CA Pub. Decisions

In these consolidated criminal appeals, appellant Richard Lieng appeals from his plea of no contest to one felony count of cultivation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358), and appellant Tony Lieng from his plea of no contest to one felony count of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The issues raised by both appellants on appeal relate to alleged error by the trial court in denying their motions brought under Penal Code section 1538.5 (Section 1538.5), to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at real property located in Willits, California, and to traverse/quash the warrant.
court conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motions, and affirm the judgment and convictions.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with a special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). He was sentenced to a term of life in state prison without the possibility of parole.
In this appeal he claims that the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of a prosecution witness following the prosecutor's refusal to grant the witness immunity at trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct and resulted in a denial of his rights to confrontation and due process. He argues that the prosecutor committed additional acts of misconduct by relying on inadmissible evidence of his silence to prove guilt in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. He also objects to the trial court's instruction on unjoined perpetrators.
We conclude that the prosecutor did not deny defendant the right of confrontation by refusing to grant immunity to a witness who testified at the preliminary hearing but was subsequently charged with murder. We conclude that the prosecutor's reference in closing argument to defendant's postarrest silence in discussions with a friend was misconduct, but was not prejudicial to the defense. We find that no other prosecutorial misconduct was committed, and defendant's trial counsel did not afford him inadequate representation. No instructional error occurred. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with a special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). He was sentenced to a term of life in state prison without the possibility of parole.
In this appeal he claims that the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of a prosecution witness following the prosecutor's refusal to grant the witness immunity at trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct and resulted in a denial of his rights to confrontation and due process. He argues that the prosecutor committed additional acts of misconduct by relying on inadmissible evidence of his silence to prove guilt in violation of his privilege against self incrimination. He also objects to the trial court's instruction on unjoined perpetrators.

Defendant Michael Cornett was charged with molesting his two stepdaughters, 10‑year-old Jane Doe 1 and six-year-old Jane Doe 2, with the final instance captured in a photograph taken by defendant's 12-year-old stepson. A jury found defendant guilty on all seven felonies alleged against him, and found all special allegations to be true--including that 11 years earlier he had been convicted of molesting yet another stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years, plus 150 years to life in state prison.
Defendant makes numerous arguments on appeal, asserting myriad errors during trial and at sentencing. The People concede that two of the arguments as to sentencing on count 6 are well taken, and we conclude that an argument as to the conviction on that count has merit as well, requiring a reversal of the conviction on that count.
We shall also reverse the conviction on count 7, alleging commission of a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (because no evidence regarding that offense was presented at the preliminary hearing), modify two rulings made at sentencing, and in all other respects affirm, leaving defendant convicted of six felonies. The judgment is affirmed as modified, a modification that does not affect the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court.
All these issues, save one, are addressed in the unpublished portion of this opinion. The singular exception, the one issue addressed in the published portion of the opinion, is an issue apparently never before addressed in California: was Jane Doe 1, who was 10 years 11 months at the time of the molestation, a â€

Defendant Michael Cornett was charged with molesting his two stepdaughters, 10‑year-old Jane Doe 1 and six-year-old Jane Doe 2, with the final instance captured in a photograph taken by defendant's 12-year-old stepson. A jury found defendant guilty on all seven felonies alleged against him, and found all special allegations to be true--including that 11 years earlier he had been convicted of molesting yet another stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years, plus 150 years to life in state prison.
Defendant makes numerous arguments on appeal, asserting myriad errors during trial and at sentencing. The People concede that two of the arguments as to sentencing on count 6 are well taken, and we conclude that an argument as to the conviction on that count has merit as well, requiring a reversal of the conviction on that count.
We shall also reverse the conviction on count 7, alleging commission of a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (because no evidence regarding that offense was presented at the preliminary hearing), modify two rulings made at sentencing, and in all other respects affirm, leaving defendant convicted of six felonies. The judgment is affirmed as modified, a modification that does not affect the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court.
All these issues, save one, are addressed in the unpublished portion of this opinion. The singular exception, the one issue addressed in the published portion of the opinion, is an issue apparently never before addressed in California: was Jane Doe 1, who was 10 years 11 months at the time of the molestation, a â€

