CA Pub. Decisions

This case involves one of the most egregious types of juror misconduct. During deliberations, a juror performed an experiment at his home under conditions not subject to judicial oversight or cross-examination. He later reported the result, which was unfavorable to defendant, to his fellow jurors, who were struggling over a crucial issue in the case. The jury subsequently convicted defendant Kyle Jordan Vigil of shooting at an occupied dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246),[1] with a true finding that the crime was committed to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (hereafter § 186.22(b)(1)), an enhancement that earned him an indeterminate life sentence (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
Vigil was the driver of the car that was used to commit the charged crimes. The shooter, codefendant Joshua Lawrence Latham, was convicted by the same jury of the same offense and enhancement, as well as an additional count of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)).
Both defendants appeal. With respect to Vigil, Court shall reverse the judgment for prejudicial jury misconduct. With respect to Latham, Court find no reversible error and shall affirm.

Craig C. (Father), Elsie C. (Mother), and Christopher C. (Chris)[1] appeal from the juvenile court's visitation order. They contend the manner in which the order was crafted denies them visitation with the four youngest children and allege the juvenile court improperly delegated its power to order visitation. Court conclude that Chris's appeal must be dismissed. Finding no error in the court's order, Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Defendant and appellant Jimmy Sigala was convicted by jury of three counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).)[1] The jury found that defendant had substantial sexual contact with each victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) and committed an offense set forth in section 667.61, subdivision (c) against more than one victim.[2] Defendant admitted two prior convictions under the three strikes law. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive terms of 45 years to life.
In this timely appeal, defendant argues Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2008-2009) CALCRIM No. 1120, which defines the elements of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 for purposes of the continuous sexual abuse statute, erroneously advises the jury that the â€

In Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096 (Verdin), our Supreme Court held that the prosecution had no right to compel a mental examination of a defendant by a retained prosecution expert because such an examination is a form of discovery that is not authorized by statute or mandated by the Constitution. Here, we hold that a 2010 amendment to the California discovery law authorizes such a mental examination of a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). (Pen. Code,[1] § 1054.3, subd. (b), see also § 1027.)
Calvin Leonard Sharp petitions this court for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order of January 25, 2010, granting the People's motion for a mental examination by a prosecution-retained expert. The People's motion was granted by the trial court pursuant to section 1054.3, subdivision (b)(1), a provision in the California discovery law which became effective on January 1, 2010 (section 1054.3(b).) Court issued an alternative writ and real party in interest filed a return.

Penal Code section 134 makes it a felony to prepare false evidence with intent that it be produced "upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law."[1] Here, we conclude that the statute is violated by a probationer who prepares a false urine sample with intent to produce it to his probation officer during court-ordered drug testing. Court-ordered probation drug testing is an "inquiry . . . authorized by law" within the meaning of the statute. (Ibid.)
William Tyndall Morrison appeals from a judgment after conviction by jury of preparing false evidence in violation of section 134. The trial court sentenced him to eight months in state prison[2], suspended his sentence and granted him a five-year term of probation.
Appellant contends that section 134 does not apply to a probationer who provides a falsified urine sample to his probation officer if he provides it with intent to avoid a hearing. Alternatively, appellant contends that the trial court invaded the role of the jury when it instructed the jury that probation drug testing is an "inquiry authorized by law" and a probation revocation hearing is a "proceeding or inquiry authorized by law," within the meaning of the statute. Court affirm.

State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) petitions for writ of review pursuant to Labor Code section 5950[1] of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's opinion and order denying reconsideration of a joint supplemental findings and award. In that award, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found that lien claimant Carl Pearson, husband of applicant Francisca Apparicio, provided Apparicio with attendant care services 24 hours every day from July 24, 2003, and that Pearson was entitled to compensation for those services at $30 per hour. The total reimbursement to Pearson was $1,520,640. We conclude that Apparicio and Pearson's ex parte communications to a medical examiner violated the prohibition against ex parte communications in workers' compensation regulations. That violation requires disqualification of the medical examiner and the striking of the medical examiner's reports and testimony. We also conclude that the award of compensation to Pearson for caregiver services was unreasonable, was not authorized by section 4600, subdivision (a), and was not supported by substantial evidence. We annul the opinion and order denying reconsideration and order the matter remanded with directions to disqualify the medical examiner, to strike reports and opinions of the medical examiner, to select a new medical examiner, and to conduct proceedings to redetermine and recalculate compensation to be awarded lien claimant Pearson.

A former school district employee filed a petition for writ of traditional mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) to compel the district to reinstate him as a high school baseball coach. The primary issue in this case is whether the district had a mandatory duty under the Education Code to classify the petitioner as a â€

In the underlying action, appellant Jordy Ezequiel Ochoa was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)).[1] Prior to his trial, he sought discovery under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). After the jury in appellant's first trial was unable to reach a verdict on the charge, the trial court declined to revoke appellant's probation, and appellant was convicted of the charge after a second trial. Appellant contends that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the ruling on his probation barred the second trial; in addition, he requests this court independently review the in camera proceeding conducted pursuant to Pitchess, to determine whether the trial court improperly denied disclosure of discoverable information. We reject the contention regarding the application of collateral estoppel, and following a review of the in camera proceeding, find no error under Pitchess. Court therefore affirm.

California voters have a powerful tool, the ballot initiative, to make public policy. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (a) [â€

California voters have a powerful tool, the ballot initiative, to make public policy. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (a) [â€

Plaintiff Gina Holmes appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants Petrovich Development Company, LLC and Paul Petrovich in her lawsuit for sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, violation of the right to privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary adjudication with respect to the causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination, and that the jury's verdict as to the remaining causes of action must be reversed due to evidentiary and instructional errors. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Gina Holmes appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants Petrovich Development Company, LLC and Paul Petrovich in her lawsuit for sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, violation of the right to privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary adjudication with respect to the causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination, and that the jury's verdict as to the remaining causes of action must be reversed due to evidentiary and instructional errors. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Megan Kucker and Bonnie Alexander are successor trustees of the Mona S. Berkowitz Trust (the Trust). They filed a petition to confirm that shares of stock were an asset of the trust. (Prob. Code § 850, subd. (a)(3)(B); see also Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943.) The shares had been owned by the deceased trustor, Mona S. Berkowitz (Trustor). Appellants appeal from the probate court's order denying their petition. The probate court erroneously concluded that the Trustor's general assignment to the Trust of her personal property was ineffective to transfer the shares of stock to the Trust. Court reverse.