CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiff in these actions, South Sutter, LLC (South Sutter), owned an option to acquire a large tract of land from defendant Odysseus Farms. South Sutter claimed the option agreement also gave it an exclusive interest in other lands owned by Odysseus Farms and a right of first refusal should Odysseus Farms acquire additional property and enter into a joint venture with third parties regarding the new property.
When Odysseus Farms entered into an agreement with defendant LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (LJ Sutter), optioning its other lands, and when Odysseus Farms allegedly formed a joint venture with defendant Anderson West, LLC, regarding new property it had acquired, South Sutter sued. It alleged contract and tort causes of action.

Plaintiff in these actions, South Sutter, LLC (South Sutter), owned an option to acquire a large tract of land from defendant Odysseus Farms. South Sutter claimed the option agreement also gave it an exclusive interest in other lands owned by Odysseus Farms and a right of first refusal should Odysseus Farms acquire additional property and enter into a joint venture with third parties regarding the new property.
When Odysseus Farms entered into an agreement with defendant LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (LJ Sutter), optioning its other lands, and when Odysseus Farms allegedly formed a joint venture with defendant Anderson West, LLC, regarding new property it had acquired, South Sutter sued. It alleged contract and tort causes of action.

The People petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court's October 28, 2010 order granting Ronald Brim's motion for a separate penalty jury in a capital murder case. The People contend the trial court abused its discretion under Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (c). We agree and grant the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order and issue a new order denying Brim's motion.

Faced with a deficit exceeding $500 million and an impending cash flow crisis, the Mayor and City Council of Los Angeles (City) approved an ordinance directing the Mayor to adopt a plan to furlough City civilian employees for up to 26 days per fiscal year. The Mayor adopted such a plan, and many employees filed grievances challenging the furloughs to which they were subjected. The grievances were denied and the employees, supported by their union, the Engineers and Architects Association (Union), requested arbitration of the grievances. When the City refused to arbitrate, the Union filed a petition to compel arbitration of over 400 such grievances. Concluding that the grievances were arbitrable, the trial court granted the petition to compel. The City challenged the order compelling arbitration by petition for writ of mandate. We issued an order to show cause and now grant the petition. While there are questions as to whether the issue of furloughs is grievable under the terms of the controlling Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs),[1] we conclude that any agreement to arbitrate the issue of furloughs would constitute an improper delegation of discretionary policymaking power vested in the City Council.

Faced with a deficit exceeding $500 million and an impending cash flow crisis, the Mayor and City Council of Los Angeles (City) approved an ordinance directing the Mayor to adopt a plan to furlough City civilian employees for up to 26 days per fiscal year. The Mayor adopted such a plan, and many employees filed grievances challenging the furloughs to which they were subjected. The grievances were denied and the employees, supported by their union, the Engineers and Architects Association (Union), requested arbitration of the grievances. When the City refused to arbitrate, the Union filed a petition to compel arbitration of over 400 such grievances. Concluding that the grievances were arbitrable, the trial court granted the petition to compel. The City challenged the order compelling arbitration by petition for writ of mandate. We issued an order to show cause and now grant the petition. While there are questions as to whether the issue of furloughs is grievable under the terms of the controlling Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs),[1] we conclude that any agreement to arbitrate the issue of furloughs would constitute an improper delegation of discretionary policymaking power vested in the City Council.

The Board of Parole Hearings (Board) denied petitioner Kevin Jackson parole on December 3, 2008. Jackson challenged that decision by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. In response to the petition, the high court ordered respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to show cause before this court â€

Plaintiffs' complaint, although pleading some sixteen causes of action, essentially seeks recovery of damages and other relief from the several defendants for their breach of the three real estate sales contracts (hereinafter, PSAs) and the failure of some of the defendants to meet the requirements of three related Deed Restriction agreements that those defendants had entered into with the City of Santa Monica, and as to one of which two of the plaintiffs, 15394 NM and NMS/JSM San Lorenzo, claim to be third-party beneficiaries.
The three PSAs each contained a broad arbitration clause which the petitioners moved to enforce. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that not all of the plaintiffs and only a small number of the defendants were actually signatories to the PSAs. In addition, the Deed Restriction agreements entered into by several of the defendants and the City of Santa Monica contained no arbitration clause, and the trial court concluded that those agreements were not dependent on or intertwined with the PSAs, thus giving rise to non-arbitrable disputes.
After reviewing the record in this factually complex matter, we conclude that the trial court did not have before it sufficient information to determine whether plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate and therefore properly denied the motion to compel without prejudice. We will therefore deny the petition and remand the matter with directions.