Defendant Michael Cornett was charged with molesting his two stepdaughters, 10‑year-old Jane Doe 1 and six-year-old Jane Doe 2, with the final instance captured in a photograph taken by defendant's 12-year-old stepson. A jury found defendant guilty on all seven felonies alleged against him, and found all special allegations to be true--including that 11 years earlier he had been convicted of molesting yet another stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years, plus 150 years to life in state prison.
Defendant makes numerous arguments on appeal, asserting myriad errors during trial and at sentencing. The People concede that two of the arguments as to sentencing on count 6 are well taken, and we conclude that an argument as to the conviction on that count has merit as well, requiring a reversal of the conviction on that count.
We shall also reverse the conviction on count 7, alleging commission of a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (because no evidence regarding that offense was presented at the preliminary hearing), modify two rulings made at sentencing, and in all other respects affirm, leaving defendant convicted of six felonies. The judgment is affirmed as modified, a modification that does not affect the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court.
All these issues, save one, are addressed in the unpublished portion of this opinion. The singular exception, the one issue addressed in the published portion of the opinion, is an issue apparently never before addressed in California: was Jane Doe 1, who was 10 years 11 months at the time of the molestation, a â€

The primary questions presented in this case are whether lost profits may be awarded as consequential damages under Civil Code section 3306 for breach of a real property sale agreement where the buyer intended to renovate and sell the property at a profit and, if so, whether lost profits were properly awarded here.[1] We shall conclude that although lost profits may be available in an appropriate case, lost profits were not properly awarded here, where the evidence showed the prospect of profits was uncertain, hypothetical and entirely speculative.
Defendant Donna Wong appeals from a judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff and respondent Greenwich S.F., LLC (Greenwich S.F.) $600,000 in lost profits, among other damages, on appellant's breach of a real property sales agreement between appellant and plaintiff Yui Hei Chan, Greenwich S.F.'s predecessor in interest.[2] Appellant contends the trial court applied an erroneous measure of damages by allowing recovery of lost profits as consequential damages under section 3306. She also contends the court erred (1) in admitting expert testimony as to the hypothetical value of the property if it had been renovated according to plaintiffs' plans; (2) in allowing the expert to testify as to new opinions regarding valuation dates to which the expert did not testify during her deposition; and (3) in instructing the jury that it could award lost profits. If lost profits may be recovered in an appropriate case, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the award in this case as (4) lost profits were not proved with reasonable certainty and the prospect of profits after renovation was hypothetical and speculative, and (5) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant knew plaintiffs intended to sell the property for a profit. Appellant also challenges (6) the award of $60,000 damages for sums plaintiffs had deposited into escrow, and (7) the award of $90,000 damages for funds plaintiffs expended toward the planned property renovation. Finally, should she prevail on appeal, appellant seeks reversal of the attorney fee award.

The primary questions presented in this case are whether lost profits may be awarded as consequential damages under Civil Code section 3306 for breach of a real property sale agreement where the buyer intended to renovate and sell the property at a profit and, if so, whether lost profits were properly awarded here.[1] We shall conclude that although lost profits may be available in an appropriate case, lost profits were not properly awarded here, where the evidence showed the prospect of profits was uncertain, hypothetical and entirely speculative.
Defendant Donna Wong appeals from a judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff and respondent Greenwich S.F., LLC (Greenwich S.F.) $600,000 in lost profits, among other damages, on appellant's breach of a real property sales agreement between appellant and plaintiff Yui Hei Chan, Greenwich S.F.'s predecessor in interest.[2] Appellant contends the trial court applied an erroneous measure of damages by allowing recovery of lost profits as consequential damages under section 3306. She also contends the court erred (1) in admitting expert testimony as to the hypothetical value of the property if it had been renovated according to plaintiffs' plans; (2) in allowing the expert to testify as to new opinions regarding valuation dates to which the expert did not testify during her deposition; and (3) in instructing the jury that it could award lost profits. If lost profits may be recovered in an appropriate case, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the award in this case as (4) lost profits were not proved with reasonable certainty and the prospect of profits after renovation was hypothetical and speculative, and (5) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant knew plaintiffs intended to sell the property for a profit. Appellant also challenges (6) the award of $60,000 damages for sums plaintiffs had deposited into escrow, and (7) the award of $90,000 damages for funds plaintiffs expended toward the planned property renovation. Finally, should she prevail on appeal, appellant seeks reversal of the attorney fee award.

