CA Pub. Decisions

Defendants PMA Capital Insurance Company as successor in interest to Caliber One Indemnity Company, and Caliber One Management Company appeal from an order, filed November 19, 2009, denying their petition to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning attorney fees to be paid to an alleged Cumis counsel.[1] (See Civ. Code, § 2860, subd. (c).) We affirm.

Sarah Morrison appeals from a post-judgment order denying her motion for attorney's fees under Civil Code section 1942.5 and Government Code section 12989.2 after the parties had resolved their dispute by settlement. We will affirm the order.

Sarah Morrison appeals from a post-judgment order denying her motion for attorney's fees under Civil Code section 1942.5 and Government Code section 12989.2 after the parties had resolved their dispute by settlement. We will affirm the order.

Hans Bartsch died and willed his estate to particular family members and friends. He specifically left 14 percent of his estate to respondent Arndt Peltner and named him as the executor of the estate. Objector Norman Bartsch Herterich claimed he was the decedent's only son and sole heir to the entire estate. The probate court approved an interim award of attorney fees and costs incurred by respondent in the ongoing will contest. On appeal, objector contends the award of attorney fees is improper under Probate Code section 11704 because respondent is both an executor and an heir, and therefore is not impartial. We affirm because we determine under the circumstances of this case the personal representative or executor may participate â€

Conservator Fessha Taye brought this litigation on behalf of conservatee Ida McQueen, a mentally and physically disabled elder, against several of McQueen's family members and the family's legal representative.[1] Specifically, it was claimed that these individuals violated the terms of a trust set up for McQueen by her father when they sold the family residence, in which McQueen held a life estate, without her consent or knowledge and then misappropriated the entirety of the sales proceeds for their own use.

This appeal is from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate challenging Alameda County's denial of General Assistance to minor Dajohn McCormick on the basis that he qualified for and received benefits, although not cash aid, from the CalWORKS program. Appellants contend Dajohn was entitled to support from General Assistance because his circumstances do not fall within any of the exceptions to the requirement that General Assistance â€

In Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1401 (Turner I), this court held that, when taking a standardized test, individuals with learning disabilities and other conditions affecting their ability to read are not entitled to accommodations under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) (Civ. Code, § 51)[1] and Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (§ 54 et seq.). We reversed the trial court's decision in favor of plaintiffs[2] and, on remand, defendant Association of American Medical Colleges sought an award of attorney fees under section 55 of the DPA. Section 55 provides that the â€

In Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1401 (Turner I), this court held that, when taking a standardized test, individuals with learning disabilities and other conditions affecting their ability to read are not entitled to accommodations under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) (Civ. Code, § 51)[1] and Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (§ 54 et seq.). We reversed the trial court's decision in favor of plaintiffs[2] and, on remand, defendant Association of American Medical Colleges sought an award of attorney fees under section 55 of the DPA. Section 55 provides that the â€

Plaintiffs Kathleen Paulsen and others[1] appeal a judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of defendants Local No. 856 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 856) and Joe Martinelli to plaintiffs' putative class action complaint. They contend on appeal that their action was not subject to the exclusive initial jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). We affirm.

A modification decision.

The Home Equity Sales Contract Act (HESCA or the Act) (Civ. Code, § 1695 et seq.),[1] enacted in 1979, is designed to protect homeowners in default against unfair purchases of their home equity. The Act regulates transactions between an equity purchaser and an equity seller resulting in the sale of residential real property in foreclosure. Central to the legislative scheme is the requirement that the agreement between the buyer and seller be in writing and contain specific terms aimed at protecting the homeowner (§§ 1695.2, 1695.3, 1695.5). (Segura v. McBride (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1034-1036 (Segura).)

These consolidated appeals are from a judgment after trial in a consumer class action against wireless telephone carrier Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (Sprint), challenging its policy of charging early termination fees (ETF's) to customers terminating service prior to expiration of defined contract periods.[1] The trial court found the ETF's to be unlawful penalties under Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d),[2] enjoined enforcement, and granted restitution/damages to the plaintiff class in the amount of ETF's collected by Sprint during the class period, $73,775,975. A jury found that class members who had been charged ETF's had violated the terms of their contracts with Sprint, and that Sprint's actual damages exceeded the ETF charges Sprint had collected. The resulting setoff negated any monetary recovery to the class. The trial court, reasoning that the jury had failed to follow its instructions on Sprint's actual damages, granted the plaintiffs'[3] motion for a partial new trial new on that issue. Sprint appeals the decision invalidating the ETF's and enjoining their enforcement, and the court's grant of the motion for partial new trial on damages. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in permitting Sprint to assert damage claims as setoffs to class claims for recovery of ETF's paid. In the published portions of this opinion we address the issues of federal preemption and the application of section 1671, subdivision (d). We affirm in all respects.

These consolidated appeals are from a judgment after trial in a consumer class action against wireless telephone carrier Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (Sprint), challenging its policy of charging early termination fees (ETF's) to customers terminating service prior to expiration of defined contract periods.[1] The trial court found the ETF's to be unlawful penalties under Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d),[2] enjoined enforcement, and granted restitution/damages to the plaintiff class in the amount of ETF's collected by Sprint during the class period, $73,775,975. A jury found that class members who had been charged ETF's had violated the terms of their contracts with Sprint, and that Sprint's actual damages exceeded the ETF charges Sprint had collected. The resulting setoff negated any monetary recovery to the class. The trial court, reasoning that the jury had failed to follow its instructions on Sprint's actual damages, granted the plaintiffs'[3] motion for a partial new trial new on that issue.
Sprint appeals the decision invalidating the ETF's and enjoining their enforcement, and the court's grant of the motion for partial new trial on damages. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in permitting Sprint to assert damage claims as setoffs to class claims for recovery of ETF's paid. In the published portions of this opinion we address the issues of federal preemption and the application of section 1671, subdivision (d). We affirm in all respects.

These consolidated appeals are from a judgment after trial in a consumer class action against wireless telephone carrier Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (Sprint), challenging its policy of charging early termination fees (ETF's) to customers terminating service prior to expiration of defined contract periods.[1] The trial court found the ETF's to be unlawful penalties under Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d),[2] enjoined enforcement, and granted restitution/damages to the plaintiff class in the amount of ETF's collected by Sprint during the class period, $73,775,975. A jury found that class members who had been charged ETF's had violated the terms of their contracts with Sprint, and that Sprint's actual damages exceeded the ETF charges Sprint had collected. The resulting setoff negated any monetary recovery to the class. The trial court, reasoning that the jury had failed to follow its instructions on Sprint's actual damages, granted the plaintiffs'[3] motion for a partial new trial new on that issue.
Sprint appeals the decision invalidating the ETF's and enjoining their enforcement, and the court's grant of the motion for partial new trial on damages. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in permitting Sprint to assert damage claims as setoffs to class claims for recovery of ETF's paid. In the published portions of this opinion we address the issues of federal preemption and the application of section 1671, subdivision (d). We affirm in all respects.