CA Pub. Decisions

Roberto Canas-Fuente (Canas) killed Fernando Morales, the boyfriend of appellant Perla Isabel Gonzalez (Perla), during a fight between Morales and Canas. Morales, along with Perla, his accomplice, ambushed Canas as he was picking up his daughter at a street corner. Canas at the time did not know either Morales or Perla.
During the fight, Morales pulled out a knife with a three- to four-inch blade, thrust it at Canas and cut him in the cheek. After Canas threw Morales to the ground, Morales got up and ran to Perla, who had been standing about 10 feet away, by her car, anxiously watching the fight. From her car, Perla grabbed a rifle she had brought to assault Canas, cocked it, pointed it at Canas and then handled it to Morales. Afraid for his life, Canas ran at Morales. During the struggle for the weapon, Canas was shot three times. Although wounded, Canas gained control of the rifle and a few seconds later shot and killed Morales, as Morales ran away.

Roberto Canas-Fuente (Canas) killed Fernando Morales, the boyfriend of appellant Perla Isabel Gonzalez (Perla), during a fight between Morales and Canas. Morales, along with Perla, his accomplice, ambushed Canas as he was picking up his daughter at a street corner. Canas at the time did not know either Morales or Perla.
During the fight, Morales pulled out a knife with a three- to four-inch blade, thrust it at Canas and cut him in the cheek. After Canas threw Morales to the ground, Morales got up and ran to Perla, who had been standing about 10 feet away, by her car, anxiously watching the fight. From her car, Perla grabbed a rifle she had brought to assault Canas, cocked it, pointed it at Canas and then handled it to Morales. Afraid for his life, Canas ran at Morales. During the struggle for the weapon, Canas was shot three times. Although wounded, Canas gained control of the rifle and a few seconds later shot and killed Morales, as Morales ran away.

This is a dispute over insurance coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) issued to Advanced Network, Inc. (ANI). On appeal, Peerless contends the court erred by finding an underlying action for the replacement of cash stolen by an ANI employee from one of its clients, a credit union, was an action for damages for the "loss of use" of property within the meaning of the policy. We agree with Peerless. " 'Loss of use' of property is different from 'loss' of the property." (Collin v. American Empire, Ins. Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 818 (Collin).) As neither the allegations of the underlying complaint nor any extrinsic facts raised any coverage potential, Peerless had no duty of defense or indemnification. We reverse the judgment, which awarded ANI approximately $2 million in compensatory and punitive damages, and direct the court on remand to enter judgment for Peerless.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This case deals with the vexing issue of when one physical act can constitute multiple criminal â€

We conclude here that Revenue and Taxation Code section 19138,[1] a corporate tax penalty provision for understating such taxes by more than $1,000,000, is just that‑‑a penalty‑‑and therefore not subject to the two-thirds legislative vote requirement for a â€

Plaintiff and appellant David Taylor (Taylor) brought an action against his employer, defendant and respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), seeking recovery of unpaid overtime compensation, penalties for missed meal and rest periods, and other related claims. UPS successfully moved for summary judgment on the grounds Taylor was an exempt executive and administrative employee and therefore not entitled to overtime payments and the related benefits afforded nonexempt employees. Taylor appeals, contending there are material triable issues as to whether he was misclassified as exempt. Because we conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (c)[1] provides broad immunity from civil liability for a social host who â€

Matthew M. (father), the biological father of X.S., appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court declared his son a dependent child of the court based in part on a finding against father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered the child placed with his maternal grandmother. Because no substantial evidence supports the section 300, subdivision (b), finding against father, we reverse the judgment as to him and remand the matter for the juvenile court to reconsider its disposition orders.

In this case, Court conclude that a prospective beneficiary of a will cannot maintain a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney who drafted the will but did not have it executed before the death of the testator.

Defendant and appellant Columbus Club, Inc. entered into an agreement to lease an assembly hall to plaintiff and respondent Hoso Foods, Inc. (Hoso). When Hoso learned that city ordinances precluded it from using the hall for catered events as it had intended, it filed a complaint against appellant alleging claims including breach of contract and fraud. According to Hoso, appellant knew about the restrictive ordinances, did not disclose them to Hoso and made affirmative representations that contradicted the ordinances. The parties agreed to arbitrate their claims and the arbitrator found in favor of Hoso, awarding it over $1.2 million. The trial court confirmed the award, rejecting appellant's arguments that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in making the award and conducting the arbitration.
We reverse. The award must be vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), because the arbitrator exceeded his powers by limiting appellant's representation at the arbitration to an individual who had been sued personally, was not appellant's choice of representative, was not involved in significant aspects of the transaction and was dismissed from the action at the conclusion of the hearing. The arbitrator's conduct deprived appellant of a fair hearing.

Emir Bautista was terminated as a sworn peace officer by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Department) for engaging in a personal relationship with a known prostitute and heroin addict in violation of the Department's prohibited-association policy. On appeal Bautista challenges the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of mandate seeking to reverse the decision of the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (Commission) approving his discharge and the court's order granting summary judgment for the Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca on Bautista's federal civil rights claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (section 1983). Bautista contends the Department's prohibited-association policy, as applied to him, violated his right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as his statutorily protected federal civil rights. court affirm.

As part of the resolution of a criminal case charging him with two felony counts of failure to control a mischievous animal that caused serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 399, subd. (b)),[1] Orlando Vasquez agreed to pay $168,633.20 in restitution to Heiddy G., a young girl who had been severely mauled by his pit bull. Vasquez subsequently moved to have the court declare his restitution obligation satisfied, contending a $300,000 payment to settle a civil suit against Vasquez and his landlord, funded by the landlord's insurer through a homeowners policy that also insured Vasquez, is properly deemed restitution made directly from Vasquez within the meaning of section 1202.4 and constituted a full offset to the restitution award. The trial court denied the motion, observing its restitution order had expressly stated Heiddy was still receiving medical treatment and provided any additional losses she sustained could be recovered in a civil action. Court affirm.

Kerwin Jackson appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Appellant contends that the jury instructions on the elements of burglary erroneously imposed a presumption that the balcony in this case qualified as a building for purposes of Penal Code section 459. Court affirm.