CA Pub. Decisions

In 2009, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informed plaintiff Overhill Farms, Inc. (Overhill) that 231 of its then-current employees had provided invalid social security numbers. Overhill was advised its use of invalid tax identification information exposed it to the imposition of penalties and criminal liability. Overhill contacted the employees identified by the IRS, advised them that their social security numbers were invalid according to the IRS, and provided them the opportunity to correct the erroneous information to avoid the termination of their employment with Overhill. One of the identified employees provided Overhill information showing that the employee's invalid social security number was an error. The remainder of the identified employees either admitted they had submitted an invalid social security number and were not authorized to work in the United States, or ignored Overhill's requests for information; their employment with Overhill was thereafter terminated.

Norma Jean Klein appeals from an order granting â€

Court affirm the trial court's determination that a patient waived her contractual right to arbitrate a medical malpractice dispute by waiting to pursue arbitration until the virtual eve of trial, long after discovery, including expert discovery, had been completed. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual determination on waiver, based on our Supreme Court's multi-factored test in St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 (St. Agnes). The physician suffered prejudice by losing whatever time and cost benefits could have been gained through arbitration, and by focusing his litigation efforts on a jury trial rather than an arbitration panel. Audiences matter, and the factual record supports a finding of prejudice.

William Cook Ennis II was convicted of various crimes involving sexual molestation of his daughter, then age 8, and his stepdaughter, then age 14. He was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 64 years.[1]
Ennis' primary contention on appeal is that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. He acknowledges there was testimony which, if believed, was sufficient to establish he did commit the crimes of which he was convicted, but argues that testimony was inherently improbable – by which he means full of contradictions, inconsistencies and implausibilities – and thus no rational jury could have relied upon it as a basis to convict. The contention is unpersuasive.
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J.L. appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication sustaining allegations he committed four lewd and lascivious acts with three children, his cousins. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless noted.) Defendant contends the dire consequences of the adjudication -- including lifetime registration as a sex offender, potential exposure to civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), and residency restrictions under Proposition 83 (Jessica's Law) -- are punitive in nature. Defendant argues due process requires a jury trial before the state may impose such severe punishment. He contrasts his lifetime punishment with the less severe outcomes that mark typical juvenile adjudications, where the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned proceedings less formal than a criminal prosecution, including the absence of a jury trial, based on the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. (See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528 (McKeiver).) Defendant also argues equal protection of the law requires a jury trial before a trial court may impose the lifetime punishment he faces. Defendant asserts juveniles subject to these consequences are similarly situated with adults who are subjected to these identical consequences only after a criminal conviction. Because their similarly-situated adult counterparts are entitled to a jury trial, defendant asserts equal protection requires that juveniles should have the same right.

J.L. appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication sustaining allegations he committed four lewd and lascivious acts with three children, his cousins. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless noted.) Defendant contends the dire consequences of the adjudication -- including lifetime registration as a sex offender, potential exposure to civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), and residency restrictions under Proposition 83 (Jessica's Law) -- are punitive in nature. Defendant argues due process requires a jury trial before the state may impose such severe punishment. He contrasts his lifetime punishment with the less severe outcomes that mark typical juvenile adjudications, where the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned proceedings less formal than a criminal prosecution, including the absence of a jury trial, based on the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. (See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528 (McKeiver).) Defendant also argues equal protection of the law requires a jury trial before a trial court may impose the lifetime punishment he faces. Defendant asserts juveniles subject to these consequences are similarly situated with adults who are subjected to these identical consequences only after a criminal conviction. Because their similarly-situated adult counterparts are entitled to a jury trial, defendant asserts equal protection requires that juveniles should have the same right.

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a)(10),[1] the People appeal the judgment entered against defendant and respondent Jose Luis Labora. They contend the judgment was a result of judicial plea bargaining. We determine that the People have standing and judicial plea bargaining did occur. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (hereafter the surety) appeals an order denying its motion to set aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. It contends that the bond was exonerated by operation of law, pursuant to Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (a), and that the court lacked jurisdiction to order its forfeiture.

