CA Pub. Decisions

Gary Fong appeals an order imposing $200,000 in monetary sanctions against him under Family Code section 2107, subdivision (c)[1] for failure to comply with his disclosure obligations and imposing an additional $100,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 271. He contends Marci Kingston is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (c) as a matter of law because she failed to comply with her disclosure obligations. He also contends the trial court failed to consider his ability to pay in awarding attorney fees and costs under section 271, challenges the awards on other grounds, and also contends the failure to issue a statement of decision was reversible error.
We conclude that Marci is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (c) because the statute only authorizes an award in favor of a â€

The County of Los Angeles (County) appeals from the grant of summary judgment to EHP Glendale, LLC and Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc. (Eagle), on Eagle's action for a property tax refund. The County contends the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the Los Angeles County Assessor (assessor) and the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (Board) used the wrong methodology in appraising the Glendale Hilton Hotel (hotel or property) after its purchase by Eagle. In turn, Eagle cross-appeals from the trial court order denying its motion for attorney fees.
We hold that the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment on an incomplete record, and, in any case, the record establishes there are triable issues of material fact. For the reasons explained below, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for trial.

Plaintiff and Appellant Michael Hall filed suit against Goodwill Industries of Southern California (Goodwill) alleging a retaliation claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), and wrongful termination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodwill on the ground that Hall's action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court subsequently denied Hall's motion for a new trial based on a claim that newly discovered evidence permitted the court to apply equitable tolling principles to the limitations period. We conclude that the one-year limitations period set forth in Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b) (section 12965(b)) began to run as of the date of the right-to-sue notice issued to Hall and, as a result, Hall's complaint was untimely filed. We further conclude the trial court properly denied Hall's motion for a new trial because he did not present any newly discovered evidence in support of the motion.

In Allstate's petition for rehearing, it cites for the first time California Code of Regulations, title 16, section 3353, subdivision (g).[FN 2] The regulation is promulgated by the Department of Consumer Affairs, Bureau of Automotive Repair. The regulation provides that under "[u]nusual circumstances," the customer may approve a repair estimate by telephone. Allstate claims the regulation substantially relaxes the literal requirements of section 9884.9.

Defendant Jose Leiva appeals from judgments entered following separate findings that he violated the terms and conditions of his grant of probation.[1] His principal contention is the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation on either occasion because probation had expired by operation of law. He also asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the court's findings and the court considered inadmissible evidence. We conclude that defendant's claims lack merit and affirm.

Six days after birth, plaintiff Aidan Ming-Ho Leung suffered irreversible brain damage caused by â€

Six days after birth, plaintiff Aidan Ming-Ho Leung suffered irreversible brain damage caused by â€

Six days after birth, plaintiff Aidan Ming-Ho Leung suffered irreversible brain damage caused by â€

Six days after birth, plaintiff Aidan Ming-Ho Leung suffered irreversible brain damage caused by â€

Facing a multi-million dollar budget reduction for the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the Superior Court of Alameda County (the Court) implemented a reduction in force. Among those laid off were a number of members of appellant Alameda County Management Employees Association (ACMEA), a labor organization representing certain Court employees in managerial classifications. After being notified of the impending action, a number of ACMEA members selected for layoff invoked the seniority provisions of the Court's personnel policies and requested demotions or transfers to lower paying classifications in which they had previously held tenure. Although these employees' seniority would have entitled them to demotions under the Court's personnel policies, in all but two instances, the Court denied their requests, citing the definition of seniority contained in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) it had negotiated with another union. The Court determined that the seniority definition contained in the MOU applied to ACMEA's members and that under that definition, they could not exercise the demotion rights they would otherwise have enjoyed under the Court's personnel policies. In addition, the laid-off ACMEA members requested due process hearings in front of a hearing officer, believing that their layoffs were disciplinary in character. The Court denied those requests also.

Facing a multi-million dollar budget reduction for the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the Superior Court of Alameda County (the Court) implemented a reduction in force. Among those laid off were a number of members of appellant Alameda County Management Employees Association (ACMEA), a labor organization representing certain Court employees in managerial classifications. After being notified of the impending action, a number of ACMEA members selected for layoff invoked the seniority provisions of the Court's personnel policies and requested demotions or transfers to lower paying classifications in which they had previously held tenure. Although these employees' seniority would have entitled them to demotions under the Court's personnel policies, in all but two instances, the Court denied their requests, citing the definition of seniority contained in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) it had negotiated with another union. The Court determined that the seniority definition contained in the MOU applied to ACMEA's members and that under that definition, they could not exercise the demotion rights they would otherwise have enjoyed under the Court's personnel policies. In addition, the laid-off ACMEA members requested due process hearings in front of a hearing officer, believing that their layoffs were disciplinary in character. The Court denied those requests also.

The California Medical Association (CMA) contests the legality of a loan made from the Contingent Fund of the Medical Board of California (Medical Board) to the state General Fund to help balance the state's fiscal year 2008−2009 budget. Government Code section 16310 authorizes loans from Special Funds to the General Fund if the General Fund is exhausted and the loan does not interfere with the object for which the Special Fund was created. We conclude that the loan to the General Fund was lawful under this statute, and affirm the denial of CMA's petition for writ of mandate to require that the money be returned to the Contingent Fund.

Appellant Stephen Wollmer asks this court to reverse the denial of his petition for administrative mandamus challenging two approvals by respondents City of Berkeley and the Berkeley City Council (collectively, the City) for a mixed-use affordable housing or senior affordable housing project located at 1200 Ashby Avenue.[1] Specifically, he denounces the approvals as violative of the state's density bonus law as well as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).[2] We conclude the trial court properly denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Stephen Wollmer asks this court to reverse the denial of his petition for administrative mandamus challenging two approvals by respondents City of Berkeley and the Berkeley City Council (collectively, the City) for a mixed-use affordable housing or senior affordable housing project located at 1200 Ashby Avenue.[1] Specifically, he denounces the approvals as violative of the state's density bonus law as well as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).[2] We conclude the trial court properly denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.