CA Pub. Decisions

These appeals, consolidated on this court's motion, follow the trial court's entry of an order awarding the City of Santa Rosa and the People of the State of California (collectively, the City) attorney fees in this red light abatement action. In appeal No. A124199, the City contends that the court erred in using a cost-plus approach rather than the lodestar method in calculating the amount of the attorney fees award. In appeal No. A124452, the Patels[1] argue that the court erred in awarding fees because the City lacked standing to pursue the underlying action and that, in any event, the fee award should be modified as the City's judgment in the underlying case was modified on appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred in not using the lodestar method to calculate the fee award and, therefore, remand the matter to the trial court for a recalculation of the fee award. Court will dismiss appeal No. A124452 as moot.

The question posed by these consolidated cases is whether a trial court's order compelling compliance with a legislative subpoena (Gov. Code, § 37104 et seq.) is appealable. We conclude that it is. Accordingly, we reverse the orders dismissing these appeals and remand the cases to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings.

Defendants Albert Albillar, Alex Albillar, and John Madrigal stand convicted by a jury of forcible rape while acting in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1), forcible sexual penetration while acting in concert (id., §§ 289, subd. (a)(1), 264.1), and active participation in a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury further found that the sex offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. (Id., § 186.22, subd. (b).) Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions of the substantive gang offense as well as the gang enhancements. This appeal raises three issues.

Defendants Albert Albillar, Alex Albillar, and John Madrigal stand convicted by a jury of forcible rape while acting in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1), forcible sexual penetration while acting in concert (id., §§ 289, subd. (a)(1), 264.1), and active participation in a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury further found that the sex offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. (Id., § 186.22, subd. (b).) Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions of the substantive gang offense as well as the gang enhancements. This appeal raises three issues.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Benjamin Puentes of statutory rape of someone more than three years younger. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on felony probation for three years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was subjected to vindictive prosecution, (2) the conviction violates the proscription against multiple prosecution set forth in Penal Code section 654[1] as construed by Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822, (3) the felony punishment violates the state Constitution's double jeopardy clause, and (4) venue in Santa Clara County was improper. We agree with defendant's vindictive-prosecution point. Since the point is dispositive, court will reverse the judgment and direct a dismissal without addressing defendant's secondary claims.

Plaintiff Thomas S. Robinson, who suffered severe injuries after he was implanted with the Ancure Endograft System (Ancure Device), brought a products liability and personal injury action against defendants Endovascular Technologies, Inc. (EVT), Guidant Corporation (Guidant), Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., and Origin Medsystems, Inc.[1] The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal law. Plaintiff has filed a timely appeal from the judgment of dismissal. Court find no error and affirm.

Plaintiff Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. (Jacobs), sued defendant Western Farm Service, Inc. (Western Farm), alleging that pesticides defendant applied to fields near plaintiff's farm migrated to plaintiff's land, contaminated plaintiff's crop, and rendered the crop unmarketable. Plaintiff sued defendant for crop losses it suffered in 2006 and for an injunction to prevent further pesticide applications in 2007. By the time of trial in 2008, the injunction issue was moot; both the 2006 and the 2007 crops had been contaminated by the migrating pesticide. A jury found defendant liable in negligence, trespass, and nuisance and awarded plaintiff $1 million for the 2007 loss but nothing for 2006.

Plaintiff Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. (Jacobs), sued defendant Western Farm Service, Inc. (Western Farm), alleging that pesticides defendant applied to fields near plaintiff's farm migrated to plaintiff's land, contaminated plaintiff's crop, and rendered the crop unmarketable. Plaintiff sued defendant for crop losses it suffered in 2006 and for an injunction to prevent further pesticide applications in 2007. By the time of trial in 2008, the injunction issue was moot; both the 2006 and the 2007 crops had been contaminated by the migrating pesticide. A jury found defendant liable in negligence, trespass, and nuisance and awarded plaintiff $1 million for the 2007 loss but nothing for 2006.

The last possible day to file a notice of appeal from an appealable order is 180 days after the signed order is filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(3).)[1] This outside time limit is jurisdictional and cannot be extended, even if notice was not given. Appellants have a maximum of 180 days to come to a judgment, and cannot wait for a judgment to come to them.
But what happens when a file-stamped appealable order disappears into the juridical equivalent of a sock drawer? Here, the appealable order was signed and file-stamped (fittingly enough) on April Fool's Day. But it was not served on the litigants, and did not make its way into the public records. Appellant, who repeatedly (and physically) checked the court files to determine whether any order had been entered, came away empty-handed. Not until late summer was the order â€

Albert Z. (Father) appealed from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, then two‑year‑old A.Z. Father contended the juvenile court erred by finding inapplicable the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). In his appellate briefs, Father asserted, inter alia, his concern that A. â€

In July 2003, plaintiff Mohammad Entezampour was hired by defendant North Orange County Community College District (the District), as dean of the science, engineering, and mathematics division at Cypress College. In February 2007, Entezampour was notified that the District would not be renewing his employment as dean for the following academic year. He sought to exercise the so‑called â€

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner challenges the decisions made by the Governor in 2009 and 2010, to reverse the findings of the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) that he was suitable for parole in November 2008 and November 2009 (his fifth and sixth parole hearings).
In reversing the findings of the Board, the Governor determined petitioner's release on parole posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety based on two grounds. First, the Governor found the second degree murder committed by petitioner was especially atrocious and heinous. Second, the Governor concluded petitioner lacked adequate insight into the commission offense because he had given differing versions over the years.

In 2009, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informed plaintiff Overhill Farms, Inc. (Overhill) that 231 of its then-current employees had provided invalid social security numbers. Overhill was advised its use of invalid tax identification information exposed it to the imposition of penalties and criminal liability. Overhill contacted the employees identified by the IRS, advised them that their social security numbers were invalid according to the IRS, and provided them the opportunity to correct the erroneous information to avoid the termination of their employment with Overhill. One of the identified employees provided Overhill information showing that the employee's invalid social security number was an error. The remainder of the identified employees either admitted they had submitted an invalid social security number and were not authorized to work in the United States, or ignored Overhill's requests for information; their employment with Overhill was thereafter terminated