Appellant Brian D. Peters is the victim of a Nigerian-style email scam. He agreed that his corporation would receive money supposedly owed to a gentleman in Malaysia, and would then pay that money out at the gentleman's direction, in return for a 15 percent fee. His corporation received checks totaling $808,988.90 and deposited them in an account with respondent Chino Commercial Bank, N.A. (the Bank). It then had the Bank make wire transfers totaling $468,000 out of the account. All of the checks bounced, because they had been altered. This resulted in an overdraft. The Bank claims, and Peters does not dispute, that he was personally liable for any overdraft.
The Bank promptly obtained a right to attach order against Peters. Peters appeals from the right to attach order. He argues that the Bank had the burden of proving that it did not act negligently and that it failed to carry this burden.
We will hold that, even assuming the Bank had the burden of proof, it introduced sufficient evidence that it did not act negligently in accepting the checks for deposit. Court will further hold that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) precludes any claim that the Bank acted negligently in making the wire transfers. Accordingly,court will affirm.

Defendant John Thomas Christiana appeals from orders following special proceedings to determine competency (Pen. Code,[1] § 1368) and to authorize involuntary administration of psychotropic medication (§ 1370). He argues that (1) he had a constitutional right to testify at his competency hearing, and the denial of that right was reversible error; and (2) the trial court's authorization to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to him was not supported by substantial evidence. Court reject the first contention but find merit to the second, and we reverse the order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.

Mother Sarah F. appeals the juvenile court's order granting a Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 827 petition and thus authorizing the release of Sarah's court-ordered psychological evaluation. The petition was brought by C.D. and her husband, S.D. (together, the D.'s), who are the de facto parents of Sarah's minor children, juvenile court dependents B.F. and R.R. (together, the children). Sarah contends the court abused its discretion by allowing the D.'s access to the evaluation. Court agree.

In his appeal and habeas petition, John Paul Nelson challenges his conviction of premeditated attempted murder with a finding that he personally discharged a firearm. In the published portion of this opinion, we reject defendant's contention that his constitutional right to confront witnesses, as defined in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), was violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statement identifying defendant as the perpetrator. We hold the victim's brief informal statement, made on the night of the shooting in an ambulance when the victim was close to death, was not testimonial. Hence, admission of the statement did not contravene defendant's rights under Crawford.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address defendant's other assertions of error, including erroneous admission of uncharged misconduct and bad character evidence; a violation of the Doyle rule precluding reference to post-Miranda silence; closing argument references to facts not in evidence; and inadequate cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. Court find no reversible error, and accordingly affirm the judgment and deny the habeas petition.

In his appeal and habeas petition, John Paul Nelson challenges his conviction of premeditated attempted murder with a finding that he personally discharged a firearm. In the published portion of this opinion, we reject defendant's contention that his constitutional right to confront witnesses, as defined in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), was violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statement identifying defendant as the perpetrator. We hold the victim's brief informal statement, made on the night of the shooting in an ambulance when the victim was close to death, was not testimonial. Hence, admission of the statement did not contravene defendant's rights under Crawford.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address defendant's other assertions of error, including erroneous admission of uncharged misconduct and bad character evidence; a violation of the Doyle rule precluding reference to post-Miranda silence; closing argument references to facts not in evidence; and inadequate cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. Court find no reversible error, and accordingly affirm the judgment and deny the habeas petition.

In his appeal and habeas petition, John Paul Nelson challenges his conviction of premeditated attempted murder with a finding that he personally discharged a firearm. In the published portion of this opinion, we reject defendant's contention that his constitutional right to confront witnesses, as defined in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), was violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statement identifying defendant as the perpetrator. We hold the victim's brief informal statement, made on the night of the shooting in an ambulance when the victim was close to death, was not testimonial. Hence, admission of the statement did not contravene defendant's rights under Crawford.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address defendant's other assertions of error, including erroneous admission of uncharged misconduct and bad character evidence; a violation of the Doyle rule precluding reference to post-Miranda silence; closing argument references to facts not in evidence; and inadequate cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. Court find no reversible error, and accordingly affirm the judgment and deny the habeas petition.