CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiffs Jerry Epstein, A. Redmond Doms, and Donald A. Casper brought this action against the Governor, the Acting Director of the Department of General Services (Director), and the Department of General Services (Department), seeking to prevent the Department's sale and leaseback of 11 state office buildings pursuant to authority granted by the Legislature as a budget-balancing measure. (See Gov. Code, § 14670.13 (§ 14670.13).) The trial court refused to preliminarily enjoin the sale, and plaintiffs petitioned this court for an extraordinary writ to compel the trial court to do so. We issued an order to show cause and stayed the sale pending further briefing. While the matter was pending, a new governor took office. When he and the other defendants filed their return, on February 10, 2011, they asserted that he had â€

The question presented here is whether a defendant's credit for presentence confinement can be reduced by virtue of a prior conviction when the allegations concerning that conviction are â€

Appellants Trinity Park, L. P. and Classic Communities, Inc. (hereafter, collectively Trinity) are the developers of a residential housing project known as Trinity Park, which consists of 42 houses in a subdivision located in respondent City of Sunnyvale (City). The City's 2007 approval of the Trinity Park development was conditioned upon compliance with the City's below market housing ordinance, which required Trinity to sell five houses in the subdivision at below market prices. In 2009, after substantial construction of the project, Trinity filed a complaint in which it sought to invalidate the City's below market housing requirement as applied to the Trinity Park development.

Appellants Trinity Park, L. P. and Classic Communities, Inc. (hereafter, collectively Trinity) are the developers of a residential housing project known as Trinity Park, which consists of 42 houses in a subdivision located in respondent City of Sunnyvale (City). The City's 2007 approval of the Trinity Park development was conditioned upon compliance with the City's below market housing ordinance, which required Trinity to sell five houses in the subdivision at below market prices. In 2009, after substantial construction of the project, Trinity filed a complaint in which it sought to invalidate the City's below market housing requirement as applied to the Trinity Park development.

Defendant Shiseop Kim was charged by complaint with felony battery causing serious bodily injury (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (d), 1192.7),[1] kidnapping (count 2; § 207, subd. (a)), and attempted dissuasion of a witness by threat of force (count 3; § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). By written plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to count 1 and admitted the personal infliction enhancement on condition that he would receive a grant of formal probation and the remaining charges would be dismissed. At sentencing the trial court suspended imposition of sentence for three years and placed defendant on formal probation with the following conditions, among others: â€

In this appeal, we review whether the superior court properly granted Javier Rodriguez's petition for habeas relief arising out of a decision by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (the Governor) to reverse the 2008 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings, which had granted Rodriguez parole. For reasons that follow, we conclude that the superior court was correct in granting the petition for habeas relief.

Defendant Jose Gonzalez Sanchez was convicted by jury trial of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 12025, subd. (a)(1)) and bringing a controlled substance into a jail (Pen. Code, § 4573). The jury found true allegations that the firearm was loaded and that defendant was â€

Defendant Jose Gonzalez Sanchez was convicted by jury trial of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 12025, subd. (a)(1)) and bringing a controlled substance into a jail (Pen. Code, § 4573). The jury found true allegations that the firearm was loaded and that defendant was â€

In what might serve as a monument to our â€

Appellant Bernice Singer and her labor union, appellant California School Employees Association (CSEA), appeal from the trial court's denial of their mandate petition. They contend that a classified employee of a nonmerit system school district[1] who attains permanent status and then is laid off from her position and thereafter reemployed by the district in a different, lower position retains her permanent status and may not be required to serve a probationary period in the new position. We conclude that the statutory scheme does not support their contention. We hold that such an employee's permanent status is restricted to the position or class in which it was attained and is not retained when the employee is reemployed in a different, lower position.

Plaintiff and appellant, Country Side Villas Homeowners' Association (Country Side) appeals the trial court's order granting defendant and respondent Susan Ivie's special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] On appeal, Country Side asserts the trial court erred in granting the motion, because it was not brought within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, as required by section 425.16, subdivision (f). In addition, Country Side asserts the motion should not have been granted because Ms. Ivie cannot establish that the causes of action arise from protected activity, and Country Side can show a probability of success on the merits.

Litigants have a right to be represented by counsel of their choice, particularly in substantive areas requiring particular expertise. In short, they have the right to hire the best professionals for their team. But they cannot induce their adversary's attorney to switch sides midstream. There is a rule of automatic disqualification where counsel breaches the duty of loyalty by simultaneously representing two current clients with adverse interests.
What does it mean to be a current client? This may not be as obvious as it seems. More than five years ago, petitioner's counsel prepared two identically worded fee agreements with real party for a specific matter, which closed shortly thereafter after minimal legal work. However, the retainer agreements are open-ended, affording counsel and real party the option of creating future engagements without new writings. Counsel never again represented real party. Do these â€

B.T., the child who is the subject of this appeal, was conceived during an unlawful sexual relationship between Debra T., an adult, and Miguel M., a minor. Debra was arrested for this relationship when B.T. was not yet five months old; Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) thereupon detained not only B.T., but Debra's three other children, ages 17, 12, and 9, on the grounds of substantial risk to them of neglect and sexual abuse by Debra. After the subsequent hearing for B.T. in August 2010, the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction over B.T., based on a risk to her of sexual abuse and neglect, and awarded Miguel full legal and physical custody, with monitored visits by Debra.[1] Debra appeals these rulings.
We reverse. After carefully examining the record, we cannot find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdiction over B.T. at the time the findings and orders were made. There was no evidence that Debra was likely to abuse or neglect B.T. On the contrary, she had an exemplary track record of child-rearing. While her relationship with Miguel certainly reflected poorly upon her judgment in one area, nothing suggested that it would cause her to neglect or abuse her baby daughter, especially since there was no evidence at all of any past abuse of her three other children, or of any other children.
Because we reverse the finding of jurisdiction, we need not decide the propriety of awarding full legal and physical custody to Miguel.

This case tests the limits of a trial court's discretionary authority to determine that there is no â€