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of her husband following a trial at which she acted as her own attorney. The husband's body had been found in a cottage at their home, stabbed repeatedly. Defendant admitted the stabbing but testified she acted in self-defense.
Defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the jury panel after the prosecution was unable to explain its peremptory challenge of a female juror, erred in failing to give an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and should not have admitted her statements to police, which were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). In addition, defendant contends the court, prosecutor, and jury committed prejudicial misconduct in the course of the trial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the conviction.
During the proceedings, defendant executed a promissory note, secured by a lien against the family home, agreeing to reimburse the County of Contra Costa (County) for costs incurred in her defense. Following the trial, the County sought an order compelling defendant to reimburse those costs from the proceeds of the sale of her interest in the home. Although the trial court held a hearing with respect to the amount of reimbursable costs incurred by the County, it refused to consider whether defendant had the â€

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of her husband following a trial at which she acted as her own attorney. The husband's body had been found in a cottage at their home, stabbed repeatedly. Defendant admitted the stabbing but testified she acted in self-defense.
Defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the jury panel after the prosecution was unable to explain its peremptory challenge of a female juror, erred in failing to give an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and should not have admitted her statements to police, which were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). In addition, defendant contends the court, prosecutor, and jury committed prejudicial misconduct in the course of the trial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the conviction.
During the proceedings, defendant executed a promissory note, secured by a lien against the family home, agreeing to reimburse the County of Contra Costa (County) for costs incurred in her defense. Following the trial, the County sought an order compelling defendant to reimburse those costs from the proceeds of the sale of her interest in the home. Although the trial court held a hearing with respect to the amount of reimbursable costs incurred by the County, it refused to consider whether defendant had the â€

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of her husband following a trial at which she acted as her own attorney. The husband's body had been found in a cottage at their home, stabbed repeatedly. Defendant admitted the stabbing but testified she acted in self-defense.
Defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the jury panel after the prosecution was unable to explain its peremptory challenge of a female juror, erred in failing to give an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and should not have admitted her statements to police, which were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). In addition, defendant contends the court, prosecutor, and jury committed prejudicial misconduct in the course of the trial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the conviction.
During the proceedings, defendant executed a promissory note, secured by a lien against the family home, agreeing to reimburse the County of Contra Costa (County) for costs incurred in her defense. Following the trial, the County sought an order compelling defendant to reimburse those costs from the proceeds of the sale of her interest in the home. Although the trial court held a hearing with respect to the amount of reimbursable costs incurred by the County, it refused to consider whether defendant had the â€

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of her husband following a trial at which she acted as her own attorney. The husband's body had been found in a cottage at their home, stabbed repeatedly. Defendant admitted the stabbing but testified she acted in self-defense.
Defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the jury panel after the prosecution was unable to explain its peremptory challenge of a female juror, erred in failing to give an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and should not have admitted her statements to police, which were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). In addition, defendant contends the court, prosecutor, and jury committed prejudicial misconduct in the course of the trial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the conviction.
During the proceedings, defendant executed a promissory note, secured by a lien against the family home, agreeing to reimburse the County of Contra Costa (County) for costs incurred in her defense. Following the trial, the County sought an order compelling defendant to reimburse those costs from the proceeds of the sale of her interest in the home. Although the trial court held a hearing with respect to the amount of reimbursable costs incurred by the County, it refused to consider whether defendant had the â€

A modification decision.

Under the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (Cal-OSHA or the Act) (Lab. Code, § 6300 et seq.; all further unlabeled statutory references are to this code), employers are required to â€