CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiff Robin Rosen appeals from two judgments the trial court entered after (1) sustaining defendants Kurt Openshaw, M.D., and Vascular and Interventional Specialists of Orange County's (Vascular Specialists) demurrer and (2) granting defendant St. Joseph Hospital of Orange County's (St. Joseph Hospital) joinder in Openshaw and Vascular Specialists' demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground Rosen's causes of action constituted spoliation of evidence claims barred by the Supreme Court's decisions in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), and Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464 (Temple). Rosen asserts the trial court erred in denying her leave to amend to allege Openshaw, Vascular Specialists, and St. Joseph Hospital owed a contractual duty to preserve evidence. We find no error and affirm the judgments.

Government Code section 68097.2, subdivision (b) provides that when a peace officer is subpoenaed to testify, â€

A jury convicted defendant Jasinto Duran Meneses of committing a lewd act with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) and found true he had substantial sexual conduct with a child (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) and inflicted great bodily injury §§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e), 12022.8). The court sentenced him to 15 years to life based on the finding of great bodily injury. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e).) He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the great bodily injury allegation and that the sentence was cruel and unusual. We affirm.

Cheryl Skigin sued her employer John M. Shanahan and companies owned by him for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, marital status discrimination, religious discrimination, retaliation, sexual battery, breach of oral contract, fraud and deceit, breach of written contract, and wrongful termination. Shanahan settled the lawsuit for $700,000.
Shanahan had a renter's insurance policy and a separate personal liability policy (umbrella policy) with State Farm General Insurance Company (State Farm). He sued State Farm for breach of contract and breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing based upon State Farm's refusal to defend the Skigin lawsuit. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, contending it had no duty to defend Shanahan. Pertinent to this appeal, State Farm asserted it had no duty to defend a charge of sexual battery because intentional acts are not covered by Shanahan's policies. The trial court granted State Farm's motion.

In this personal injury case, defendant Desert Christian Center was successful in proving its affirmative defense that the injuries alleged by plaintiff Frank D. Brown were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system. A judgment of dismissal was entered and defendant sought to recover its costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.[1] Plaintiff moved to strike defendant's memorandum of costs, asserting that since defendant prevailed on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award costs. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and defendant now appeals from that order. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court had jurisdiction to award costs under the particular circumstances of this case. We agree and accordingly reverse the trial court's order striking the memorandum of costs.

After Mark Steven Bauer pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the court placed him on Proposition 36 probation, but twice he violated probation.[1] The sole issue on appeal is whether the court's termination of probation and imposition of a state prison sentence were proper. We affirm.

Following denial of his suppression motion (Pen. Code,[1] § 1538.5), appellant, Florencio Rios, pleaded no contest to possessing a firearm after being previously convicted of a violent offense (§ 12021.1, subd. (a); count 1) and resisting or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2). He admitted to having been previously convicted of four serious or violent felonies (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) and having served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Sentenced to prison for 25 years to life plus three years and ordered to pay various fines and fees, he now appeals, claiming his suppression motion was wrongly denied and that, because section 12021.1 has been replaced by section 12021, the trial court lacked fundamental subject matter jurisdiction and so the judgment is void. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Rios's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, and that he cannot raise the statutory claim because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, we affirm.
We publish to address Rios's contention that his suppression motion should have been granted because (1) the prosecution failed to prove the scope and precise terms of the search condition of the juvenile probationer in whose residence Rios was present, and (2) Rios's detention and pat search breached the limited power and authority conferred on probation officers under California law.

Appellants Ayodeji A. Ogundare, individually and doing business as Pacific Engineering Company (Pacific) and Davis Moreno Construction, Inc. (Davis) each moved to vacate a judgment entered against them pursuant to Labor Code section 1742.[1] Pacific contended that the judgment against it was not authorized by section 1742, subdivision (d) because it was filed in the wrong county and was therefore void. Davis raised the same contention, and further argued that the judgment against it had been obtained by means of extrinsic fraud. The superior court, relying on Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831 (Pressler) and Maynard v. Brandon (2005) 36 Cal.4th 364 (Maynard), concluded it did not have jurisdiction to grant relief, and denied both motions. Appellants now renew these same contentions on their appeals to this court. As we shall explain, we disagree with Pacific's contentions, but agree with Davis that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain Davis' motion on its merits. We reverse the order of the trial court denying Davis' motion, but affirm as to Pacific.

David Michael Vinson stands convicted, following a jury trial, of committing petty theft after having previously been convicted of a theft offense. (Pen. Code,[1] § 666.) Following a bifurcated court trial, he was found to have served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Sentenced to a total of five years in prison and ordered to pay various fees and fines, he now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the amendment to section 666 that became effective on September 9, 2010, applies retroactively. In the unpublished portion, we reject Vinson's claims of insufficient evidence, and trial and sentencing error.

David Michael Vinson stands convicted, following a jury trial, of committing petty theft after having previously been convicted of a theft offense. (Pen. Code,[1] § 666.) Following a bifurcated court trial, he was found to have served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Sentenced to a total of five years in prison and ordered to pay various fees and fines, he now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the amendment to section 666 that became effective on September 9, 2010, applies retroactively. In the unpublished portion, we reject Vinson's claims of insufficient evidence, and trial and sentencing error.

This appeal concerns a mixed-use development project involving 45 acres of land located on the Fresno campus of the California State University. The development is known as the Campus Pointe project and is being completed by a private developer that subleased the land from an auxiliary organization of the university. The development plans include apartments for students, faculty, employees and seniors, offices and retail stores, a hotel, and a 14-screen movie theater.
Appellants sued, challenging the approval of the project. They alleged a university trustee violated a conflict of interest statute, and the project's environmental impact report (EIR) failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).

This appeal concerns a mixed-use development project involving 45 acres of land located on the Fresno campus of the California State University. The development is known as the Campus Pointe project and is being completed by a private developer that subleased the land from an auxiliary organization of the university. The development plans include apartments for students, faculty, employees and seniors, offices and retail stores, a hotel, and a 14-screen movie theater.
Appellants sued, challenging the approval of the project. They alleged a university trustee violated a conflict of interest statute, and the project's environmental impact report (EIR) failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).

Plaintiff and appellant Juanita Martinez purchased a new 2002 Kia Sedona. She experienced significant problems with the vehicle within the warranty period, and took it to two Kia dealerships for repair. The dealerships denied warranty coverage and told her she would have to pay for the repair. Unable to pay, she left the vehicle at a dealership. It was later repossessed and sold. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against defendant and respondent Kia Motors America, Inc., alleging two violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.)[1] (the Act): breach of express warranty (§ 1793.2) and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (§ 1792). Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff was not entitled to any of the remedies provided by the Act because she no longer possessed the vehicle. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that plaintiff could not seek replacement or reimbursement under the Act because she no longer possessed the vehicle. We disagree.

A jury found true a petition filed by the People to extend the commitment of defendant, Steven Moore, who had previously been adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant contends that the trial court's comments about the reasonable doubt standard and its failure to instruct the jury that he had a right not to testify and a negative inference should not be drawn from his failure to testify require reversal of the jury's finding. We disagree and affirm. The facts adduced at the hearing on the petition are not relevant to this appeal.