CA Pub. Decisions

Defendant Jammal Yarbrough appeals from a judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree burglary for having entered a second-floor unenclosed balcony of an apartment with intent to commit a theft. He contends the court erroneously instructed the jury that an unenclosed balcony is part of a building for purposes of the burglary statute and that the facts disclosed only an attempted burglary. We agree because the Supreme Court in People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1 (Valencia) stated â€

Summary proceedings are common in family law cases. Nevertheless, however certain a court may be that a party or an attorney in a family law proceeding deserves sanctions, it must keep in mind an immutable principle that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed. Due process demands more.

The question presented is whether article I, section 2 of the California Constitution permits a privately owned shopping mall to enforce rules that give preferential treatment to labor speech and thereby discriminate against other types of speech. The answer is no. We therefore reverse the trial court's order denying the motion for preliminary injunction filed by Best Friends Animal Society (Best Friends) against Macerich Westside Pavilion Property LLC (Macerich), the owner of the Westside Pavilion Shopping Center (Westside Pavilion).

CBS Broadcasting, Inc. and Sarah Goldfinger (collectively defendants or appellants) appeal from the denial of their special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the anti-SLAPP motion.

Defendant and respondent California Village Homeowner's Association (California Village) hired plaintiff and appellant Kurt Iversen (Iversen), an independent contractor, to service air conditioner units on the roofs of several of the buildings at its Tarzana, California condominium complex. Iversen fell from a ladder attached to one of those buildings and brought an action against California Village alleging theories of premises liability and negligence for injuries sustained in the fall. Iversen alleged negligence per se because the ladder was not equipped with the safety mechanism provided for by California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Lab. Code, § 6300 et seq.[1]) (Cal-OSHA) regulations. California Village moved for summary judgment, inter alia, on the ground that Iversen could not rely on Cal-OSHA to support a negligence action because he was an independent contractor and not California Village's employee. The trial court granted California Village's summary judgment motion.
On appeal, Iversen contends that he can use Cal-OSHA regulations to establish negligence per se because those regulations do not apply just to employees. We hold that the Cal-OSHA regulations do not apply to an independent contractor and that Iversen cannot use those provisions to establish negligence per se or negligence in this case. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jose Alfredo Ramirez appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187),[1] with the finding that he personally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury to one of the victims (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The jury also concluded appellant committed the crimes with the intent to benefit a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Appellant was sentenced to three consecutive life terms for the attempted murders (he must serve a minimum of 15 calendar years for each term before becoming eligible for parole) and three consecutive 25 year-to-life terms for the firearm enhancement. He appeals, contending trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the court erred in permitting the preliminary testimony of a witness to be read to the jury, and his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent contends the abstract of judgment fails to accurately reflect the court's imposition of certain fees. We conclude the abstract of judgment must be corrected, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Mildred Delgado, convicted of, among other things, kidnapping to commit robbery, contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on principles of aiding and abetting and false imprisonment. He also maintains the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that he inflicted great bodily injury. We affirm.

Appellant Robert D'Ausilio sued respondent City of Alhambra (City) for civil rights violations and then settled the case with the City. The City then sued appellant for breach of the settlement agreement and declaratory relief. Appellant moved to strike the declaratory relief claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the â€

This appeal arises from two of many lawsuits seeking damages allegedly caused by the activities of private investigator Anthony Pellicano and others. Michael Gerbosi has filed a complaint against Pellicano and Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (Gaims),[1] a law firm that allegedly accepted the fruits of Pellicano's activities. Erin Finn has also filed a complaint against Gaims. This appeal follows protracted proceedings on separate anti-SLAPP motions filed by Gaims to strike Gerbosi's and Finn's complaints. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)[2] The trial court issued an order denying both motions, leaving Gerbosi's and Finn's complaints to proceed unabated against Gaims. Later, the court entered an order jointly awarding attorneys' fees to Gerbosi and Finn in an amount of roughly $220,000.
Gaims appealed and we affirm the trial court's rulings on Gaims's anti-SLAPP motion to strike Gerbosi's complaint. All of Gerbosi's causes of action against the law firm may proceed, and Gerbosi may recover attorneys' fees incurred in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. We affirm in part the trial court's rulings on Gaims's anti-SLAPP motion to strike Finn's complaint. Her causes of action alleging unlawful wiretapping-related claims may proceed, but her causes of action alleging that Gaims engaged in wrongful acts in the course of underlying litigation must be stricken. As a result, the attorneys' fees in favor of Finn must be denied.

A modification decision.

Subcontrator Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. (Pacific) sued its general contractor Bernards Bros. Inc. (Bernards) seeking payment for work performed under Pacific's subcontract. The trial court granted Bernards' motion for judgment, ruling, because Pacific did not maintain a Class C‑12 specialty license, that it was not â€

An employee who listens to consumer complaints should have a thick skin. He or she might reasonably expect to hear complaints just like the ones in this case, i.e. complaints laced with references to bovine excrement, body parts and other vulgarities derived from sexually-related terms. If the complaint is by telephone, the call recipient can be a crime victim (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a)). [1] Alternatively, the caller may not threaten to inflict injury on the employee or use obscene language lewdly. Here, appellant made annoying telephone calls to a customer comment line using an abundance of vulgarities derived from sexually-related terms but not lewdly. He did not threaten to harm the recipient of his consumer complaints. Thus, as we shall explain, he did not violate section 653m subdivision (a).
David Thomas Powers was convicted in a court trial of four misdemeanor counts of making annoying telephone calls to a customer comment telephone line maintained by the corporate office of Cold Stone Creamery. The trial court placed appellant on probation, ordered him to serve 540 days in county jail, with credit for 225 days of actual custody and 110 conduct credits, and ordered him to pay certain fines.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court committed error in issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing defendant and appellant Los Angeles Unified School District Personnel Commission (Commission) to vacate that portion of its administrative order of April 16, 2008, denying back pay to plaintiff and respondent Steven Candari and remanding to the Commission to determine the amount of back pay owed to Candari. We find no error and affirm.

Gary Fong appeals an order imposing $200,000 in monetary sanctions against him under Family Code section 2107, subdivision (c)[1] for failure to comply with his disclosure obligations and imposing an additional $100,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 271. He contends Marci Kingston is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (c) as a matter of law because she failed to comply with her disclosure obligations. He also contends the trial court failed to consider his ability to pay in awarding attorney fees and costs under section 271, challenges the awards on other grounds, and also contends the failure to issue a statement of decision was reversible error.
We conclude that Marci is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (c) because the statute only authorizes an award in favor of a â€