Plaintiffs' complaint, although pleading some sixteen causes of action, essentially seeks recovery of damages and other relief from the several defendants for their breach of the three real estate sales contracts (hereinafter, PSAs) and the failure of some of the defendants to meet the requirements of three related Deed Restriction agreements that those defendants had entered into with the City of Santa Monica, and as to one of which two of the plaintiffs, 15394 NM and NMS/JSM San Lorenzo, claim to be third-party beneficiaries.
The three PSAs each contained a broad arbitration clause which the petitioners moved to enforce. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that not all of the plaintiffs and only a small number of the defendants were actually signatories to the PSAs. In addition, the Deed Restriction agreements entered into by several of the defendants and the City of Santa Monica contained no arbitration clause, and the trial court concluded that those agreements were not dependent on or intertwined with the PSAs, thus giving rise to non-arbitrable disputes.
After reviewing the record in this factually complex matter, we conclude that the trial court did not have before it sufficient information to determine whether plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate and therefore properly denied the motion to compel without prejudice. We will therefore deny the petition and remand the matter with directions.

In this appeal, we resolve two issues addressing the scope of the power press exception in Labor Code section 4558.[1] Section 4558 provides an exception to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule for employees injured as a result of the employer knowingly having removed or having failed to install a point of operation guard on a power press machine. Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128 (Award Metals), held the exception applies only for injuries meeting the statute's heightened pleading requirements of knowledge, and an affirmative act on the part of the employer. (Id. at pp. 1134-1136.) We follow Award Metals and reject the application of any exception that would expand section 4558 to permit pleading other tort causes of action requiring a lesser standard of proof.
We also conclude section 4558 does not permit a spouse to bring a loss of consortium cause of action. Nevertheless, since section 4558 is an exclusion from the workers' compensation laws, a spouse may bring a loss of consortium cause of action because that claim is dependent upon an injured spouse's excluded injury.
Here, the complaint sufficiently pleads the power press exception. Accordingly, employer and petitioner LeFiell Manufacturing Company (LeFiell) is entitled to some, but not all, of the relief it seeks, and we shall grant the writ limited to O'Neil Watrous's (hereafter Watrous) additional tort claims that are barred.

In People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), our Supreme Court held that a sentencing court's failure to exercise discretion pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 is an abuse of discretion because it mistakenly believes it lacks authority to exercise such discretion. (Id., at p. 530, fn. 13.) [1] This is a similar case. We hold that section 1385 vests trial courts with the discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction in order to afford the maximum allowable presentence conduct credits. We remand to the trial court to determine whether a defendant should be awarded such credits (§ 4019, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)).
In exchange for an indicated three-year sentence, Trevor Lee Koontz pled guilty to felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)), and admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck the prior serious felony conviction and a prior prison term. On March 16, 2010, it sentenced appellant to three years state prison. The court awarded 219 days actual credit and 108 days conduct credit (§ 4019, subds. (b)(2) & (c)(2)) but ruled that appellant was not eligible to receive one-for-one conduct credits (an additional 108 days conduct credit) due to the prior serious felony strike conviction.

Hopkins Real Estate Group (Hopkins Group) appeals from the trial court's order authorizing a writ of attachment for California Retail Portfolio Fund (California Retail) in connection with California Retail's arbitration proceeding against the Hopkins Group for breach of a real estate joint venture agreement. Because there was substantial evidence that an award for California Retail might be rendered ineffectual without a writ of attachment, we affirm the order.

Clarendon America Insurance Company (Clarendon) filed a complaint for declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and equitable indemnity against General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona as the attorney in fact for General Security Indemnity Company (General Security) after settling an action against Hilmor Development (Hilmor), a company that both Clarendon and General Security had insured during different time frames. General Security cross-complained for declaratory relief and the trial court resolved competing motions for summary judgment in General Security's favor. Clarendon appeals from the final judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment against it. We affirm.

Defendant, a member of the Rebels street gang, went on a mission late one evening to locate and â€

Appellant Animal Film, LLC (Animal) sued respondents D.E.J. Productions, Inc. (DEJ) and First Look Studios, Inc. (First Look) in Los Angeles County Superior Court for contract damages and an accounting related to the production of a motion picture. Based on a clause in the production agreement providing that Texas law governs the parties' rights and stating that the parties submit to jurisdiction in Texas, DEJ and First Look moved to stay or dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that Texas is the proper forum for the case to be tried. The trial court agreed, first staying the action so Animal could file it in Texas and later dismissing it. We reverse, concluding that the Texas forum selection clause in the production agreement is permissive, not mandatory, and that the trial court erred in determining under forum non conveniens principles that the action should be tried in Texas.