CA Pub. Decisions

Defendant and appellant, Jose Duarte, appeals his conviction for lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (15 counts), lewd and lascivious acts on a child 14 or 15 (5 counts), and exposing a minor to harmful matter (5 counts), with a multiple victims enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subds. (a) & (c)(1), 288.2, subd. (a)(2), 667.61, subd. (c)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 225 years to life, plus 5 years 8 months.
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Bradford D. Creger (plaintiff) bought a condominium that, unbeknownst to him, had construction and legal defects. When those defects came to light, plaintiff and the other condo owners in the same complex filed suit and entered into two sets of settlements. Unsatisfied with these settlements, plaintiff sued many of the entities and lawyers involved in the earlier litigation. These defendants moved to dismiss many of plaintiff’s claims under the “anti-SLAPP”[1] statute. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)[2] The trial court partly granted and partly denied those motions, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants on those motions. Plaintiff now appeals some (but not all) of the grants and the fee awards. Except as to one claim, we conclude that the trial court’s rulings were correct and affirm.

A modification decision.

A.S. (Father) has attempted to appeal from jurisdiction and disposition findings made in conjunction with an order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for his 12-year-old daughter A. S.-G. (A.)[1] Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support some of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and that the court erred by denying him visitation. We will construe Father’s notice of appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ. We reject all of Father’s contentions and deny the petition on the merits.

Presumed father Archie M. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights as to his daughters following a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing).[1] He contends the termination order must be reversed because “he was denied his right to be present in person” at the .26 hearing.
We affirm.

H.M. has appealed a post-dispositional order denying his motion for factual findings necessary for him to qualify for special immigrant (SIJ) status under federal law (hereafter the SIJ motion). (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) [hereafter the SIJ statute].) In their respondent’s brief, the People concede that the trial court erred in refusing to make factual findings requested in the SIJ motion. In light of that concession, H.M. has filed an “Unopposed Motion for Summary Reversal and Expedited Consideration.” We vacate the order on the SIJ motion.

J.M., the minor, was born to 15-year-old parents, who had themselves been dependents of the juvenile court. The minor was detained because mother would not feed or attend to the infant in the hospital after giving birth, and both parents’ families had lengthy histories with the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) agency. The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging neglect based on the parents’ lack of parenting skills or support system, psychological issues, father’s delinquency wardship based on his sexual abuse of his younger sibling, and the fact both parents had been dependent children themselves, coming from dysfunctional families. The minor was removed from the parents’ custody and placed in foster care at the dispositional hearing, where the parents were ordered to participate in reunification services which included visitation two times per week. Mother appealed the judgment.
On appeal, mother asserts: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (b); and (2) the dispositional order removing the minor from mother’s custody was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

Defendant, Thad Warth, appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of firearm possession after having previously been convicted of a felony. (Former Pen. Code,[1] § 12021, subd. (a)(1) now § 29800, subd. (a)(1).) The information alleged defendant was in possession of a firearm on December 21, 2010. Count 1 alleged defendant had been convicted of burglary on June 23, 1988. Count 2 of the information alleged, on or between August 30, and September 1, 2010, defendant committed grand theft of property exceeding $950. (§ 487, subd. (a).) The jury acquitted defendant of count 2 and two lesser included offenses of attempted grand and attempted petty theft. The jury deadlocked on a third potential lesser included offense of attempted petty theft. The trial court granted a mistrial as to the third lesser included offense. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss count 2 pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a).
The trial court placed defendant on formal probation for three years. Defendant was ordered to pay a: restitution fine of $200 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)), $200 (§ 1202.45); probation restitution fine of $200 (§ 1202.44); $40 court security assessment fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1); and $30 criminal conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). The oral pronouncement of judgment gave defendant three days for actual time served. The trial court did not grant defendant any conduct credits. However, the minute order states that defendant received six days of credit consisting of three days of actual credit plus three days of conduct credit.

Defendant challenges the trial court’s 2011 denial of his motion to withdraw his 2003 guilty plea, after remand by this court for a full hearing on the motion. Defendant contends his mental condition prevented him from exercising his free and clear judgment when he pled guilty, his counsel was ineffective, and the trial court improperly coerced him to plead guilty. As discussed below, we conclude that each of these claims lacks merit and so affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to withdraw.

L.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s November 18, 2011 jurisdictional and dispositional orders adjudging minor S.F. a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).[1] Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional order. We agree because there was no substantial evidence in the record to show that as a result of Mother’s mental and emotional problems, S.F. suffered or will suffer serious physical harm because of Mother’s failure to supervise or protect her adequately within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). We reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

Defendant Jeffrey James Pringle was convicted of burglary and receiving stolen property. The trial court sentenced him to six years in prison (three years doubled under California’s three strikes law based on a strike).
Defendant contends (1) he did not admit that his prior out-of-state conviction constituted a strike under California law; (2) even if he admitted a prior conviction, his admission was not knowing and voluntary; (3) the record does not support a finding that the prior conviction qualifies as a strike; and (4) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge whether the prior conviction constituted a strike.
We agree with defendant (and the Attorney General) that defendant did not admit a prior strike conviction. We also agree that even though defendant waived his right to have the prior strike allegation determined by trial, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that his prior robbery conviction in Maine would constitute a prior serious felony conviction, and hence a strike, under California law. Accordingly, it is not necessary to address defendant’s second and fourth contentions.
We will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In 2005, the San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (49ers') began implementing a policy of the National Football League (NFL) requiring all patrons at their football games to submit to a patdown search before entering the stadium. Plaintiffs claim the policy violates their state constitutional right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) The case has come to us after the superior court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the action. On appeal after the superior court has sustained a demurrer, we assume as true all facts alleged in the complaint. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) In this case, assuming the alleged facts to be true, we hold the record does not contain enough information to establish as a matter of law that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Accordingly, this action is not susceptible to disposition on demurrer. We reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Procedural History

A modification decision.

The question before this court is whether the People are entitled to appeal an order granting a motion to suppress evidence where, prior to the filing of the appeal, the misdemeanor case was dismissed pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 1385 at the People's request. We conclude that they are not.