individual corporate capacity.

This is a nuisance abatement action by the City of Fontana (City). All of the defendants’ defaults were entered. However, two of the defendants — Avtar Singh Bhangu (Bhangu) and Bani, LLC (Bani) (collectively appellants) — filed a series of motions to set aside their defaults; they filed the first such motion through an attorney who, at the time, was suspended from the practice of law. The trial court denied all of these motions. Ultimately, it entered a default judgment, including monetary relief as well as injunctions essentially commanding appellants to abate the nuisance. When appellants failed to abate the nuisance, the trial court held them in contempt and appointed a receiver to enforce the judgment. The Court agree that the trial court erred by awarding administrative costs and by awarding the City’s attorneys’ printing and copying costs. Otherwise, we find no prejudicial error. Accordingly, The Court modify the judgment.

In People v. Fadden (Jan. 4, 2007, F049795), an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed defendant Barrett Juston Fadden’s conviction for possession of a weapon while confined in a penal institution (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)). On November 4, 2014, pursuant to the resentencing provision of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), the trial court heard and denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. The Court affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Tony Ing appeal s from a money judgment in favor of respondent Thomas Lee. He argues that Lee’s claims, based on Ing’s alleged misappropriation of $1 million Lee had given Ing in 2008 to invest in currency trading, were barred by the statute of limitations and not subject to the delayed discovery rule. Ing also argues that the unclean hands doctrine precludes Lee’s recovery because Lee engaged in tax fraud in an earlier investment in a medical center. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

This is a legal malpractice lawsuit against Attorney Gerald Malanga for failing to identify the alleged legal malpractice of another attorney. The trial court sustained Malanga’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the lawsuit barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we conclude the trial court should have allowed leave to amend to assert equitable estoppel as a potentially valid defense to the statute of limitations.

Defendant and appellant, David Israel, appeals his conviction for lewd act on a child under 14, with recidivist sexual offender and prior serious felony conviction findings (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (a), 667.71, 667, subds. (b)-(i)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 55 years to life.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Defendant and appellant, Travon Dion Richard, appeals his conviction for burglary (2 counts), kidnapping (2 counts), stalking, battery and violation of a protective order (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 207, 646.9, 243, 273.6).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of five years four months.
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Yolanda Ghoston (defendant) challenges her convictions arising from identity theft and theft from an elderly man because the trial court admitted evidence that she did nearly the same thing to another elderly man to prove her identity, intent and a common scheme or plan. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. We affirm the conviction, but require that the abstract be corrected on a handful of issues.

Appellant Ana Vaca sued her former attorney, Neil M. Howard, and his alleged agent, employee, and co-conspirator, respondent Sheldon Lewenfus, for damages caused by the alleged wrongful taking of her property. Lewenfus moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] The trial court granted the motion and awarded Lewenfus his attorney fees. This appeal followed.
The complaint’s allegations are as follows: In furtherance of an alleged conspiracy with Lewenfus, Howard obtained a court order authorizing a sheriff’s sale of appellant’s residence on behalf of his client, a judgment creditor. At the sheriff’s sale, Howard did not make a credit bid on behalf of the judgment creditor—thus leaving his judgment unpaid—and Lewenfus, the sole bidder, purchased appellant’s residence at a grossly inadequate price. Howard and Lewenfus obtained the property at the expense of appellant and the judgment creditor, both former clie

evel Studios, Inc. (Level) and Thomas Adamski (collectively "respondents") are the prevailing parties in an action brought by Haley Daria. The trial court determined, inter alia, that Daria's claims were precluded by an earlier settlement agreement. Respondents moved for an award of attorney fees based on a provision in the agreement entitling the prevailing party to fees in any dispute arising under it. (See Civ. Code, § 1717.)[1] The trial court granted the motion.
Daria contends the trial court erroneously relied upon a "materially altered" version of the settlement agreement. This argument was not raised in the trial court; therefore, we do not consider it on appeal. (See Hepner v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486.) We reject her other contentions and affirm.

Defendant Danny Beltran appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of two counts of willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), arising from two separate attacks on Yvonne Lara. He contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence of cohabitation; (2) there was insufficient evidence that he inflicted great bodily injury on Lara with respect to the second attack; (3) there was insufficient evidence that he used force likely to produce great bodily injury with respect to the second attack; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. We disagree and affirm.

Appellants Enrique Medina, Michael Barrios, and Thomas Arellanes were convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code[1] section 187, subdivision (a), and one count of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that all three appellants committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22. The jury found not true the allegation that Medina personally used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. The jury found true the allegations as to Barrios and Arellanes that a principal was armed in the commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53. The court sentenced Medina to 40 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life in state prison for the murder conviction, plus 15 years to life for the attempted murder conviction pursuant to section 186.22. The

Defendant and appellant, Fred Lee Davis, appeals his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, with great bodily injury, dangerous weapon use, and a prior serious felony conviction finding (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 192, subd. (a), 12022.7, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 667, subds. (a)-(i)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 19 years.
The judgment is affirmed.